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Foreword
In the aftermath of  the global financial crisis, policymakers in many countries 
face considerable challenges in fostering sustained strong growth, price stability 
and financial stability. In general, economic recovery has been slow and inflation 
has stayed below accepted definitions of  price stability. In response, monetary 
policy has become increasingly accommodative, relying on unconventional 
policies, such as large-scale government bond purchases and negative interest 
rates in some countries. Yet there is broad agreement that there are limits 
to the scope of  monetary policy actions and their effectiveness. Sustainable 
growth and price stability will require a coherent, integrated policy strategy 
that also includes contributions from fiscal and structural policies – as well as 
appropriate policies to contain financial risks.  
This book contains the proceedings of  the high-level seminar on “Rethinking 
Monetary‒Fiscal Policy Coordination” organised by the Bank of  Slovenia 
and the International Monetary Fund on 19-20 May 2016 in Portorož, 
Slovenia. The seminar explored the thinking of  policymakers and academics 
on the roles and coordination of  monetary and fiscal policies in the European 
Union and elsewhere. Three main topics were taken up in separate sessions: (i) 
principles and practical experience in the coordination of  monetary and fiscal 
policies; (ii) fiscal policy implementation in the EU institutional framework 
and implications for monetary policy; and (iii) conducting monetary policy 
when fiscal space is limited.  
Speakers in the first session underscored that central bank independence is a 
cornerstone principle of  modern economic policymaking. Independence is 
critical for central bank credibility, which in turn is of  paramount importance 
for transmitting policy impulses to the economy. Independence also implies 
that monetary–fiscal policy coordination will be achieved with the monetary 
and fiscal authorities acting independently within their mandates. Participants 
recognised the potential advantages, in some circumstances, of  using fiscal 
policy to support the demand-stabilising efforts of  the central bank – but also 
emphasised associated practical risks. 
Participants in the second session noted that the EU’s fiscal policy framework 
aims to ensure that no individual member state runs excessive deficits or 
builds up excessive debts. The increase in public debt experienced by many 
European countries after the global financial crisis – brought on both by the 
deep recessions and the need to support their banking systems – constrains 
fiscal policy’s ability to assist in output stabilisation. That said, countries with 
fiscal space are well advised to use it as needed to assist monetary policy in 
closing the negative output gaps and raising potential growth. And even in 
countries without fiscal space, fiscal policy can still support growth by reducing 
distortionary taxes and unproductive or poorly targeted expenditure while 
increasing productive investment. 
Finally, the last seminar session explored the challenges of  conducting monetary 
policy when fiscal space is limited, and the special difficulties in the European 
context. Monetary policy has to fulfil its price stability mandate, keeping 
inflation close to target. With interest rates near zero, the substantial use of  
unconventional monetary measures to stimulate domestic demand has been 
appropriate. With such demand support, output gaps in Europe are gradually 
closing. To raise growth further, structural policies that raise investment, labour 
force participation and productivity need to pick up the torch. 
We are grateful to Biswajit Banerjee for taking primary responsibility for 
editing the proceedings of  the seminar. Our thanks also go to Marija Žiher 
for providing invaluable support in the preparation of  the manuscript, to 
Anil Shamdasani for excellent and swift handling of  its production, as well as 
to everyone who helped to make the seminar a success, in particular, Polona 
Flerin.
Tobias Adrian Boštjan Jazbec
Financial Counsellor & Director Governor
Monetary and Capital Markets Department Bank of  Slovenia
International Monetary Fund
Opening remarks
Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of  Slovenia
It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to the high-level seminar on 
“Rethinking Monetary‒Fiscal Policy Coordination” organised jointly by the 
Bank of  Slovenia and the International Monetary Fund. It is a great honour 
to have a very distinguished gathering of  central bank governors, senior 
officials of  governments and international institutions, leading academics 
and practitioners to discuss a very critical issue that occupies the minds of  
policymakers in the euro area and elsewhere.
The objective of  the seminar is to explore current thinking on the roles and 
coordination of  monetary and fiscal policies. The presentations and discussion 
will focus on three main themes: (i) the principles and practical experience in the 
coordination of  monetary and fiscal policies; (ii) fiscal policy implementation 
in the EU institutional framework and implications for monetary policy; and 
(iii) conducting monetary policy when fiscal space is limited.  I will now briefly 
touch on these themes in general terms.
Policymakers in the euro area face considerable challenges in fostering 
sustained strong growth, price stability and financial stability.  Following 
the onset of  the global financial crisis, economic recovery has been slow 
and growth remains lacklustre. Inflation is much below the medium-term 
objective of  lower than, but close to 2%. For some time now, inflation has been 
continually weaker than expected and market-based measures of  inflation 
expectations stand at historical lows. Therefore, monetary policy has become 
increasingly accommodative, relying on several non-standard measures and 
negative interest rate policy.
There is broad agreement that in the current setting there are limits to the 
scope of  monetary policy actions and their effectiveness for lifting the euro area 
economy. Concerns are mounting that the outlook may be one of  a prolonged 
period of  low inflation and low interest rates, which can adversely affect both 
the real and financial sectors. Therefore, many of  us have emphasised on 
numerous occasions that “monetary policy cannot be the only game in town”. 
Strong sustainable growth, price stability and financial stability will require 
a coherent, integrated policy strategy that also includes fiscal and structural 
policies.
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The message on the importance of  fiscal policy supporting monetary policy 
is founded on historical precedence. In 1936, prescribing the way out of  the 
Great Depression, Keynes wrote: 
“It seems unlikely that the influence of  [monetary] policy on the rate of  interest 
will be sufficient by itself.  I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive 
socialization of  investment will prove the only means of  securing an approximation 
to full employment.” 1 
These words are very relevant at the current juncture as well.
The ECB has emphasised that fiscal policies should support the economic 
recovery while remaining in full compliance with the EU’s fiscal rules. 
Otherwise, credibility in the fiscal framework cannot be maintained. A 
critical question, therefore, is whether the prevailing rules could be barriers 
to achieving the desired coordination of  monetary and fiscal policies.
There are two key prerequisites for obtaining effective fiscal support to monetary 
policy within the Stability and Growth Pact rules. Governments must have 
adequate fiscal space, and fiscal policy must ensure the sustainability of  public 
finances. In both respects, there appears to be little room for a meaningful 
fiscal expansion within the existing rules. There is broad agreement that the 
fiscal framework has failed to ensure long-term sustainability while avoiding 
procyclical fiscal behaviour. Countries did not build up sufficient fiscal space 
during the pre-crisis expansionary period, and fiscal space narrowed following 
the onset of  the financial crisis. Public debt increased sharply during the 
crisis years and the policy focus turned to an austerity mode when market 
pressures heightened. Most of  the euro area countries still face long-term 
fiscal sustainability issues and are expected to keep their fiscal consolidation 
efforts, in terms of  the cyclically adjusted deficit, ongoing. In 2016, only four 
countries – namely, Germany, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia – have fiscal 
space for additional discretionary measures according to the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules.
What then is the way forward? It has been emphasised on many occasions 
that for countries without fiscal space, fiscal policy can still support demand 
by altering the composition of  the budget. In particular, it has been pointed 
out that consideration should be given to cutting distortionary taxes and 
unproductive expenditure and to increasing investments that improve total 
factor productivity over the medium term. Investment and structural reforms 
that increase the growth potential of  the economy create fiscal space by raising 
future government revenues. It should be noted that some of  these measures 
1 Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan & Co., Chapter 24.
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will require political resolve and social support, as they are likely to affect social 
entitlements. Some analysts have remarked that these measures will not have 
much impact in the short term.
Should there be a rethinking of  the monetary policy framework? In a recent 
blog in April 2016, former Chairman of  the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, 
argued that: 
“under certain extreme circumstances - [such as] sharply deficient aggregate demand, 
exhausted monetary policy, and unwillingness of  [fiscal authorities] to use debt-
financed fiscal policies - [money-financed fiscal programs, colloquially known as 
helicopter drops] may be the best available alternative” and that “it would be 
premature to rule them out”.2
Earlier in this vein, in 2003, Bernanke had recommended that Japan fight 
deflation through an expansionary fiscal policy financed by permanent 
purchases of  government debt by the central bank. The permanency of  central 
bank purchases of  public debt rules out that the new debt will ever be placed on 
the market, thereby eliminating Ricardian equivalence effects and preventing 
new public debt accumulation.
However, an essential aspect of  money-financed fiscal programmes is that they 
involve revocation or suspension of  central bank independence. Precisely for 
this reason, and because governance of  money-financed fiscal programmes is 
inherently difficult (since it creates perverse incentives for legislators to facilitate 
tax cuts or spending when such actions no longer make macroeconomic sense), 
this option is not something that central banks in general are discussing or 
even considering. 
In the euro area, the principle of  central bank independence is one of  the 
cornerstones of  the economic policy constitution enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty. A fundamental expectation is that monetary–fiscal policy coordination 
will be achieved with different institutions acting independently within their 
mandates. To preserve this framework, the focus should be on improving the 
governance structure so as to ensure that the euro area does not gradually slide 
into a regime of  fiscal dominance. Within the constraint of  its given mandate, 
the ECB has moved towards improving the policy mix through the expansion 
of  its balance sheet aimed at stimulating economic activity. 
It is my sincere hope that the seminar will provide a useful springboard for 
moving forward with bolder policy actions and reforms that will help put the 
euro area on a path of  strong sustained growth and price stability.
2 www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/04/11/what-tools-does-the-fed-have-left-part-3-helicopter-money/.
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Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deputy Director, Research Department, 
International Monetary Fund3
Let me start by thanking Governor Jazbec and the Bank of  Slovenia for their 
hospitality. Let me also welcome you all on behalf  of  the IMF’s side of  the 
organising committee. It is a pleasure and a privilege to be at this high-level 
seminar with so many distinguished participants. 
I would like to discuss three inter-related issues that I am sure will be addressed 
in much greater detail in the seminar sessions today and tomorrow. My aim 
is more to ask questions than to provide answers, as I feel there are many in 
this room far more qualified than me to provide the latter. 
The first issue is central bank independence and how it came to be. I will discuss 
in general terms the idea that monetary policy can and should be delegated 
to a separate agency protected from short-term political pressures, and that it 
should be set independently from the fiscal stance.
The second issue is how the post-crisis experience has challenged this model. 
In particular, I will touch upon how the need to deviate from the pre-crisis 
consensus model has reignited pressures on central banks and potentially led 
to threats to their independence. 
Finally, I would like to reflect on the potential role for coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policy when there is limited fiscal space and conditions 
are close to a liquidity trap. In that context, I will briefly discuss “helicopter 
money”, on which I think my views are in line with those of  Governor Jazbec.
The pre-crisis consensus and central bank independence
During the 25 or so years before the crisis, we thought of  monetary policy as 
having one target (namely, inflation) and one instrument (namely, the policy 
rate). As long as inflation was stable, the output gap was likely to be small and 
stable and monetary policy did its job. We thought of  fiscal policy as playing 
a secondary countercyclical role, with political-economy constraints sharply 
limiting its usefulness. This is a bit of  a caricature, but not too far from the 
consensus view prevailing at the time. 
Looking at it in more detail, monetary policy had a simple mandate: price 
stability. Stable and low inflation was presented as the primary, if  not exclusive, 
target of  central banks (sometimes with output or unemployment as a secondary 
3 The views in this presentation are those of  the author and do not necessarily represent those of  the IMF, its 
management, or its Executive Board. 
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target). This was the result of  a coincidence between the reputational need of  
central bankers to focus on inflation rather than activity and their desire, at 
the time, to decrease inflation from the high levels of  the 1970s. 
This view also was rooted in a strong intellectual framework. First, there was 
a well-understood time inconsistency for fiscal authorities with the temptation 
to inflate public debt away, as in the Barro-Gordon model.4 Second, in the 
New Keynesian models, typically characterised by nominal rigidities as the 
only frictions, a divine coincidence emerged (as Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Gali 
called it)5 – the best monetary policy can do when facing demand shocks 
is to maintain inflation stable. In practice, this also meant low. This would 
automatically guarantee the lowest output gap, or the same level of  activity 
that would prevail in the absence of  nominal rigidities. 
Since we had a measurable target – the inflation rate – the central bank could 
be easily held accountable for its actions while at the same time it could be 
vindicated against undue criticism. For instance, the central bank could show 
after a tightening that the inflation rate was right below the target. Thus, 
it could more easily resist ex ante pressures to keep monetary policy on an 
excessively easy stance. 
There was also another simplification: a mono-dimensional and observable 
instrument – the policy rate. This simplification relied on two assumptions. 
First, what mattered were prices and interest rates and not the underlying 
monetary aggregates or liquidity. Second, well-functioning financial markets 
would transmit the monetary stimulus across the economy. So, all one needed 
to do was to move the policy rate and the entire economy would adjust 
accordingly. This also meant that the separation from the fiscal authorities 
could be strengthened through explicit limits on central bank action, such as 
no monetary financing of  the deficit. 
To summarise, the pre-crisis consensus framework allowed transparency, 
accountability and limits on central bank actions. This led to the delegation 
of  monetary policy, which became the primary macroeconomic countercyclical 
lever, to a politically acceptable non-elected agency. This was the foundation 
of  the operational independence of  central banks. 
4 Barro, R.J. and Gordon, D.B. (1983), “A Positive Theory of  Monetary Policy in a National-Rate Model”, Journal of  
Political Economy 91(4): 589–650.
5 Blanchard, O. and Gali, J. (2007), “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model”, Journal of  Money, Credit and 
Banking 39(S1): 35–65.
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In contrast, fiscal policy had a much more limited role from the cyclical point 
of  view. This was very different from earlier decades in which fiscal policy 
was the centre of  macroeconomic policy (for instance, as Governor Jazbec 
mentioned, in the wake of  the Great Depression).
There were several reasons for this limited role of  fiscal policy. First, there 
was widespread scepticism about the effects of  fiscal policy, mostly based on 
Ricardian equivalence arguments. This was combined with a sense that the 
leads and lags associated with the effects of  changes in the fiscal stance were too 
long and poorly understood for fiscal policy to be an effective countercyclical 
tool. Second, since monetary policy could maintain a small and stable output 
gap, there was little reason to use another instrument. Third, in several 
countries, the priority was to stabilise and possibly decrease typically high 
levels of  debt. Finally, fiscal policy was seen as highly exposed to risks of  
political interference.
Overall, at least until the global financial crisis, this macroeconomic policy 
setup was seen as a highly successful model. It was often credited for the Great 
Moderation and explains the prevalence of  inflation-targeting frameworks 
across advanced economies and, increasingly, in emerging market countries. 
Post-crisis needs led to new (yet old) mandates and new instruments 
With the onset of  the financial crisis, this model was challenged. Central banks 
had to do things that were very different from what they had been doing in the 
previous 25 years (but not that different when judged with a longer history in 
mind). For example, they provided liquidity to a variety of  agents – not only 
deposit-taking institutions but also other intermediaries, such as money market 
funds and insurance companies. They supported liquidity conditions in several 
asset markets and re-established and repaired broken arbitrage conditions. 
They also bought massive amounts of  sovereign bonds. 
These actions were necessary. They were justifiable both from a global welfare 
point of  view and under long-term inflation targeting (the so-called flexible 
IT framework), but they were dramatic deviations from what one was used to 
seeing central banks do. More generally, the realisation that a low and stable 
inflation rate was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for macroeconomic 
stability led to a re-evaluation of  the pre-crisis framework. 
If  central banks at times needed to do things that were much less transparent 
and much less measurable than changes in the policy rate, the political-
economy and governance conditions that had allowed for delegation became 
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subject to discussion as well. This does not mean that we should reconsider 
central bank independence, but it explains why central banks have seen an 
increase in political pressure in so many countries. 
Let me give an example. Think about macroprudential policy. Imagine 
that either the central bank or whatever specialised agency in charge of  it 
decides to tighten loan-to-value ratios because it sees leverage growing and 
is concerned about a potential crisis. If  no crisis materialises in the following 
year, all the critics are going to say: “See, you were paranoid. There were 
no reasons to tighten loan-to-value ratios. There is no problem. There is no 
financial instability.” Of  course, it may be that the crisis did not materialise 
exactly because the central bank or the macroprudential agency acted. But, 
the counterfactual is not observable and it is difficult, if  not impossible, to 
convince critics that a crisis outcome would have been the state of  the world 
in the case of  inaction. 
This is very different from what happens with inflation. In this case, the central 
bank could go out and say: “See, the inflation rate is at 1.9% and, if  we hadn’t 
tightened, we would be above target.” This vindicates the tough choice ex ante. 
Once we deviate from a simple price stability target, we have much murkier, 
less measureable and less observable mandates. Things are much more difficult 
to defend and, hence, there are more pressures on the central bank to act one 
way or another. 
This brings me to my next point: how monetary policy has to act sometimes 
in support of  the fiscal position of  a country, and how this again may muddy 
the mandate. As an example, consider the situation in Italy or Spain in 2009, 
2012 and 2014. From the fiscal sustainability point of  view, the fundamentals 
of  these countries cannot explain the wild swings in sovereign spreads. Instead, 
this can be ascribed to something akin to a Diamond–Dybvig-type bank run.6 
There is a liquidity component to stability in countries that are in a certain 
range of  the debt-to-GDP ratio, and this component needs to be addressed. So, 
what is the role of  monetary policy in this context? How can the central bank 
help in steering markets away from the bad equilibrium towards the good one? 
In that context, President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech7 played the role 
that deposit insurance plays in banking models. Essentially, Mr. Draghi was 
saying that the ECB was going to do whatever was needed in order to keep 
the euro together against the liquidity crisis. In doing so, the ECB averted the 
liquidity crisis altogether. Of  course, it is difficult to distinguish liquidity from 
6 Diamond, D.W. and Dybvig, P.H. (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”, Journal of  Political Economy 
91(3): 401–419.
7 www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
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solvency.  This raises the question of  what kind of  governance framework one 
should have to ensure that the necessary fiscal incentives are in place, once 
the central bank plays the role of  liquidity provider of  last resort on sovereign 
markets. 
Finally, I would like to touch very briefly on so-called helicopter money. I 
completely share Governor Jazbec’s view that the idea of  helicopter money 
is a valid one in a model where central bank credibility is not under threat. 
It removes public debt from the market. Since the debt will never have to 
be repaid, it is more effective than other forms of  fiscal financing under a 
Ricardian equivalence framework. However, there is a significant danger of  
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The baby here is the degree of  
central bank credibility that we have achieved over the past 30 years. To a large 
extent, this credibility is the result of  the governance framework for monetary 
policy and central bank independence adopted in the three decades before 
the global financial crisis. 
I would argue that central bank credibility has been of  paramount importance 
even after the crisis. It has been probably the main factor behind the lack of  
severe deflationary episodes. We have had very low inflation, but we have 
not seen major deflationary episodes after the crisis. Given the magnitude of  
economic contraction that we have witnessed in some countries, that is what 
I think any economist would have expected to happen. So, the question is 
how much would helicopter money buy you relative to a Nash equilibrium 
between the central bank and the fiscal authorities. In that model, the fiscal 
authorities would provide stimulus and the central bank, in its independence, 
would decide to set interest rates where it believed they should be, based on 
its mandate. This is essentially the current framework in most countries and 
is one that is best equipped to preserve central bank credibility. In terms of  
effectiveness, the difference is that hyper-Ricardian consumers would see the 
debt held at the central bank in the same fashion as debt held by the private 
sector. But we know (for example, from the experience of  Japan) that markets 
do not look at the two in the same way. So, the benefits of  helicopter money 
are likely to be very small and the potential costs in terms of  governance may 
be very large. 
I wish all of  us a wonderful conference.
Panel 1
The coordination of  monetary and fiscal policy – 
principles and practical experience
Chair
Nikolay Gueorguiev, Unit Chief, International Monetary Fund
Lead Speaker
Steven Phillips, Advisor, International Monetary Fund
Panellists
Jan Smets, Governor, National Bank of  Belgium
Lars Rohde, Governor, Danmarks Nationalbank
Dimitar Bogov, Governor, National Bank of  the Republic of  Macedonia
Nerses Yeritsyan, Deputy Chairman, Central Bank of  Armenia
Summary of  Panel 1
Nikolay Gueorguiev
The lead speaker, Steven Phillips, recalled the general evolution of  thinking 
of  policymakers on monetary policy and fiscal coordination over the past 50-
60 years. During the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, it was generally 
accepted that monetary and fiscal policies would work together, and that fiscal 
policy had an important role to play in stabilising output. The idea of  monetary 
policy being capable of, and sufficient for, handling stabilisation of  output as 
well as inflation came to prominence later in the 1990s and 2000s. This was 
combined with the view, held by many, that fiscal policy efforts should focus on 
avoiding excesses and ensuring sustainability – in other words, steering clear 
of  “fiscal dominance”. This thinking led to more independence for central 
banks and more constraints (e.g., rules) for fiscal policy. Today, post-global 
financial crisis, monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre and effectiveness are 
diminished, while fiscal policy is constrained by previously introduced fiscal 
rules and by a lack of  fiscal space, real or perceived. This situation has raised 
several questions and debates:
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• Should we now be more concerned about risks of  fiscal dominance, or about 
insufficient fiscal policy contribution to output and inflation stabilisation? 
How do we find the right balance? If  the risk of  fiscal dominance is really 
a problem, is there a way that we can address it more efficiently than with 
rules that are overly simplistic?
• With monetary policy engaged to the limit, exchange rate moves may 
be large. While the overall net effect of  a monetary easing on the output 
of  a country’s trading partners is likely to be positive, spillovers through 
exchange rate channels may cause certain strains.  Is this problematic? If  
so, is this an argument for also using fiscal easing, rather than just monetary 
easing, when countercyclical policy is needed?    
The panellists noted that the EU policy architecture envisaged that monetary 
and fiscal policies would pursue their assigned objectives without explicit 
coordination. In the current environment, however, most saw a need for 
fiscal policy coordination between the euro area member states to ensure 
that the desirable euro area fiscal stance is in place. They noted that small 
open economies usually followed the monetary policies of  their main trading 
partners, irrespective of  their formal monetary/exchange rate framework; 
thus, fiscal policy was their only instrument for smoothing cyclical fluctuations 
in output. The panellists emphasised, however, that a strong overall financial 
position of  the government was a prerequisite for a countercyclical fiscal 
stance in a downturn, as it allowed fiscal easing without harming public debt 
sustainability and the sovereign’s access to financing. They also warned of  the 
risk of  using monetary and fiscal policies in order to avoid necessary policy 
adjustments or structural reforms that would raise productivity and growth.  
During the subsequent discussion, the audience touched upon several issues: 
(i) Can we devise fiscal instruments that would have the same effect on the 
domestic economy as monetary policy easing? (ii) Fiscal policy easing may be 
necessary now, but how can we make it sustainable and avoid the issue of  fiscal 
dominance returning? (iii) What constraint does high public debt impose on 
stabilisation policies? (iv) What is the efficiency of  monetary policy at present 
in terms of  monetary transmission? (v) What are the benefits and costs of  
quantitative easing (QE), including for the financial sector as low interest rates 
adversely affect banks and insurance companies?
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The panellists’ responses included the following: 
i. Fiscal discipline strengthens economic confidence. Moreover, a rebalancing 
of  tax away from direct income taxes towards less distortionary taxes can 
be beneficial for growth and job creation. In addition, targeted long-term 
investments in infrastructure financed by very low interest rates can support 
domestic demand and raise productivity. 
ii. At present, the search seems to be for mechanisms to commit fiscal policy 
to medium-term solvency while allowing short-term flexibility so that it 
can also contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation. 
iii. High public debt does constrain the ability of  fiscal policy to provide 
stimulus, and there is no easy way to reduce debt quickly. In any case, 
debt reduction will require a significant structural reduction of  fiscal 
spending, the success of  which depends on the population’s willingness 
to bear sacrifices. 
iv. On the effectiveness of  monetary policy, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) facilitated credit expansion by improving borrowing conditions for 
companies and households, which resulted in stronger growth and higher 
inflation than otherwise. 
v. Regarding the impact of  QE on financial stability, low interest rates cause 
difficulties for banks, insurance companies and pension funds. However, 
if  monetary policy were to fail to achieve price stability and allow the 
economy to go into a prolonged period of  deflation and stagnation, the 
financial system would suffer even more, as long-term yields would remain 
low for a very long time. 
Presentations by Lead Speaker and panellists
Lead Speaker: Steven Phillips
It is a pleasure to be here today, to engage with this distinguished panel of  
policymakers and experts on the topic of  rethinking monetary and fiscal policy 
coordination. 
Let me start with a quick outline of  my remarks. I begin with the idea that 
for us to “rethink”, it is useful to first recall the history of  thought and its 
inspirations. After reviewing the main thinking of  the past 50 years or so, I 
will turn to two areas to talk about in more depth. One area is the problem 
of  conducting monetary policy in a context of  concerns about fiscal policy 
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excesses. The second area looks at some open economy aspects of  monetary 
and fiscal policy coordination, particularly exchange rate implications. Finally, 
I will suggest a few issues that panel members may want to discuss. 
To begin a stylised history of  thinking on monetary and fiscal policy roles 
and coordination, let us go back to the 1950s and 1960s, when the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system was in place. At that time, it was generally 
accepted that both monetary and fiscal policies were available tools to be put 
to work on the goal of  stabilising the economy. Why was this accepted? One 
reason, perhaps, is that in those days there was not so much concern about 
policy excesses or policy mistakes – the skill, benevolence and credibility of  
policymakers were taken for granted. In addition, when the Bretton Woods 
system of  fixed exchange rates was serving as a nominal anchor on the price 
level, it constrained monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre. So, there was not 
a sense that monetary policy was fully capable and unlikely ever to need help 
from fiscal policy. Since both monetary and fiscal policy tools could influence 
demand, why not use both, in a coordinated manner? 
A very different thinking had emerged by the 1990s and continued into the 
2000s. By then, a combination of  factors had led many to favour a specialisation 
of  monetary and fiscal policy roles and efforts to separate and also constrain 
both policies. One factor was that many more countries had flexible exchange 
rates following the end of  the Bretton Woods system. This made monetary 
policy more capable, as it had more freedom. There was a view among many 
economists that monetary policy instruments were sufficient for demand 
management goals, without need for help from a less agile, slow-to-move 
fiscal policy. Also, there was a growing belief  in the “divine coincidence” of  
output and inflation stabilisation goals.  
Moreover, there was more concern that monetary and fiscal policies could go 
very wrong, for example, if  policymakers yielded to inappropriate pressures. 
Most notably for our purposes, there was a fear of  fiscal policy excesses, even 
to the point of  “fiscal dominance”. There also was a concern that without clear 
policy mandates and accountability, the risks of  policy excesses would be high. 
Such risks were not just possibilities; they sometimes had materialised. There 
were cases where one could look back and say that inflation had become high, 
and judge that fiscal policy excess and monetary policy accommodation of  
this excess were to blame. However, I should note that not all experiences of  
excessive inflation can be attributed to slippage in fiscal discipline. 
Three other developments likely contributed to concerns about policy excesses. 
First, the expanding size of  the public sector in many economies gave rise 
to greater potential tensions between deficit financing and price stability. 
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Second, the deregulation of  domestic financial systems (the end of  the so-
called financial repression) made it less easy for a government to fund its deficit 
from the private sector, and correspondingly made financing from the central 
bank more attractive. Third, an opening of  the external capital accounts 
provided governments with a new source of  deficit financing – but not on an 
unlimited basis. When a government deficit is financed externally, there is risk 
of  a sudden stop, and even a reversal, of  net external financing. So, a new 
concern was that the new availability of  external financing would facilitate 
fiscal indiscipline for a while only to later end in an external financing crisis, 
a crash in output and perhaps an inflation‒depreciation spiral. 
Thus, there were plenty of  worries, especially about fiscal policy excesses. The 
worries were not only about inflation but also about large current account 
deficits and financial instability and crises, not to mention crowding-out of  
private-sector investment and limiting potential growth. Faced with all these 
concerns, one might conclude that the single most important job of  fiscal 
policy from a macroeconomic perspective was not to make things right, but 
to avoid doing harm. 
Such concerns fuelled policy and institutional changes that allowed less 
discretion for fiscal policy, with fiscal rules and constraints on public debt and 
deficits, and in some cases limits on direct central bank credit to government. 
We also saw important moves to clarify responsibilities and accountability of  
central banks, together with more independence for central banks and freedom 
to act within their mandate – the so-called constrained discretion of  inflation 
targeting. All these changes seemed logical steps to address the diagnoses that 
had motivated them. 
But, then came the global financial crisis. The crisis led to rethinking on many 
fronts, including a rethinking of  macro policy roles, as it gave rise to some 
special circumstances and problems for monetary and fiscal policy. Monetary 
policy found its room for manoeuvre reduced and its effectiveness diminished. 
It was hampered by the zero lower bound problem, and by the problem of  
damaged balance sheets reducing the transmission of  monetary policy. Then 
there was a concern that keeping interest rates “low for long”, while it might 
have a desirable stimulating effect in the short run, would lead to excessive 
risk taking and eventually to a crash and a worse outcome. In addition, for 
some countries, deploying their own monetary policy had ceased to be an 
option, as they no longer had their own currency or had chosen to adopt a 
currency board. 
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Meanwhile, the potential for fiscal policy to play a supportive role also 
diminished, as it was constrained in many cases by previously established fiscal 
rules and/or by a lack of  fiscal space. By the latter, I mean either policymakers’ 
own judgement that remaining fiscal space was negligible, or a judgement by 
financial markets that government debt had become very risky. 
Thus, we have had both monetary and fiscal policy being constrained and, 
with their effectiveness diminished, a recovery from the Great Recession that 
has been weaker than it would have been otherwise.  This raises the question 
of  whether the constraints on monetary and fiscal policy in the aftermath 
of  the global financial crisis could, and should, be relieved in some way, or 
whether that would be too risky. 
I want to focus on the question of  the role of  fiscal policy when monetary 
policy is constrained. In the current context, should we be more worried about 
an easing of  fiscal policy causing harm, or should we be more worried about 
fiscal policy not making a greater countercyclical effort?
Many debates about monetary and fiscal policy coordination and interaction 
come down to differing judgements of  the seriousness of  the risk of  fiscal 
dominance or of  a sudden loss of  confidence in public finances. Surely, we 
can all agree with the principle that sound, sustainable public finances are 
essential – a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for stability and 
economic welfare. The problem is that the concepts of  public sector solvency, 
sound finances and fiscal space are difficult to pin down in operational terms. 
We know that there must exist limits on fiscal deficit financing, but we do not 
know the precise limits. So, it is a matter of  judging the distribution of  risks 
and how close we are to a danger zone.
At times, financial markets seem to clarify the matter for us by stopping 
financing the deficit or financing it only at very high interest rates. However, we 
cannot count on markets to give us an early warning or to provide disciplinary 
pressure. Too often, it seems that markets do not provide pressure and then 
suddenly provide too much pressure, in a panic that is self-fulfilling. Considering 
that markets are prone to sudden switches, one may argue that a government 
should be extra careful to ensure it will not lose the confidence of  markets. 
But, how careful? One may also argue that during a panic, central banks 
should step in and support government debt, though some will worry that this 
undermines incentives for fiscal discipline. Similarly, regarding quantitative 
monetary easing that involves the purchase of  government debt, even if  that 
policy is chosen by an independent central bank and is motivated only by 
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its pursuit of  its inflation target, such purchases have the appearance of  the 
central bank doing a favour for the government. To some, this brings the risk 
that such generosity undermines incentives for fiscal discipline. 
As I have emphasised, the difficulty is that reasonable people can come to very 
different operational judgements on how policies should proceed because the 
true distribution of  policy risks is not known, and we perceive risks differently. 
In that light, we must ask what more could be done to make the picture 
of  fiscal solvency clear, and thus to avoid sudden deteriorations in market 
perceptions and jumps in the risk premium on public debt. We have to think 
hard about possible commitment devices that would credibly ensure the state 
of  future public finances without excessively constraining fiscal policy in special 
circumstances. 
Perhaps we can find ways to appropriately constrain monetary and fiscal 
policies, but at the same time let them have the room to ease at the right time 
without their action being misunderstood and triggering an unnecessary loss 
of  confidence. That doesn’t mean abandoning fiscal rules, but it may mean 
making them more complex – letting them give exceptions, say, when inflation 
is very much below target, when there is deflation, when there is a sizeable 
negative output gap or when the forecast from an independent, credible 
central bank is for a persistent negative output gap and deflation. Of  course, 
more complex fiscal rules could open up new areas for scepticism about their 
application (think, for example, of  disagreements about the output gap and 
rate of  growth of  potential output).  
Let me touch briefly on two exchange rate aspects of  monetary‒fiscal policy 
coordination and easing that are especially relevant now. One is that with 
diminished transmission of  monetary policy through domestic channels, an 
absence of  stimulating help from fiscal policy means more monetary easing, 
a lower interest rate for a longer period of  time, and so a larger effect on the 
exchange rate. Such currency effects are a normal part of  how monetary 
policy works, but there is a question of  how far they should go. Taking an 
international perspective, a policy mix in one country that leads to more 
currency depreciation than would some alternative mix may be a sensitive 
issue if  it diverts demand from other countries that may also have negative 
output gaps. A similar sensitive issue arises when, in the pursuit of  easing, 
monetary policy takes the form of  a central bank purchasing the debt of  
another country’s government. This can be perceived as a form of  foreign 
exchange market intervention, as it has a larger exchange rate effect than other 
forms of  monetary easing. Again, if  fiscal policy stimulus is not available, we 
will see greater monetary easing effort and large exchange rate effects. That 
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may be an acceptable outcome (particularly if  other economies are able to 
use their own monetary policy to offset spillover effects), or it may lead us to 
reconsider the constraints we have chosen to place on fiscal easing. 
In closing, I admit that I have raised many questions without providing concrete 
answers. Let me suggest several questions that the panellists might wish to take 
up. First, do we agree that concerns over fiscal dominance and credibility of  
public finances are a key issue in monetary‒fiscal policy coordination debates? 
If  such concerns are not overstated, are there ways that we could address 
them more efficiently than under current rules? Second, do we think that 
monetary policy spillovers to the exchange rate are very problematic? If  so, 
is this a reason to use fiscal policy easing more to take some of  the burden off 
monetary policy? Finally, on a subject I did not touch on – namely, the stability 
of  an economy’s financial system – do the lessons from the global financial 
crisis have implications for monetary‒fiscal policy coordination? 
Panellist 1: Jan Smets
I am honoured to participate in this seminar and want to thank the Bank 
of  Slovenia, the International Monetary Fund and, in particular, Governor 
Jazbec for having invited me.
When preparing my remarks, I also strolled through the literature on monetary 
and fiscal coordination, focusing on what it has to say about coordination in a 
monetary union. In contrast to Steven Phillips, I only went back as far as 1999 
where a paper by Chris Sims, the 2011 Nobel Laureate in Economics, drew 
my attention.1 Back then, Sims was already flagging the institutional gaps in 
the design of  EMU threatening the union’s long-term success. The title of  the 
paper is telling: “The precarious fiscal foundations of  EMU”. 
Sims derived his insights from a theoretical framework2 which explicitly 
incorporates monetary–fiscal interactions. This framework deviated from 
the economic paradigm of  the 1990s, which prescribed a strict separation 
between fiscal and monetary policy. This was prompted by the belief  that the 
1 Sims, C.A. (1999), “The Precarious Fiscal Foundations of  EMU”, De Economist 147(4): 415-436.
2 This unconventional perspective is labelled “the fiscal theory (or more descriptively, the real theory) of  the price 
level”. This theory grew out of  the following work: Leeper, E.M. (1991), “Equilibria under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies”, Journal of  Monetary Economics 27(1), 129-147; Sims, C.A. (1994), “A Simple Model for 
Study of  the Determination of  the Price Level and the Interaction of  Monetary and Fiscal Policy”, Economic Theory 
4(3): 381 399; Woodford, M. (1995), “Price-Level Determinacy without Control of  a Monetary Aggregate”, Carnegie 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 43: 1-46; and Cochrane, J.H. (1998), “A Frictionless View of  U.S. Inflation”, 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 13: 323-384.
Panel 1: The coordination of  monetary and fiscal policy – 
principles and practical experience
 
17
main interaction between the two policy domains was in the form of  attempts 
by the fiscal authority to get the central bank to finance government debt. A 
belief  that is still widely present today, but that needs nuancing.
This conventional view inspired the institutional set-up of  the euro area 
whereby an independent central bank at the union level focuses primarily 
on price stability for the area as a whole, while national fiscal policies ensure 
sound public finances in each country. Each authority alone should take care 
of  its assigned objective, without relying on or needing a helping hand from 
the other. In order to constrain fiscal free-riding incentives that arise in a 
monetary union, disciplining fiscal rules were even put into law. They entail 
the prohibition of  monetary financing of  public debt, a no-bailout clause and 
deficit and debt rules.3 EMU architects thus put everything to work to ensure 
a maximum degree of  monetary dominance.
During the pre-crisis period, the Eurosystem indeed delivered on its price 
stability mandate. In contrast, national compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules was far from perfect. Nevertheless, this did not appear to 
have impacted the Eurosystem’s stabilisation role.
The crisis altered this view. Not only did it teach us that strict compliance 
with rules is necessary, but also that for policies to be effective, they require 
an appropriate response from other policies, especially in exceptional 
circumstances. We need to let policies have the room to do the right thing at 
the right time for the right reason. This may be even more true for countries in 
a monetary union. In what follows, I will illustrate two areas where the original 
design of  EMU limited the synergies between policies, making members more 
vulnerable to adverse shocks.
First, euro area countries effectively issue real instead of  nominal debt, making 
them more susceptible to shocks which can have feedbacks on monetary policy. 
Indeed, governments no longer issue debt in their own currency but in euros, 
over which they have no direct control. Consequently, in the absence of  an 
inflation cushion, the only option available to resolve unsustainable debt is 
outright default. Possibly based on the strong principles enshrined in the Treaty, 
markets assumed the Eurosystem had no role to play in sovereign insolvency 
and was expected not to act as lender of  last resort in the government bond 
market – a function that a central bank in a stand-alone country implicitly does 
assume. This made countries, possibly even those with sound public finances, 
prone to self-fulfilling market expectations that threatened to turn a sovereign 
liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis. 
3 See Articles 123, 125 and 126(2) to (14) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union; the latter also 
reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact.
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Figure 1: Government bond yields and spreads versus the German bund
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The euro sovereign debt crisis has taught us this the painful way. Fiscal 
fundamentals for the union as a whole were certainly no worse than those 
for other major advanced economies, but its borrowing costs were clearly 
higher as self-fulfilling market panic was allowed to gain footing. True, debt 
sustainability concerns were justified for some members, but certainly not for 
all those under pressure. In 2012, with the Outright Monetary Transactions 
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(OMT), the Eurosystem provided a backstop for government funding, breaking 
down the vicious circle between market expectations and government debt 
dynamics.
Let me be clear: OMT is not enough. Safeguarding long-run solvency requires 
decisive action by governments. In general, and as already accounted for in 
the original EMU design, a governance framework that ensures sound fiscal 
policies is needed. I therefore count on the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact to deliver better results than its predecessor.
Let me now turn to a second fragility of  the original design of  EMU, namely, 
the lack of  coordination among fiscal policies of  individual member states 
and its repercussions for the conduct of  monetary policy. 
During and in the aftermath of  the sovereign debt turmoil, several euro area 
countries were forced to quickly undertake fiscal consolidation which was not 
compensated by fiscal loosening in other countries, making the area-wide fiscal 
stance weigh on domestic demand. Since the strengthened fiscal governance 
framework places a dominant emphasis on individual countries’ fiscal discipline 
rather than on area-wide business cycle stabilisation, this left monetary policy 
as the key player for macroeconomic stabilisation, requiring the Eurosystem 
to resort to hitherto unseen stimulus measures. That may be one reason why 
the recovery has been lacklustre so far. Hence the observation, in line with 
that of  Steven Phillips, that fiscal policy probably has a bigger role to play in 
stabilisation than was originally acknowledged by the Stability and Growth 
Pact.
However, one should not be too pessimistic in this regard, because the fiscal 
rules do allow for some support to aggregate demand. First, when interest rates 
fall, governments’ interest expenses fall as well, implying that there is more 
room for fiscal expansion before the headline deficit limit is crossed. Indeed, 
the framework uses headline balances and not primary balances. Second, on top 
of  that, the fiscal requirements are formulated in structural terms, implying 
that the economic cycle is taken into account and less fiscal effort is required 
during recessions.
Moreover, some improvements to the framework have been introduced and are 
to be welcomed. In 2015, by introducing its famous “matrix”, the European 
Commission allowed for more flexibility in the rules, leaving more leeway for 
fiscal policy regarding stabilisation. With this increased flexibility, we should 
now of  course guard against the risk that those who cannot afford spend it, 
while those who can afford it do not. The “cannot” group is large and not 
only limited to countries that have been severely affected by the crisis. A case 
in point is Belgium, where high legacy debt leaves no room for embarking 
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upon fiscal stimulus. Instead, intelligent adjustment towards its medium-term 
budgetary objective is required and aimed for. This again highlights the careful 
balance between stabilisation and debt sustainability that fiscal authorities 
need to strike.
This brings me to a more specific, yet related aspect of  the current framework 
that can be improved: its narrow focus on national fiscal stances, leaving the 
aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area undetermined. To improve welfare 
for the union as a whole, it seems preferable that not only monetary but also 
aggregate fiscal policy be determined at the euro area level. Especially when 
monetary policy is constrained, there appears to be a premium in coordination 
and better balanced fiscal actions. 
Figure 2: Structural fiscal balances and medium-term objectives (% of  GDP) 
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One should not be too pessimistic in this regard either, as here also we see new 
initiatives that I applaud. By coordinating national fiscal councils, the newly 
created European Fiscal Board4 is taking a first step towards tackling this issue.
4 The European Fiscal Board was established in October 2015, in line with recommendations in the Five Presidents’ 
Report, and became operational in October 2016.
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To conclude, I would like to underscore that we have to look beyond the 
negative consequences of  monetary–fiscal interactions emphasised by the 
conventional macro view, and acknowledge the positive spillovers that both 
policy domains could have on each other. Both could enable each other to 
better realise their specific objective, especially when one policy is constrained. 
Fortunately, institutional gaps in the euro area are beginning to be addressed, 
acknowledging the subtle interactions between monetary and fiscal policy and 
hence allowing for a more optimal policy mix in which monetary dominance 
remains key. 
Panellist 2: Lars Rohde
Denmark is the odd case out because of  the fixed exchange rate regime that 
it followed. Let me elaborate on this.
Monetary and fiscal policy in Denmark
Since the early 1980s, Denmark has conducted a fixed exchange rate policy, 
first against the Deutsche mark and since 1999 against the euro (Figure 1, top 
panel). Over time, linking the Danish krone to the euro created a basis for 
achieving the same level of  inflation and inflation expectations in Denmark 
as in the euro area. If  inflation is higher in Denmark than in the euro area, 
Denmark’s competitiveness will, all other things being equal, deteriorate.
This is well understood by both labour unions and employers’ associations. The 
fixed exchange rate policy has therefore helped to achieve wage agreements 
that have supported Denmark’s competitiveness.
As the exchange rate is fixed, large current account imbalances are corrected 
by the relative wage growth in Denmark and abroad. The present large Danish 
current account surplus gives room for larger wage increases in Denmark 
relative to abroad. 
The fixed exchange rate policy implies a clear distribution of  responsibilities 
between monetary and fiscal policies. Monetary and exchange rate policies are 
aimed at keeping the krone stable vis-à-vis the euro (Figure 1, bottom panel), 
while any specific need to stabilise cyclical fluctuations in Denmark is handled 
via fiscal policy or other economic policies.
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Figure 1: Denmark: Exchange rate and policy interest rate
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Fiscal policy has to be disciplined and sustainable
Going into an economic downturn, the initial position of  the public budget 
has to be so strong that, inter alia, the automatic stabilisers can take full effect 
without jeopardising long-run sustainability. This is a precondition for fiscal 
policy to be able to stabilise cyclical fluctuations. Furthermore, it is crucial that 
financial markets have confidence in fiscal policy. Hence, in Denmark it is very 
important that fiscal policy is both disciplined and sustainable. 
Denmark has strong public finances (Figure 2) achieved through, inter alia, 
a budget law and medium-term fiscal plans. The fixed exchange rate policy 
has probably helped in achieving this, as politicians cannot rely on monetary 
policy to correct lax fiscal policy.
Figure 2: Denmark: Fiscal balance and public debt  
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An independent monetary policy is not a necessary condition for 
achieving stability
When comparing Denmark with euro area countries or countries similar to 
Denmark outside the euro area (such as Sweden), there is nothing indicating 
that the Danish economy has performed worse with respect to the stability of  
output and inflation (Figure 3). This is in part because the Danish business cycle 
is to a large extent synchronous with that of  the euro area. Furthermore, fiscal 
policy in Denmark reacts quickly to shocks through large automatic stabilisers.
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Figure 3: Output gap and inflation in Denmark and Sweden
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So, an independent monetary policy is not a necessary condition for achieving 
stability. However, it is required that other policies – i.e., fiscal – are disciplined 
and sustainable. 
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The loss of  flexibility in a fixed exchange rate regime is probably 
minor for small open economies
Advanced small open economies such as Denmark and Sweden are strongly 
influenced by the world economy, especially the euro area. Studies, such as 
those from the Bank for International Settlements, have shown that the policy 
rates of  small open economies follow those of  the euro area and the United 
States more closely than can be explained by output gaps and inflation (i.e., 
the Taylor rule) (Figure 4).  One reason could be that large currency shocks 
can create financial stability issues, for example if  a country has large liabilities 
in a foreign currency that are not hedged.
So, in practice, for small open economies “inflation targeting” and “fixed 
exchange rate policy” lead to very similar monetary policy.  Consequently, the 
loss of  monetary policy flexibility in a fixed exchange rate regime is probably 
small – or at least smaller than is predicted by textbook theoretical models.
Figure 4: Monetary policy rates in selected small advanced open economies 
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Panellist 3: Dimitar Bogov
Macedonia, similarly to Denmark, has its exchange rate pegged to the euro, 
having previously been pegged to the Deutsche mark. The country has pursued 
this policy from 1995 onwards, and since a one-off devaluation in 1997, the 
exchange rate has been stable. Of  course, we have been challenged several 
times, but successfully overcame these challenges. I like what Lars Rohde 
said, as it is in line with the view that I very often express in Macedonia: for 
small open economies, it doesn’t matter whether the monetary framework 
is inflation targeting or an exchange rate peg. In the end, you have to have 
the same prudent policies. Otherwise, although the transmission channels 
may be different, the outcome will always be the same. If  you have upward 
pressures on the foreign exchange market, eventually you will end up with 
higher interest rates – regardless of  whether you achieve this through exchange 
rate depreciation or through interest rate increases to defend the exchange 
rate. Maybe the large economies have a choice, but small economies do not 
have much freedom in choosing the right monetary policy. 
What is the experience of  Macedonia regarding the coordination of  monetary 
and fiscal policies? An exchange rate peg means having a constraint on 
monetary policy.  In the case of  Macedonia, it is not a full constraint because 
the “impossible trinity” is not present, since we do not have capital mobility for 
various reasons. One reason is that the capital account still has some restrictions; 
but more importantly, in my opinion, it is the general political instability of  
the country which is not very favourable to capital inflows. Constraints to 
capital inflows enable some degree of  independence to monetary policy in a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Anyway, it is fiscal policy that should take on the 
burden of  adjustment when one has an exchange rate peg. This means that 
fiscal policy must be disciplined. When we analyse the 19 years from 1994 
to 2012, we find that in half  of  these years fiscal policy was countercyclical, 
while in the other half  it was procyclical. When we look at dominance, whether 
fiscal or monetary, we find that in and around the years Macedonia suffered 
shocks – 2001, when we had an internal security crisis; and 2008, when the 
global financial crisis started – we had fiscal dominance. Otherwise, fiscal policy 
was quite disciplined, especially in the period before 2001. Maybe it helped 
that Macedonia always had some arrangements with the IMF, and that the 
exchange rate peg pushed fiscal policy to be very disciplined. Before 2001, 
fiscal policy was subordinated to monetary policy, supporting the stability of  
the peg. In 2001, this was disturbed as other priorities emerged. After fiscal 
stabilisation in 2003, however, coordination of  monetary and fiscal policy 
was restored and fiscal policy supported the exchange rate peg and monetary 
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policy. It should be noted that before 2008, fiscal deficits in Macedonia were 
very small – the country’s budgets were always either balanced or had a deficit 
of  no more than 1% of  GDP. 
Before 2008, when the economy was booming, the government made two 
decisions – one favourable and one not so. The first decision was to reduce the 
tax burden, with corporate tax and income tax rates reduced substantially to 
10%. Social contributions (the tax wedge) were also reduced. This appeared 
to be very beneficial after the crisis. The unfavourable development was that 
the windfall in the budget at that time tempted the government into spending 
more on higher public sector salaries, more generous pensions, increased social 
welfare and higher subsidies for farmers. At that time, this did not place a 
burden on the budget because it was in surplus. However, after 2008–2009 
when there was a sharp deceleration in capital flows and foreign trade and GDP 
also declined, a shortfall in the budget emerged. Fortunately, fiscal policy did 
not reverse the action on taxes, and this proved to be supportive for businesses 
and the economy after 2009. There also was room for fiscal stimulus in 2009. 
Because budget deficits had historically been low, public debt was extremely 
low (at around 23% of  GDP), creating the space for fiscal stimulus. Hence, 
fiscal policy supported economic growth in Macedonia after the onset of  the 
global financial crisis in 2008. However, fiscal stimulus worsened the public 
finances, and public debt rose very quickly to the current level of  45% of  
GDP – public debt has thus doubled in seven years. 
Monetary policy had to take the opposite stance: it had to tighten. First, 
because in 2009 Macedonia had to defend its exchange rate through very high 
interest rates. Once the situation stabilised and as economic growth picked 
up and the external balance was restored, monetary policy was loosened. It 
remained in this loosening cycle until early May 2016. Why was this possible? 
Because there were structural changes in the economy and the balance-of-
payment position improved substantially thanks to policies aimed at attracting 
foreign direct investment. The policy rate of  the central bank was reduced 
to an historically low level of  3.25%. At that time, many asked why the rate 
could not be lowered to 0%, as the ECB had done. We could go close to zero 
if  fiscal policy were more balanced, but in a context in which fiscal deficits 
since 2008 had been between 3% and 4%, monetary policy had to keep the 
balances in the economy. So 3.25% is Macedonia’s “zero lower bound”. We 
have to have this spread vis-à-vis the ECB’s policy rate in order to preserve 
the exchange rate peg. 
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The lesson from this is that when you have disciplined fiscal policy and there 
is fiscal space, fiscal policy can support the economy when it is faced with a 
shock without endangering monetary policy. Monetary policy could tighten if  
necessary, but not by much. If  the fiscal space were exhausted, however, then 
support from fiscal policy would be very difficult. Now we are wondering what 
will happen if  Macedonia is hit by another shock. Fiscal policy has no room 
for expansion – our debt level is over 45%, and our limit is obviously much 
lower than that of  the euro area countries. 
Panellist 4: Nerses Yeritsyan
The objective of  monetary and fiscal policies is to achieve stable/sustainable 
and non-inflationary economic growth. I agree with the lead speaker, Steven 
Phillips, that the dominant issue in monetary–fiscal coordination is gauging and 
managing the risk of  fiscal indiscipline, especially when the objectives of  fiscal 
policy become solving problems of  unsustainable budget deficits and debt. 
The ultimate objective of  both policies is to maximise the overall welfare of  
society, which can be achieved by keeping inflation low and employment at 
its potential level. Economic theory suggests that these two objectives are not 
mutually exclusive. Thus, strict adherence to “separation of  powers” in the 
management of  the economy will cause degeneration in the economy as fiscal 
and monetary authorities genuinely and rigorously pursue their own selfish 
objectives. This may result in serious economic distortions even if  accidentally, 
or randomly, fiscal and monetary authorities are achieving or are close to 
achieving their objectives. 
It is true that in the last couple of  decades, countries have built up space for 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies by following prudent fiscal and 
debt sustainability policies. This space is quickly disappearing, however, and 
should be reassessed and not used to postpone necessary adjustment and 
structural reforms in the economy. Fiscal space should not be used to finance 
growing pension bills instead of  implementing pension reforms, and monetary 
space should not be used for keeping interest rates too low for too long in order 
to rescue a dead or non-competitive private sector. History has shown how 
costly these delays can become.    
Fiscal policy is a stricter constraint on monetary policy due to its lower agility. 
However, in the current globalised world with a growing number of  open 
economies, monetary policy is also constrained by exchange rate and capital 
account volatility. The latter should also become a constraint for fiscal policy in 
open economies, especially when the fear of  floating is not overcome. For much 
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of  the past three decades, fiscal policy remained a major concern for monetary 
policy in emerging market economies. Unsustainable fiscal deficits and public 
debt levels created the prospect of  fiscal dominance in many countries, leading 
to high and volatile inflation, a fear of  floating and elevated risk premia on 
government debt. Unfavourable exchange rate dynamics – linked to weak fiscal 
and monetary policy credibility, low levels of  financial development and a high 
degree of  dollarisation – exposed emerging market economies to destabilising 
capital flows and high exchange rate pass-through. The consequence was that 
both fiscal and monetary policies tended to be procyclical in many countries, 
accentuating rather than dampening economic volatility.
The relationship between fiscal policy and interest rates is another aspect of  
fiscal and monetary policy interaction. The impact of  fiscal policy on interest 
rates depends on whether the private sector is Ricardian or non-Ricardian. In 
a Ricardian world, fiscal deficits and debt have no consequences for interest 
rates, as the private sector saves the full extent of  discounted tax liability 
implied by an increase in the fiscal deficit. In a non-Ricardian world, however, 
changes in fiscal deficits can lead to changes in interest rates. The classical 
mechanism is the “crowding-out” hypothesis, where higher fiscal deficits, with 
an unchanged money supply, lead to higher interest rates. In economies with 
fiscal dominance and a reliance on foreign credit, the mechanism that prevails 
is worsening default risk premia on government debt. If  debt levels are too 
high, a country may find itself  in a sudden stop or constrained in adopting 
expansionary policies, as it may experience higher sovereign risk premia and 
volatility in its costs of  financing. 
This increase in risk premia and volatility in the exchange rate create financial 
stability issues. In this case, monetary policy should deal with fiscal as well as 
financial-sector dominance as policy constraints. The lesson learned from the 
recent crisis is that central banks may serve as a first line of  defence – including 
providing initial liquidity or rescue packages to banks – but experience has 
shown that if  this is instead of  countercyclical fiscal policies, it only delays the 
crisis and eventually fiscal policy should deal with consequences in more severe 
way. We have done a simulation analysis for small open and fragile economies 
which shows that some degree of  temporary exchange rate management 
is necessary during economic turbulence driven by external shocks, which 
suggests more active fiscal policy or less fiscal constraint on monetary policy. 
Finally, before I talk about the Armenian experience, one aspect of  monetary 
and fiscal interaction that was overlooked and in my opinion should receive 
our attention is the local currency government debt market attracting 
international capital. In emerging market economies, local government debt 
markets are well developed compared to other local financial markets, but 
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they are underdeveloped compared to advanced economies. Governments 
have become complacent in addressing this issue as access to foreign currency 
debt becomes easier. Therefore, the target should be not only financing the 
deficit, but also developing a domestic savings pool as well as the appropriate 
infrastructure for attracting foreign saving into local currency instruments. In 
this case, fiscal and monetary authorities in open market economies will have 
more space to counteract sudden shocks. I hope at some point somebody will 
propose a multicurrency global trading platform with a centralised clearing 
and settlement system.      
In Armenia, fiscal rules and formal coordination procedures between the 
government and the central bank play an important role. The Central Bank of  
Armenia (CBA) implemented an inflation-targeting policy framework in 2006 
(with a target of  4 ± 1.5%), which has developed over time with help from the 
IMF and colleagues from the Czech National Bank. The current government 
debt level is moderate and there is no direct central bank financing, indicating 
the absence of  fiscal dominance in the usual sense. A debt-to-GDP ceiling of  
50% of  the previous year’s GDP has been officially set as a fiscal rule under 
the Law of  the Republic of  Armenia on the Budgetary System, and this is 
well implemented. The rule has survived two major shocks in the past decade. 
Monetary and fiscal policy coordination takes place on institutional, operational 
and debt-management levels. The CBA acts as a fiscal and payment agent 
of  the government, in accordance with a series of  formal agreements and 
government decisions. Relations between the CBA – as a financial agent of  
the government – and the Ministry of  Finance are not regulated under a single 
formal agreement but rather in separate agreements dealing with specific 
issues. Furthermore, additional guidelines have been issued separately, for both 
the CBA and Ministry of  Finance staff, on how to implement the agreements 
in each institution. 
Monetary policy operations are formally separated from debt-management 
transactions. The CBA has full independence in implementing its monetary 
policy and does not interfere in the issuance program of  government securities. 
If  not satisfied, the CBA has the right and power to issue its own securities. The 
cash flow forecasts produced by the Public Debt Management Department 
are currently shared with the CBA on a weekly basis, which helps to manage 
day-to-day liquidity effectively. 
The CBA also provides an official opinion on the main government programmes 
– such as the strategic development programme, the medium-term expenditure 
programme, the annual budget law and the debt-management programme 
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– and on tax and expenditure polices. The CBA is required to provide an 
independent opinion on the state budget-related hearings in the Parliament, 
which is discussed during the presentation of  the annual state budget law.
Formal coordination and information-sharing between the CBA and the MoF 
take place throughout the year. There are eight meetings per year for interest-
rate setting, where monetary policy is discussed and where the Ministry of  
Finance is represented by the Deputy Minister as an observer. There are also 
weekly meetings attended by both institutions: on Thursdays at the Ministry 
of  Finance to monitor budget execution and cash forecasts, and on Fridays 
at the CBA for monetary policy coordination. Furthermore, there are daily 
phone conversations between CBA and Ministry of  Finance staff and daily 
informal meetings take place at the CBA during which participants discuss 
relevant issues of  the day. 
Overall, this policy coordination framework has served Armenia well, especially 
during the recent global and regional crises. After the recent oil crisis, Armenia 
emerged with the lowest inflation (negative), the highest growth (3.5%) and 
most stable currency exchange rate (14% adjustment). The financial sector 
also showed great resilience and built up its capital buffers, driven by the CBA’s 
decision at the end of  2014 to increase the minimum capital requirement from 
5 billion drams to 30 billion drams (US$60 million).
In conclusion, coordination between monetary and fiscal policies remains a 
major policy goal and neither of  these policies should have dominance over 
the other. A temporary departure from this rule might be necessary, but only 
to counteract temporary shocks and support reform-driven structural change 
processes. With the current dual objective of  both monetary and financial 
stability, fiscal policy becomes an even more important constraint for monetary 
policy and, if  ignored, it could lead to a hard landing with a larger cost 
to taxpayers. In this context, deepening and globalising local currency debt 
markets would improve policy coordination and allow more space for effective 
and harmless countercyclical policies. 
General discussion
Nikolay Gueorguiev: Let me pose a question to the panellists before we take 
some questions from the audience. Monetary policy in Europe, the United 
States and elsewhere has already done a lot to stabilise output and keep 
inflation on target. However, senior policymakers everywhere have repeatedly 
warned that success in this endeavour to stabilise output and inflation requires 
support from other policies as well. So, in the panellists’ view, what role should 
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fiscal policy in the EU play in light of  its own constraints? More generally, 
what is the best feasible monetary‒fiscal policy mix in the EU in the current 
circumstances? I am pleased that we have diverse representation on the panel 
from countries in the euro area, in the EU and outside the EU. Sometimes, 
an outside view can also be very helpful. 
Jan Smets: It is a very good question. I would say three things. 
First, I think that monetary policy should do what it ought to do. In the euro 
area, we have a clear price-stability mandate entailing medium-term inflation 
of  close to but below 2%. We should do whatever is necessary to meet this 
mandate, independent of  what is happening elsewhere. In the current situation, 
it is really important to continue to achieve the inflation objective as it would 
enhance the efficiency of  our monetary policy. Given the zero lower bound, 
it would facilitate the rebalancing of  competitive positions within the euro 
area and it would help bring down debt positions that are still very high in 
some segments of  the euro area economy. Indeed, the current close to zero 
or even negative inflation rates in the member countries contribute to rising 
debt positions in real terms, which weighs on the recovery. So, in order to exit 
from this very problematic situation we should do our job and we are doing it. 
What we are not doing though, is favours for the government – quantitative 
easing (QE) is not a sign of  fiscal dominance. On the contrary, it is a reflection 
of  our independence. It is a demonstration that we are in full control of  our 
actions. Once policy interest rates approached their effective lower bound, we 
decided on QE measures because we considered them absolutely necessary. 
However, I recognise that, given the incomplete nature of  the economic and 
monetary union, the asset purchase programme was designed such that it takes 
into account the need for protection of  the ECB and the need to keep fiscal 
incentives in place. I am referring to the limited loss sharing, to the allocation of  
the programme across countries according to the ECB’s capital key, and so on. 
Second, it is clear that the efficiency of  monetary policy will be strongly 
enhanced if  other policies were to help. When I was a student, my professor 
used to say – and students present here perhaps have already heard the same 
saying – that monetary policy can lead a horse to water but cannot make 
it drink. With our monetary policy measures, we are doing just that: giving 
incentives to the private sector to consume and invest. However, in order 
to make the corporate sector invest, you need returns on capital and banks 
that are sound. You need a stable framework in fiscal terms and renewed 
structural policies that enhance economic and job growth. That is the task 
for governments. That is why the president of  the ECB is calling on others 
to do their duties.
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Third, I have two messages on the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy. First, in normal times, at the national level, countries have to stick 
to the Stability and Growth Pact. This would give fiscal policy the room to 
stabilise the economy in bad times. Indeed, the recovery in euro area member 
states would have been smoother if  fiscal policies had more room to actively 
contribute to it. In this way, both monetary and fiscal policy would stimulate 
the economy. Unfortunately, only a few countries in the euro area currently 
possess this margin for manoeuvre. In my own country, Belgium, the margin 
is not there: we still have a public debt of  106% of  GDP. Hence, in order 
for fiscal policy to regain its stabilisation function and to restore confidence, 
adherence to the fiscal rules is crucial. You cannot convince people to invest 
when Ricardian equivalence is playing, when people fear higher taxes in 
the future to repay public debt you are incurring today. So, the first job is 
to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact rules. The second job, as I 
already mentioned earlier during my presentation, entails completing the EMU 
framework. Besides monitoring and correcting national fiscal stances, we also 
need to pay more attention to how these add up to the fiscal stance of  the 
euro area as a whole.  Better coordination of  national fiscal policies would 
result in a more appropriate fiscal stance for the union. In turn, this would 
facilitate the exchange of  views on the best combination of  the monetary and 
the fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole. For this to be possible, however, 
you ultimately need greater fiscal responsibility at the union level. 
Lars Rohde: I think it is a very difficult question. I am not sure I am in a 
position to give good advice on that. One has to recognise that there are 
boundaries for the impact of  monetary policy. To echo what Governor Smets 
said a couple of  minutes ago, I think it is very difficult for monetary policy in 
its own right to get the inflation rate up. Why? Because, it is well recognised 
that inflation, at the end of  the day, is a question about conditions in the labour 
market and the existence of  idle capacity. So, how should we have inflation 
going forward? In my opinion, we should again echo that monetary policy is 
not the only game in town. If  the starting point is a huge negative gap in the 
economy, then we should rely on other instruments (i.e., structural instruments) 
and also consider a balanced path where, for some period of  time, you have 
a more relaxed fiscal policy but where you have a credible strategy for how to 
balance the economy in five years or ten years’ time. In other words, having 
a trade-off, or whatever you wish to call it, between demand now and a more 
restrained public sector demand in the future. I think moving in that direction 
could, to some extent, contribute to solving the problem. 
Nikolay Gueorguiev: How does this issue look from outside the European 
Union?
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Dimitar Bogov: Usually, in Macedonia, we are in the opposite situation. We 
are receiving recommendations and criticism from the EU. Speaking as an 
outsider, the key here is that currently the EU is in a situation where monetary 
policy is the only game in town. There is a huge burden on the ECB. The ECB 
is pumping a lot of  money through QE, but the monetary policy stimulus is 
not giving results easily and so fast. Both the money multiplier and velocity 
of  money have fallen. Because of  that, a strong response is necessary from 
the ECB. 
But, why did the EU come into such a situation? The main problem is that 
during the peak of  the cycle, before 2008, many of  the countries ran budget 
deficits. In such a cyclical phase, when there were windfalls of  revenues and 
high economic growth, it would have been wise to have had budget surpluses. 
But most countries did not; they had procyclical policies and increased spending 
during the expansionary phase. Thus, there was little room for countercyclical 
policy during the downturn. However, the key is to restore fiscal discipline and 
solid public finance management rules. Then the question is why they did 
not have this before? The simple answer is that there were some fiscal rules 
but they were simply not respected, as in the cases of  Greece, Germany and 
France. Rules are being strengthened once again, and the important question 
is if  they will be obeyed in the future. 
Nerses Yeritsyan: I will be more critical in the sense that monetary easing 
most probably was delayed and is now is aiming at the wrong target. Because 
of  this, fiscal and structural problems have become more severe. There is 
a lot of  discussion on this, but action-wise there is no progress. In our kind 
of  economies, we would be dead already because of  fiscal and monetary 
constraints and non-availability of  external saving to finance our problems, 
whereas the rest of  the world is saving to finance the problems of  advanced 
countries, thereby delaying the adjustment process. This is a privilege, but if  it 
is used for a long period of  time there might be reversals and the consequences 
will become more severe.
On monetary policy independence, I want to react to Jan Smet’s comment 
that QE shows that the ECB is independent. I would argue that if  you follow 
independent policy, you will not be able to impose discipline on fiscal policy 
and structural reforms – for example, by increasing the haircut on collateral for 
repo-eligible government bonds or increasing haircuts for different government 
instruments. In this way, you would be able to impose fiscal discipline which 
would increase interest rates. Interest rates would not be negative if  you did 
not collect collateral at 100% or with a 1% or 0% haircut for the collateral. 
For example, in the Armenian case, when we became independent from the 
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Soviet regime, the government could easily borrow directly from Gosbank, the 
state bank, without limit. The finance minister would write a cheque and the 
credit would go to different sectors. When we took over the central bank, the 
first thing we did was to get a law in place that forbade direct lending to the 
government. In addition, we securitised the stock of  government debt to the 
central bank. The government then had to use those securities to raise money 
for the budget deficit in the private market. Interest rates went up to 100% or 
200%. In the European context, the obvious early examples are Finland and 
Sweden. These are very good examples of  how adjustment should take place. 
If  it is delayed, then something else should be done and more vigorously than 
it has been done so far. That would be my reflection. 
Nikolay Gueorguiev: Now is the time to take a few questions from the 
audience for the panellists. 
Suzanne Bishopric (Global Sovereign Advisors): My question is for Lars 
Rohde on pensions. I am wondering how much negative and falling interest 
rates are contributing to the fiscal problem by making the pension funds more 
underfunded, because those liabilities just balloon when interest rates drop.
Isabel Correia (Bank of Portugal): We have to take the “rethinking” topic 
of  this conference seriously. I believe we would not be hearing about the issue 
if  the zero lower bound had not materialised after the crisis. Everyone was 
quite happy about the way monetary policy had been working for 15 years 
prior to the crisis. It was very much driven by having one instrument and one 
goal, and this created independence and credibility that were very difficult to 
distinguish. We should understand that when we came from the old type of  
monetary policy to that instrumented in interest rates, we are really playing 
the game of  changing incentives for the agents in the economy. This is the 
main channel of  transmission. So, when you try to compare it to fiscal policy, 
for me it is always a bit weird that we focus so much on the stimulus deficit 
part of  the fiscal counterpart. What we know in terms of  research is that we 
have instruments in fiscal policy that are very similar to the interest rate. But, 
these instruments are not government expenditure (G) or deficit or debt. If  I 
used G or deficit or debt, I would not have an independent central bank. For 
me, I believe that we cannot really rethink the connection between fiscal and 
monetary policy if  we do not take seriously where fiscal policy is playing a very 
similar role to the interest rate and begin to think about taxes. As someone 
has already pointed out, we have to go inside the deficit and understand what 
type of  institutions we would have to have so that we can have fiscal roles 
similar to the monetary ones, but without the bound that monetary ones 
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have in a way that when you arrive at this situation, they really can play as 
substitutes to monetary policy without having anything to do with deficit or 
debt or fiscal space.
Mejra Festić (Bank of Slovenia): The Great Depression between 1929 and 
1936 had very similar reasons to those we faced during the last crisis in 2008, 
but it was manifested on a more sophisticated level. We know that prior to the 
crash in 1929, there was a high overheating of  the economy and exponential 
stock market growth. During the depression, there was a liquidity trap and we 
know that the Keynesian approach changed the economic trend. My personal 
opinion is that fiscal policy easing would be the rational option, but the question 
is to what extent would its combination with monetary policy be sustainable.
(Unidentified): I have two simple questions. In most countries, we are playing 
with high levels of  government debt. First, what constraints do these high 
levels of  debt impose on interest policy of  central banks? Second, is there 
any prospect of  ever getting away from these high levels of  government debt? 
Andrzej Raczko (National Bank of Poland): Today, Governor Jazbec 
mentioned that monetary policy should not be the only game in town. I 
think you have in mind the euro area. I would like to ask my colleagues about 
the efficiency of  monetary policy, taking into account the current situation of  
having very low inflation for only one year and very weak economic growth 
for a longer period in the euro area and the whole EU. Of  course, we have 
a very easy monetary policy. However, if  we consider the impact of  the very 
easy monetary policy of  the ECB via the banking sector, which is experiencing 
significant problems, the credit channel is less effective than before. The 
exchange rate channel of  transmission also is not as effective as before. If  
monetary policy is easy and is the only measure that is being implemented, it 
raises questions about the cost of  this policy. It is well known that the cost is 
the stability of  the financial sector. I am thinking not only about the insurance 
companies – for whom the negative spillover effect of  low interest is obvious – 
and about the pension fund system, but also about the stability of  the banking 
sector. Maybe we should consider having a tight monetary policy stance, given 
that the monetary policy of  the ECB now is less effective than before and that 
the long-term environment of  low interest rates may be very dangerous for 
the stability of  the financial sector.
Nikolay Gueorguiev: Let me briefly summarise the questions from the 
audience for our panellists. 
The first question is on the effect of  negative interest rates on pensions and 
insurance companies. The second question is whether we can devise fiscal 
institutions and revenue-neutral tax rebalancing that would have the same 
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effect on the domestic economy as monetary policy easing, now that the zero 
lower bound is upon us. The third question is that fiscal policy easing maybe 
rational now, but how do we make it sustainable and how do we avoid the issue 
of  fiscal dominance returning? The fourth question is on the constraints that 
high public debt imposes on monetary policy and how can debt be reduced. 
The last question is on what we think about the efficiency of  monetary policy 
now in terms of  benefits versus costs, the financial sector costs and other 
possible costs. How should policymakers take this into consideration?
Lars Rohde:  I could start with the relatively simple question. It was the 
question about insurance companies and the impact of  very low interest rates. 
I think it goes wider than just the impact on insurance companies. Because, if  
you are going from a high- to a low-return environment, it is simply a transfer 
from creditors to debtors. It also means that if  you have to have a certain 
income stream in 20 or 30 years from now, you have to save more, not less, if  
the interest rate is lower. This is a relevant point if  we are discussing QE. If  QE 
is forcing down interest rates, it also means that people will have to save more 
not less, and thereby reduce the overall demand in the economy. So, there is 
the redistribution effect and the solvency effect for insurance companies unless 
they are hedged. Maybe we have made some regulatory failures. Perhaps we 
should have changed the regime so that insurance companies and pensions 
funds were forced only to deliver hedgeable products and have a regulatory 
environment where also liabilities were marked to market. Then, we would 
not have the solvency issue at least. 
Jan Smets: Regarding the question on how we can make public finances 
sustainable, I think the answer is twofold: you need fiscal discipline and strong 
growth. Certainly, both could be enhanced in the euro area.  Fiscal discipline 
should inspire confidence in the sustainability of  public debt, which would in 
turn stimulate consumption and investment by the private sector. In addition, 
structural reforms as well as a stronger banking system should spur economic 
growth. In Belgium, we are now engaged in a huge tax-shift operation which 
is beneficial to growth and jobs and is helping to make the ECB’s monetary 
policy more effective.
Second, regarding the efficiency of  monetary policy, I believe it is most certainly 
having an effect. The ECB’s measures have improved credit conditions, 
enhanced credit expansion and lowered borrowing rates for companies and 
households, and they are supporting growth and inflation. This is indeed 
difficult to prove as there is no counterfactual, but the ECB’s analysis is 
supportive of  this.
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Third, what about the impact of  monetary policy on financial stability? There 
certainly can be adverse spillovers on pensions and on the profitability of  
insurance companies and banks. But in the first instance, achieving price 
stability – which is what monetary policy measures are aiming at – is also 
beneficial for financial stability. If  monetary policy failed to achieve price 
stability and allowed the economy to go into a prolonged period of  stagnation, 
that would be bad news for the financial system. It would mean that long-term 
yields would remain low for a very long time. The imbalance between savings 
and investment within Europe and in the euro area is the ultimate reason why 
interest rates go down; monetary policy can be seen as accompanying that 
movement. This may raise financial risks, but these should in the first instance 
be addressed by micro- and macroprudential policies. Monetary policy, which 
is set for the whole euro area, cannot be geared to address problems which are 
very specific to some segments or regions of  the euro area. For that you need 
targeted financial stability instruments, which fortunately have been elaborated 
since the crisis. We are indeed counting on them a lot. 
Dimitar Bogov: I would only like to touch on the Keynesian approach. 
There is one big difference between the 1930s and now: government budget 
expenditure then accounted for 20% of  GDP or less, compared to 50% of  
GDP now. So, there is much less space for Keynesian stimulus after the crisis 
of  2008. Here we come to the issue of  reducing the public debt. This is likely 
to be very difficult. We will likely live in periods of  high public debt which 
will constrain fiscal policy in the future. What could be the exit solution here? 
Maybe a huge reduction in the role of  the state, like what happened in the 
1990s in transition economies. There is a need for structural changes in the 
participation of  the state. Here the main question is the reduction of  the tax 
burden instead of  fiscal stimulus, which could have a similar impact at the 
end, but in the longer term and structurally it would be much more beneficial. 
Nerses Yeritsyan: I would like to add that if  Keynes were alive today, he 
would be surprised at the current level of  the wealth of  nations and at how 
effective public institutions are. That is really impressive. Going forward, 
the main issue is how much sacrifice we are ready to make to make things 
sustainable, because the threat of  adjustment is following us. It is an attitude 
issue whether we want to face this adjustment problem or delay it with the 
hope that growth will come from somewhere or people will want to work 
longer hours. This is not going to happen because the rhetoric in politics 
is the opposite: people want more pensions and higher indexation of  their 
wages and want to work fewer hours. This is the dilemma we have to solve in 
the European context. This is important for us because as a young nation, we 
want to learn by doing the right things going forward and our neighbourhood 
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environment is important from that perspective. I would like to stress again 
the point that I mentioned earlier: the interest rate would likely be positive 
and significant if  the ECB did not support government bonds as collateral 
for its operations. That would be a solution. Also, a 20% or 30% haircut on 
those securities would solve the problem. You would see positive interest rates 
immediately. This may be very revolutionary, but this sacrifice is better than 
sacrificing wealth. We would be poorer than we are today and the adjustment 
would be easier afterwards. Now, policies and institutions have kept wealth at 
a level that people have not felt the cost of  crisis and the social fabric has not 
changed too much. However, sustaining the social fabric requires more rigorous 
effort in structural reforms if  we want to escape the new adjustment causes. 
Lars Rohde: A couple of  words about the Keynesian situation in the 1930s. 
It is interesting to note that Belgium has just raised 100-year money in capital 
markets at 2%, and Ireland did the same. In Germany and Denmark, the 
government can raise money for 30 years at well below 1%. One idea that 
one could come up with is somehow to have targeted long-term investments in 
infrastructure financed at a very low interest rate. That would be a Keynesian-
like way out of  the crisis. The second point I would like to make is about 
strong financial institutions. In broad terms, in Europe we have been too slow 
and too soft on our financing institutions for too long. They should have been 
recapitalised in a much more radical way back in 2008-2009. The ECB has 
done a great job, but it would also have been helpful if  the national regulators 
had been a little bit more strict earlier on.
Nikolay Gueorguiev: Let me briefly summarise the discussion. 
First, the thinking of  policymakers about monetary policy and fiscal policy 
coordination has evolved during the past 50-60 years from the acceptance that 
both instruments can and should be actively deployed to stabilise output and 
inflation in a discretionary way. That acceptance was the case in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The idea of  monetary policy being more capable of  and sufficient 
for handling both tasks – namely, inflation and output stabilisation – and of  
the need for fiscal policy to be constrained to prevent excesses came into 
prominence in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Second, currently in many countries monetary policy effectiveness is diminished 
and fiscal policy is constrained by rules or by the sheer lack of  fiscal space. 
The search at present seems to be for mechanisms to commit fiscal policy to 
medium-term solvency while allowing short-term flexibility so that it can also 
contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation. 
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Third, monetary policy has done a lot already to help stabilisation, but this 
has great spillovers to exchange rate and financial stability. The spillovers in 
the financial sector can be handled through prudential policies. There is a 
need in the EU to improve fiscal policy coordination between member states 
and the centre, and the EU needs to think about the EU-wide fiscal stance.
We need to be mindful that in small economies – in all countries, actually 
– fiscal policy at times can be procyclical and fiscal dominance can occur at 
least some of  the time. 
In small open economies, monetary policy is constrained no matter what 
the monetary regime is. This comes from the open capital account and large 
amount of  capital flows. In this situation, a disciplined fiscal policy is needed 
to have space to stabilise output when needed.
The last observation: fiscal policy should not be misused to delay structural 
reforms of  unsustainable policies. Let me thank the panellists and the lead 
speaker for their contributions and close the session. 
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Erik Jones
The discussion in this panel revolved around six themes: (i) monetary and fiscal 
policy; (ii) rules and discretion; (iii) complexity and simplicity; (iv) centralisation 
and coordination; (v) unity and diversity; and (vi) macroeconomics and finance.
The first three themes relate to the institutional framework that exists in Europe. 
That framework is designed to achieve sustainability rather than stabilisation. 
The goal is two-fold: to ensure that no member state runs excessive deficits or 
builds up excessive debts, and to avoid any interference from fiscal policy in the 
conduct of  monetary policy. The implications are often procyclical. Under the 
current framework, fiscal authorities are encouraged to tighten as economic 
performance slows and to loosen as output growth accelerates. This can be 
seen clearly in the context of  the recent sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal policy was 
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contractionary as the crisis deepened and then became expansionary once the 
ECB stepped in to underpin sovereign debt markets in July 2012. This pattern 
is not salutary for European economic performance. Monetary policy is set to 
achieve price stability and fiscal policy accommodates. As a result, monetary 
authorities moved too late (and did too little) to avert a recession in Europe or 
even to mitigate the consequences adequately.
A part of  the difficulty results from the reliance on policy rules. Such rules are 
effective in addressing familiar problems. They are less effective in addressing 
problems that are unfamiliar. As a result, a number of  member states faced 
unexpected complications. A few even confronted problems with debt 
sustainability. The policy response has been to proliferate new rules within 
the existing institutional framework. These rules address special conditions 
or economic circumstances. They also create incentives for member states 
to engage in structural reforms. The result has been to create multiple and 
overlapping policy frameworks. Inadvertently, this has created greater scope 
for discretion – by offering an implicit choice over which framework should 
be applied and when. In turn, this discretion has given rise to uncertainty. 
Looking back at the actions of  key institutions in response to deviation from 
the rules by the member states, it is almost impossible to anticipate ex ante 
which framework would be applied.
The rules have also become more complex. The intention was to stretch 
the policy framework to address both sustainability and stabilisation at the 
same time. This intention was not without merit, but it gave rise to significant 
unintended consequences. Many of  the policy rules now rest on sophisticated 
measures of  economic performance that are also unstable over time. The 
output gap is a good illustration. This measure is important for calculating 
the structural budget. It builds on a mixture of  real-time estimates and near-
term forecasts. The methods used to make these calculations are inherently 
inaccurate. By implication, the revisions that are made over the passage of  time, 
and as increasingly precise historical data can be brought into the calculations, 
are often many magnitudes larger than the policy target. For example, it is 
impossible to reduce the structural budget deficit in real time by 0.1% of  
gross domestic product (GDP) when revisions to the estimated output gap 
can be 15 times that amount or even larger. Accounting rules create another 
source of  distortion. The rules exist to strengthen the comparability of  fiscal 
accounts across countries. The unintended consequence is to change the way 
national governments interpret revenues and expenditures. For example, public 
investment must be treated as a current outlay even if  the bulk of  the financing 
comes from the private sector.
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The implications of  this complexity are not the same for all member states. 
Large member states with advanced economies and relatively smooth 
investment cycles are less affected, while smaller member states with rapidly 
developing economies and more uneven investment cycles are disadvantaged. 
These smaller countries not only face irrational policy requirements (because 
the targets are so unstable) but also tend to underinvest (because of  how 
investment is treated by the accounting rules). These smaller countries are 
also less likely to benefit from any discretion applied in the choice of  policy 
frameworks and they are more likely to suffer from the procyclical, price-
stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policy mix.
This diagnosis of  the current situation raises questions regarding how the 
macroeconomic policy environment could be improved. This is where the next 
three themes – themes (iv) to (vi) referred to at the outset – become important. 
The first consideration is whether Europe should continue to rely on fiscal 
policy coordination or whether it requires centralised fiscal institutions to 
balance the requirements for sustainability and stabilisation. The advantage of  
such institutions is that they could allow for increased market discipline to fall 
on sub-centralised fiscal units. If  Europe had a single fiscal authority, it could 
enforce the “no bailout” rule more consistently. This is what many believe to 
be the main lesson from the United States. There, most state governments have 
“balanced budget” amendments or some other kind of  binding fiscal policy 
requirement. Where these are not followed, market discipline is allowed to 
function. Meanwhile, the US federal government provides for macroeconomic 
stabilisation through a mix of  automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal 
policy.
There are two problems with this line of  argument. The first is that US fiscal 
institutions do not work as effectively as is imagined – either in terms of  
disciplining sub-national governments or in providing for stabilisation. There 
are elements that Europe could borrow from the US experience. The usefulness 
of  supplementary federal unemployment benefits that kick in for a limited 
period when sub-national (or state) governments experience a profound 
economic shock is one example; federal deposit insurance is another. European 
policymakers could create similar arrangements that would backstop member-
state economic performance without creating unnecessary moral hazard. 
Nevertheless, the willingness of  the member states to construct institutions for 
fiscal centralisation is limited. This is the second problem with the argument 
for centralisation. Member state governments prefer fiscal sovereignty to fiscal 
solidarity. Hence, they prefer also to retain an institutional framework based on 
coordination rather than aggregating fiscal institutions at the European level.
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The present arrangements for fiscal policy coordination are too complicated. 
The challenge is to make the rules simpler. The question is whether the same 
rules should apply to all member states. There is a political logic to equal 
treatment. In practice, different member states are treated differently. The 
“no bailout” rule is a good illustration. Although theoretically this rule applies 
to all member states, in practice smaller member states face discipline while 
larger member states get more leniency (in the sense that they are “too big 
to fail”). Moreover, this pattern is borne out in virtually every federal fiscal 
arrangement and not just in Europe. The rules for fiscal targeting should 
also differ depending upon the country. This creates space for much more 
diversity and, hence, member state sovereignty. The challenge is to build 
political support for such an arrangement. At the moment, that support does 
not exist in Germany, among other countries.
Perhaps, though, it is enough to settle for a more modest change to the current 
institutional framework. The completion of  a European banking union could 
be sufficient to prevent a crisis such as the last one from recurring. Such 
a project would not improve the macroeconomic framework directly, but it 
would insulate macroeconomic policymakers from shocks emanating from the 
financial sector. It would also provide the cross-border risk-sharing mechanisms 
in the form of  deposit insurance and resolution funding necessary to prevent 
governments from having to absorb responsibility for excessive private-sector 
liabilities that suddenly become unsustainable public-sector debt. Such an 
arrangement would not be wholly separate from the fiscal framework; both 
deposit insurance and resolution funding require some kind of  fiscal backstop. 
Nevertheless, this level of  centralisation should not impinge unnecessarily on 
member state fiscal sovereignty and it should not complicate the interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policy.
A banking union would be a step in the right direction. By itself, however, it 
would be insufficient. Europe must continue to make progress on achieving 
a capital markets union in order to diversify bank funding and deepen the 
channels for cross-border private-sector risk sharing. European financial 
markets also require some kind of  common risk-free asset. Such arrangements 
will not only strengthen the institutional framework for macroeconomic policy 
coordination but also widen the scope for monetary policy, which has been 
overextended in attempting to respond to the crisis.
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Presentations by Lead Speaker and Panellists
Lead Speaker: Ľudovít Ódor
First of  all, I would like to thank the Bank of  Slovenia for inviting me to this 
conference. A few years ago, Mervyn King said that central bankers are more 
obsessed with fiscal policy than with inflation. If  he is right, I am definitely in 
the right place. Today, I am going to make the following very simple point: 
in order to have a functional monetary union with no overburdening of  
monetary policy, the euro area needs a more decentralised and depoliticised 
fiscal framework.  
Sustainability and stabilisation
Let me start with the basic fiscal objectives. A proper fiscal framework should 
ensure long-term sustainability while avoiding procyclical fiscal behaviour. 
The framework in the euro area failed on both fronts. In good times, just 
before the crisis hit, it did not motivate the creation of  sufficient fiscal space; 
in bad times, it was too restrictive to stabilise the economy. In the middle of  
the sovereign debt crisis, when market pressures heightened, the policy debate 
turned into austerity mode, and more and more new fiscal rules were legislated. 
The mood changed only after the ECB promised to do “whatever it takes” to 
save the euro. But again, the pendulum has swung too far. We are now in a 
“who can introduce more flexibility?” phase, ignoring potential sustainability 
risks lurking on the horizon. In my view, this schizophrenic, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde behaviour is a direct consequence of  the faulty institutional set-up and 
represents a real threat to the conduct and independence of  monetary policy. 
The partially finished house
There has been a lot of  debate about the potential causes of  the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis. Among them, shortcomings in the original institutional 
design have played a prominent role. The Five Presidents’ Report recognises 
that the EMU is “like a house that was built over decades but only partially 
finished”.1 In my opinion, in the area of  macroeconomic management there 
are four very important fault lines that should be addressed in order to increase 
the resilience of  the single currency. 
First, there are blurred responsibilities between national and EU level policies. 
When accountabilities are not separated clearly, the political fight is often 
between national interests and those of  Brussels. As a consequence, voters 
1 Juncker, J.C. in close cooperation with Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and Schulz, M. (2015), The Five Presidents’ 
Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels: European Commission.
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frequently see this political debate as a zero-sum game. Europe should focus 
more on common interests, risk-sharing mechanisms and insurance schemes, 
and not on fine-tuning inherently national policies. In order to find “European” 
values for the citizens, the subsidiarity principle has to be respected.
Second, peer pressure to achieve common macroeconomic and structural 
objectives has failed. With bailout mechanisms in place, member states have 
no real incentives to pursue sound policies if  the most negative assessment 
they can get is “limited compliance”. Ministers will not be keen to punish 
their colleagues if  their policies will be under investigation the next time. 
Moreover, the European Commission also has become more political (more or 
less openly), under the heavy influence of  the most important member states. 
Without de-politicisation of  policy evaluation in the euro area, procyclical 
behaviour will be hard to eliminate.
Third, management of  the sovereign debt crisis by European leaders is a 
textbook example of  how not to address difficult macroeconomic and financial 
problems. The “too little too late” behaviour actually forced the ECB to become 
a substitute for fiscal discipline, with all the potential moral hazard problems. 
Overburdening monetary policy is a real threat, which also raises important 
questions about central bank independence. True, it was partially also the 
ECB’s fault, since its monetary policy actions were not aggressive enough in 
the first phase of  the crisis. The reduction of  interest rates and quantitative 
easing came much later in the euro area than in the United States.  
Fourth, the slow decision-making process in general in the euro area is a clear 
disadvantage in an increasingly globalised world, where quick actions are 
necessary in many cases to cope with macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, a more 
flexible policy framework is needed in order to remain globally competitive. 
In sum, the euro area needs a much better economic policy framework, with 
well-functioning sticks and carrots for member states, less political influence 
and more flexible community-level decision-making. The question is how to 
achieve these goals?
Romanticism versus realism
Economists have somewhat different views on how the optimal medicine should 
look like. Some would agree that a fully-fledged fiscal union (something like 
the United States of  Europe) would, at least in theory, go a long way towards 
solving most of  the problems. In the current political environment, however, 
only a small minority of  member states would be willing to transfer more 
sovereignty to Brussels. If  the first-best solution is unattainable, is the euro 
project doomed to failure or are there other options to ensure fiscal discipline?
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Charles Wyplosz has argued that the fiscal policy problem in the euro area 
can be solved without further integration.2 In his view, compulsory adoption 
of  effective fiscal discipline frameworks by member countries should replace 
the several times discredited Stability and Growth Pact. At the national level, 
these frameworks should combine intelligent fiscal rules and independent 
fiscal councils adept at combining rules and discretion. At the collective 
level, the implementation of  national frameworks should be monitored by 
an independent European fiscal council vested with the power to bring cases 
to the European Court of  Justice. The “no bailout” clause should also be 
restored to eliminate moral hazard. In addition, Wyplosz argues that legacy 
debts should be significantly reduced in order to allow countries to pursue 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Michael Bordo and Harold James agree that the euro area is still a long way 
from a new political equilibrium that shifts towards greater fiscal federalism.3 
In contrast to the minimalistic approach advocated by Wyplosz, Bordo and 
James propose a series of  measures which amount to “partial fiscalisation”. 
Their rationale is quite simple, and is based on the historical analogy between 
the United States and the EU: in order to achieve further integration, voters 
should first see the value added of  a common action. Europe should focus on 
win-win situations which would increase cross-border ties and thus represent 
a “strong cement to the union”. These partial fiscalisations might come in 
the form of  reaping efficiency gains from a collective action or as insurance 
mechanisms at the EU level. Bordo and James provide a number of  examples, 
among which the most prominent are the banking union, the capital markets 
union, common social security, an energy union and a common defence policy. 
Both realistic solutions require important modifications to the institutional 
set-up. 
Depoliticisation and decentralisation  
At the heart of  the sovereign debt crisis in Europe lies the fundamental 
contradiction between bailouts and fiscal sovereignty inside a monetary union. 
One cannot have both at the same time. With the benefit of  hindsight, it is 
clear that absent resolution mechanisms and strong links between bank and 
sovereign risks were the main factors behind the bailouts in the initial phase 
of  the crisis. Since then, major progress has been made to set up resolution 
schemes and to present a roadmap towards a banking (financial) union. These 
2 Wyplosz, C. (2017), “Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union Without Fiscal Union”, in: L’. Ódor (ed.), Rethinking Fiscal 
Policy after the Crisis, New York: Cambridge University Press.
3 Bordo, M. and James, H. (2017), “Partial Fiscalization: Some Historical Lessons on Europe’s Unfinished Business”, 
in: Ľ. Ódor (ed.), Rethinking Fiscal Policy after the Crisis, New York: Cambridge University Press.
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are absolutely necessary building blocks of  any successful currency union. 
Creditors and shareholders have to bear a large part of  the losses stemming 
from insolvency of  banks or even sovereigns. 
Important lessons can be learned from the functioning of  existing federations. 
The degree of  central control varies considerably within them. One extreme 
possibility is reliance purely on market discipline – i.e., having a credible “no 
bailout” policy (as in the United States). The other extreme is full solidarity 
between member states, when bailout is widely expected. It should be noted 
that the design of  area-wide fiscal rules is heavily dependent on the approach 
chosen. In the former case, almost no monitoring by the centre is necessary, 
while if  one chooses the latter approach, very detailed rules and coordinated 
fiscal policy are unavoidable to fight moral hazard. 
The current situation in the euro area is somewhere between these two 
extremes. Europe is balancing between the low credibility of  the “no bailout” 
clause in the Treaty and the need to avoid free-riding. Irrespective of  the 
final model chosen, a fundamental redefinition of  accountability between the 
centre and national authorities would be necessary in any case. In my view, 
Europe needs a decentralised and depoliticised fiscal framework to ensure 
fiscal discipline in the long run.     
Maze or pyramid?
Several considerations have to be taken into account when reforming the 
fiscal framework in Europe. First, in my view, it is necessary to better align 
theory and the actual design of  fiscal rules and institutions. The fundamental 
conflict between using the one-size-fits-all approach and at the same taking 
into account country specificities has often led to reliance on escape clauses, 
special regimes and “other factors”. As a result, Europe has ended up with a 
complex web of  sometimes contradictory rules and procedures.4 Paradoxically, 
the system relies on so many rules that the final verdict is in fact a discretionary 
decision by the European Commission/Council in many cases. Despite the 
large number of  rules, the decisions are still very hard to predict.  
Second, the division of  labour between the community and national level 
is blurred. There is no clear separation of  accountability and responsibility. 
The European framework combines a non-credible “no bailout” principle, 
sovereignty of  member states in budgetary issues, the Stability and Growth 
Pact, and funds such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or European 
4 See Ódor, Ľ. (2014), “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Lessons from the first phase of  implementation of  the new 
European fiscal framework”, Council for Budget Responsibility Discussion Paper 3/2014, Bratislava (available at 
http://www.rozpoctovarada.sk/download2/gbu_final.pdf).
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Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It is necessary to define when and under 
what conditions intervention from the centre is warranted. Moreover, current 
discussions about a stronger fiscal union might add another layer of  challenges, 
namely, the question of  the proper design of  fiscal rules and institutions at 
the community level. It is also important to limit political influence over the 
application of  rules and procedures as much as possible. 
Third, current fiscal indicators allow fiscal gimmickry, and real-time evaluation 
of  structural budget balances is more art than science. More appropriate 
methodological tools are available in the literature, but their application is 
often hampered by the current institutional set-up.
A solution to these three fundamental problems I propose with Gábor Kiss 
is similar to the arrangement advocated by Wren-Lewis.5 The first line of  
defence against irresponsible fiscal policy behaviour should be at the local 
level, using home-grown fiscal rules and independent fiscal institutions. The 
community level in our proposal is represented not only by the European 
Commission, but also by an independent fiscal watchdog for the euro area.6 
These institutions should, in our view, focus primarily on avoiding free-riding 
and procyclicality at the level of  the whole area and on managing countries 
breaching European limits. 
A decentralised fiscal framework is also more compatible with the current 
situation in the EU, where not all member states have introduced the single 
currency. For member countries outside the euro area, it would be hard to 
accept more central budgetary oversight.
As I stated earlier, it is not possible to separate the issue of  fiscal frameworks 
from the question of  the overall set up of  a currency union. Therefore, at 
the bottom of  Figure 1, I list two important pre-conditions to be met: a fully 
functional banking union and a stronger “no bailout” principle. One should, 
however, note that strengthening the “no bailout” clause is not possible without 
sound macroprudential policies and an effective banking union. Even if  it 
is unlikely to achieve full credibility of  the “no bailout” principle, as is the 
case in the United States (at least in the medium term), the greater the losses 
absorbed by shareholders and creditors, the easier the design of  fiscal rules 
at the community level.
5 Ódor, Ľ. and Kiss, G.P. (2017), “Lost in Complexity: Towards a decentralised fiscal framework in Europe”, in Ľ. 
Ódor (ed.), Rethinking Fiscal Policy after the Crisis, New York: Cambridge University Press; Wren-Lewis, S. (2003), 
“Changing the Rules: Why we should not accede to EMU´s current fiscal regime”, New Economy 10(2): 73–78.
6 It should be noted that there are important differences between the European Fiscal Watchdog (EFW) in our 
framework and the European Fiscal Board (EFB), which was set up later.
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Figure 1: Proposal for a new European fiscal framework
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The problem of  deficit bias in currency unions arises both at the local level 
and the level of  the whole area. In my view, the obvious approach would 
be to build a hierarchical system of  responsibilities. When there is no sign 
of  free-riding behaviour with potential contagion effects, the national level 
should be responsible for fighting against the local deficit bias. In that case, 
a country-specific, tailor-made solution that is more in line with theory and 
based on better fiscal indicators should be designed.
Area-level rules and institutions should primarily focus on problems concerning 
common interest. High on this list are possible contagion, free-riding behaviour 
or, for example, counter-cyclical aggregate fiscal policy. In the case of  a fully 
credible “no bailout” clause, centrally imposed fiscal rules on member states 
are not even necessary. If  the euro area is successful in putting in place clear 
rules for burden sharing, banking union and debt restructuring with a strong 
backstop mechanism, the current trend for legislating more and more complex 
fiscal rules can be reversed. In my view, it would then be sufficient to operate 
with one or two simple rules. These rules should not target yearly balances in 
national budgets. Instead, they should fight against the deficit bias occurring 
at the euro area level. One can imagine various possibilities suitable for this 
purpose: debt levels, sustainability indicators or, for example, sovereign risk 
indicators. It is important, however, to design rules not with target levels, 
but rather with maximum values tolerated by the community (one common 
threshold). Countries operating below these thresholds would be free to conduct 
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their fiscal policy if  they respect minimum benchmarks (the universal 3% deficit 
limit can be abolished). If  the limits are breached, however, oversight from 
the centre should step in. The sovereignty principle should be significantly 
reduced when the agreed limits are exceeded.
Figure 2: Separation of  fiscal responsibilities in the euro area
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Euro area fiscal
watchdog
Country IFI
Country-level fiscal rules:
- Domestic deficit bias
- Avoiding procyclicality
at the national level
European rules:
- Limiting free-riding
- Avoiding aggregate procyclicality
- Minimum standards for local
fiscal frameworks
• Simple common limits 
(net debt, risk margins, etc.)
• Procedural rules for countries
over limits
• Simple rules for the European
budget
• Requirements for local fiscal
frameworks
• Procedural rules for the budget
cycle
• Full coverage of the
public sector 
(stock variables)
• Target debt trajectories 
• Operational targets and
instruments
• Cash flow
Ex ante strong resolution mechanisms and banking union
 
 
The hardest problem to tackle is avoiding aggregate procyclicality of  fiscal 
policy in exceptionally bad times (when monetary policy is constrained by 
the zero lower bound). There are two potential solutions: central risk-sharing 
mechanisms, or better coordination of  fiscal policies. I am very sceptical of  the 
latter since it is not trivial to measure and combine country-specific multipliers. 
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Concluding remarks
Over 25 years ago, the Delors Report7 stressed the importance of  macroeconomic 
policy coordination and flexible national (structural) policies for a successful 
economic union. It also emphasised the key role of  the subsidiarity principle. 
The questions today are where to draw the line between national and European 
policies and how to design the right incentive structures for policymakers. 
The pool of  potential solutions is limited by the (un)willingness of  citizens to 
transfer much more power to Brussels. Therefore, as Wyplosz8 points out, we 
have to find the constrained optimum. 
There is a relatively widespread consensus that completing the Single Market 
and the banking (financial market) union are necessary building blocks for a 
more stable European currency in the long run. The issues are much more 
controversial in case of  fiscal and structural policies. Moreover, monetary 
policy is pushed to its limits in order to substitute for the inaction in those two 
areas. If  a United States of  Europe is not on the list of  realistic options in the 
foreseeable future, the only alternative is to reform the incentive structure for 
national policies. 
As I have argued, in case of  fiscal discipline, we should move towards a 
decentralised and depoliticised framework. This is theoretically more sound 
and practically more enforceable than the current web of  complicated rules 
and procedures. Europe should base its fiscal framework on synergies between 
smart fiscal rules and independent fiscal institutions both at the national and 
the euro area level.  
Issues for discussion  
• How can the incentive structure of  national policies (fiscal and structural) 
be reformed in order to ease the burden on monetary policy?
• Is it possible to pursue counter-cyclical aggregate fiscal policy without 
central risk-sharing mechanisms? 
• What are the options for reducing the complexity of  the euro area’s fiscal 
framework? What roles should independent fiscal institutions play (both 
at the national and European level)?
7 Committee for the Study of  Economic and Monetary Union (1989), Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the 
European Community, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of  the European Communities.
8 Wyplosz, op. cit.
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Panellist 1: Lucio R. Pench
Many thanks to the organisers for having invited me. I have three points to 
make on: 
i. the origins of  the EMU fiscal framework: the Maastricht assignment;
ii. reflections on the Great Recession and its aftermath (we may also call it 
“the reality check”);
iii. possible ways forward for the EMU fiscal framework, which were mentioned 
by Ľudovít Ódor in his presentation. 
We can quickly go over the first point, the Maastricht assignment, partly 
because it is well known and partly because it has been dealt with in some 
of  the earlier presentations. A characteristic of  this unique experiment – 
centralised monetary policy in the hands of  an independent central bank with 
price stability as an objective, and decentralised fiscal policy in the hands of  
sovereign member states subject to supranational rules – is the set of  rules that 
are supposed to govern the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. 
A common feature of  these rules is that they are proscriptive as opposed to 
prescriptive in nature. The Treaty bans excessive government deficits and 
monetary financing of  government deficits and does not allow the bailout of  
governments.
What are the conceptual underpinnings of  these constructions? I think the 
underlying idea is that the supranational monetary policy was in need of  
protection from – as opposed to coordination with – fiscal policy. If  you read 
the writings of  Otmar Issing,9 it stands out very clearly that the very word 
“coordination” was seen with suspicion from the side of  the ECB. Why so? 
Because it was seen to be possibly protecting from national fiscal policy affected 
by pervasive deficit bias. This seemingly peculiar attitude of  the ECB had 
two conceptual underpinnings: the superiority of  monetary policy in dealing 
with shocks that macroeconomic policy can address; and the belief  that 
discretionary fiscal policy, more often than not, ended up destabilising rather 
than stabilising the economy. I would say that the introductory presentation 
highlighted that these were very much part of  a broader consensus going well 
beyond the euro area. 
9 See, for example, Issing, O. (2005), “The role of  fiscal and monetary policies in the stabilization of  the economic 
cycle”, speech at the International Conference on “Stability and Economic Growth: The Role of  the Central Bank”, 
Mexico City, 14 November (available at www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2005/html/sp051114.en.html).
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Let me now give you some elements of  how things have changed. 
Figure 1 highlights the euro area fiscal stance versus the fiscal rules. The blue 
bar represents an admittedly not easy reconstruction of  the rules because of  
their complexity. This, in essence, is what full compliance with the rule of  the 
Stability Pact would represent. After 2009, when the rule was suspended, the 
recommendation was to do what you are doing, namely, expand. The lighter 
blue dot in the figure represents the change in the structural balance that 
occurred. The pattern is interesting: almost every year, the fiscal stance was 
less restrictive than full compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact would 
imply. This is what the ECB was officially asking for. An important exception 
is 2012, but you cannot blame the fiscal tightening in that year on the rules 
by any stretch of  imagination, because the structural balance is much higher 
than the fiscal rule would have implied. In fact, if  you use a more sophisticated 
assessment, by examining the discretionary fiscal effort shown by the yellow 
dot, you see that the effect was even bigger. We know the reason for this: before 
the “whatever it takes” speech by Mario Draghi on 26 July 2012,10 uncertainty 
over what the ECB would do in terms of  providing liquidity to member states 
in distress was pervasive. Thereafter the pattern changes. If  you move to today, 
you see that the requirement may have slowed down somewhat, but fiscal policy 
is actually becoming more expansionary rather than restrictive.
Figure 1: Euro area fiscal stance versus fiscal rules (% of  potential GDP)
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10 www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
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Could one have done better in terms of  a rule? I have a final element in the 
rather complicated Figure 1. The green bars are the results that would provide 
a rule that is perhaps more economically sophisticated. This rule of  thumb 
deals with sustainability and stabilisation on an equal footing, whereas the 
EU rule put sustainability ahead. That gives somehow different results, but 
still one may question whether it would give the right policy mix. Why so? 
Because we know what is behind it. In Figure 2, euro area monetary policy is 
compared with the Taylor rule, which is represented by the two dotted lines 
in which the equilibrium interest rate is set either at zero or at the potential 
growth rate. Before the crisis, we all thought that the equilibrium interest rate 
was 2%. I did not consider this rate here, because it would yield results with 
not much sense. In the figure, we see at least two episodes in which the policy 
rate is above what would be given by the Taylor rule. In the second episode, 
you have the quantitative easing, and that is why you have a long-term interest 
rate that gives a better idea of  debt than the policy rate.
Figure 2: Euro area monetary stance versus the Taylor rule
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What can we conclude from this? There has been a pendulum pattern. As 
Ľudovít Ódor said, it is all procyclicality as before. In this regard, I would like 
to make three points. First, full insulation of  monetary policy – basically the 
old ECB model – is partly responsible for the procyclical excesses of  fiscal 
policy. Remember what happened in 2012 and what we have seen. Second, 
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the deficit bias may not be the sole externality of  fiscal policy that the EMU 
fiscal framework has to protect against. Linked to that is the conclusion that 
the fiscal rule should reflect both objectives of  sustainability and stabilisation. 
But – and this is my final and a very difficult point – it may not be possible to 
encapsulate the right balance in a rule. It is a judgement call that is particularly 
difficult when monetary policy is constrained. This is the lesson that I draw 
from comparing a more sophisticated rule with the outcome and stance of  
monetary policy. 
I see two alternative ways forward for the EMU fiscal framework. I put a 
question mark here because I am not sure exactly about the position taken in 
Ľudovít Ódor’s presentation. It seems to me that Mr. Odor’s presentation largely 
embodies a kind of  a return to Maastricht. He recommends decentralised fiscal 
policies, subject to “sustainability benchmarks” and “oversight from the centre” 
in case of  the agreed limits being exceeded. I have three points: (i) it looks to 
me like a bit of  a rehashing of  the original Maastricht assignment, perhaps 
without the Pact but with the rules of  the Treaty; (ii) it does not deal with the 
(non-theoretical) case of  stabilisation deficit at the level of  the euro area; and 
(iii) I do not know whether what Jean-Claude Trichet called “federalism by 
exception” is a politically viable option.
I call my alternative “Overcoming Maastricht”. I would suggest that a 
centralised stabilisation capacity is needed to meet the challenges highlighted 
by the crisis. It should be integrated with stability-oriented national rules and 
a credible “no bailout” rule at the EU level. That is my conclusion. 
Panellist 2: Dušan Mramor
I would like to give you some insights into how a finance minister lives under 
the circumstances of  existing EU fiscal rules. The question is: Is it survivable 
or not? The whole idea in the existing EU fiscal rules is that of  counter-cyclical 
policy: you save in good times, and you can use that fiscal space in bad times. 
The idea is logical. However, the problem is its implementation. Let me present 
to you the example of  Slovenia. To comply with EU fiscal rules, as a finance 
minister of  Slovenia I have the goal of  reducing the structural fiscal deficit by 
0.6 percentage points of  GDP every year for several years, as we have a very 
high nominal budget deficit and our medium-term objective is to achieve a 
nominal surplus of  0.5% of  GDP, as measured by EU accrual accounting 
standards ESA 2010. This is determined by the European Commission on 
the basis of  the current situation and forecasted economic developments in 
Slovenia. 
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We have to go through three stages of  tricky planning to achieve the structurally 
adjusted deficit reduction target of  0.6 percentage points of  GDP through 
adopting appropriate annual budgets. As in most EU countries, budgets in 
Slovenia are adopted and carried out on a cash accounting basis. Therefore, 
the required level of  nominal deficit reduction in the cash budget should be 
calculated in three stages. In the first stage, the reduction needed in structural 
terms is determined (i.e., 0.6 percentage points of  GDP). In the second stage, 
the reduction needed in ESA 2010 accrual terms that is consistent with the 
structural deficit reduction target is calculated. In the third stage, through the 
conversion of  accrual to cash basis, the actual reduction of  the budget deficit 
needed is found. 
The calculation of  the structural deficit is the first thing that makes our life 
impossible. The structural deficit depends on the output gap – its calculation 
and its stability over time. In the case of  Slovenia, six consecutive estimates 
in three years of  the output gap for 2015 varied from -2% to -0.4% of  GDP; 
the estimate of  the level of  structural deficit and its needed reduction is very 
much a moving target. Even if  the European Commission fixes the target 
of  a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the structural deficit, how can we 
determine by November each year, when the budgets for the following two 
years are prepared, the needed ESA 2010 deficit reduction if  the output gap 
– and hence, the target – moves in this way from November onwards into the 
budget year and beyond? 
Unfortunately, this is not all. Eurostat constantly changes its interpretation of  
ESA 2010 after a budget is adopted, during and after the budget year. This 
continuously changes the ESA 2010 budget results and alignment with the 
fiscal rules. One example of  how the interpretation can change is the decision 
over what is included and what is not included in the public sector. Another 
example is how certain special transactions are treated, such as those of  the 
Slovenian 100% state-owned Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC, or 
the so-called bad bank). Hence, the finance minister prepares the budget on 
the basis of  the prevailing Eurostat interpretation of  which institutions are 
regarded as the public sector, but Eurostat subsequently makes changes during 
the budget year. The same applies for other interpretations. The treatment 
of  BAMC’s transactions changed three times during the budget year. But, 
this is not all. Eurostat changes its interpretations even once the year is over. 
These changes were substantial for Slovenia in April of  2016, for example, 
with Eurostat stating that they would treat certain transactions from 2015 
differently. Consequently, Slovenia’s ESA 2010 deficit for 2015 was revised 
upwards by 0.7 percentage points of  GDP in April 2016. For comparison, 
the corresponding increase for Ireland was 1 percentage point of  GDP and 
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for Slovakia, where additional institutions were included in the public sector, 
it was 0.5 percentage points of  GDP. Recall that the European Commission 
looked at these figures in April 2016 to determine compliance with fiscal rules 
in the previous year (i.e., 2015). 
In order for us to implement fiscal policy within the European Commission 
rules, these April interpretations of  Eurostat should be communicated to me 
nearly two years earlier, during the budgeting process, and should not change 
afterwards. However, as I noted earlier, the required deficit reduction turned 
out to be an impossible moving target, causing me sleepless nights and putting 
pressure on my staff to come up with precise Eurostat interpretations and the 
relevant calculations. My staff tried hard to get relevant inputs from Eurostat, 
but concluded that what they got made no economic sense. Slovenia’s statistical 
office was also fighting Eurostat. In the end, Eurostat said that if  we did not 
comply, they would use an interpretation that would result in the budget deficit 
being not 2.9% of  GDP deficit, but over 3% of  GDP, which would make 
Slovenia subject to the excessive deficit procedure. We complied. 
As already mentioned, the issue of  the calculation of  the output gap not only 
is problematic for a finance minister under the Stability and Growth Pact rules, 
but also has important negative consequences for the economic policies of  EU 
members. I asked my staff to look into the European Commission’s output gap 
methodology and to compare the results through the years. They first focused 
on 2007, when Slovenia’s economy was clearly overheated. The European 
Commission’s methodology that was used in 2006 to predict the output gap 
in 2007 produced the following result: for the overheated Slovenian economy 
in 2007, it predicted practically a 0% output gap and, consequently, a 0% 
structural deficit. In contrast, the result of  the calculations for 2017 on the basis 
of  the European Commission’s methodology is that Slovenia has the highest 
positive output gap in the EU, at 6.9% of  GDP, thus predicting a seriously 
overheated economy. But where is Slovenia really at in terms of  overheating? 
We have deflation, the external current account is in surplus to the tune of  
7.3% of  GDP, unemployment is much higher than the long-term average, and 
domestic demand is weak. In short, no overheating whatsoever. Nevertheless, 
the calculations on the basis of  the European Commission’s methodology 
mean that in these circumstances of  a weak economy, we have to reduce our 
structural deficit by 1 percentage point of  GDP, implying a very restrictive fiscal 
policy. In fact, it is even more restrictive than it seems, as a 1 percentage point 
reduction in the structural deficit converts into a much higher reduction in the 
headline ESA 2010 deficit. Before Eurostat’s last adjustment, Slovenia achieved 
a reduction of  1.2 percentage points of  GDP in the headline ESA 2010 deficit 
in 2015. This was equivalent to only a 0.2 percentage point reduction in the 
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structural deficit. Imagine if  the same applies to the calculations for 2017. The 
requirement of  a 1 percentage point reduction in the structural deficit could 
translate into a reduction of  up to 2 percentage points in the headline ESA 
2010 deficit (potentially even more on a cash flow basis). That would without 
doubt completely “kill” the Slovenian economy. 
The EU methodology is intuitively quite logical, but it produces completely 
illogical results. Thus, when it is claimed that this methodology is “rocket 
science”, I say “but for a rocket that does not fly”. Unobservable variables, 
problematic inputs, a problematic timeframe and fantastic differences between 
results make it ill-suited to the task, and implementing it results in severely 
procyclical fiscal policy that prevents the EU from exiting the crisis. 
I also would like to mention Eurostat’s methodology of  accrual-based 
accounting as one of  the negative growth factors. For example, we have the 
EU investment programme, the “Juncker Plan”, in which one of  the sub-
programmes is energy-saving investments. Let us say that you have government 
buildings which are not insulated and do not have the most efficient heating 
and cooling systems, and that you bring in private money to invest into 
energy-saving investment and investors are paid out of  the savings. How is 
this accounted for under the EU methodology? Private money that comes 
for this investment is treated as public expenditure in the year of  investment. 
This increases the debt level of  the country, so in the end, it is counted as 
contributing to the deficit. And this is not the only problematic rule. All 
investments of  the public sector are on an accrual basis of  ESA 2010 and are 
accounted for as expenditures in the year that the investment is made. In the 
private sector, business investment is not expenditure – it is not an item on 
the income statement; only depreciation is. If  you have a small economy with 
investment cycles which are very pronounced and you try to pull out of  a crisis 
with fiscal stimulus in the form of  accelerated investment, you are unable to 
as the rules of  the Stability and Growth Pact are breached. 
Therefore, we have a big problem with the implementation of  the EU’s fiscal 
rules, which are in principle sensible. I pointed this out at the Euro Group 
and ECOFIN meetings. To my knowledge, this was the first time in 15 years 
that the European Commission and ECOFIN recognised that there are some 
problems with the methodology. Subsequently, Slovenia was not required to 
reduce its structural deficit next year by 1 percentage point (as calculated using 
the methodology), but by only 0.6 percentage points, as it was clear that the 
calculation of  the Slovenian structural deficit for the next year completely 
defies economic logic.
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Panellist 3: Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
I am going to talk about fiscal policy and fiscal policy coordination in the 
euro area. In this regard, we have objectives, instruments and institutions (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Fiscal policy in the euro area
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There are two objectives: fiscal sustainability at the national level, and fiscal 
stabilisation at the national and aggregate levels. In textbooks, however, you 
will see that there is only one objective – fiscal stabilisation – and that there is 
one constraint – the intertemporal budget constraint. In the monetary union, 
fiscal sustainability is considered an objective in itself, so you can imagine a 
monetary union where fiscal sustainability is an objective because of  the large 
spillovers going through the financial system. 
So, let us say there are two objectives. We started in 1999 with only the top-
left part of  Figure 1, with only quite simple fiscal rules as an instrument 
to achieve fiscal sustainability at the national level. Then, through several 
successive reshufflings of  the Stability and Growth Pact, the objective of  fiscal 
stabilisation at the national level was introduced through some flexibilities, 
making the rules much more complex. I would say that we could perhaps 
find ways to simplify these, looking for example at what the Germans did 
with the adjustments accounts whereby you can put some expenditures in the 
account and the account needs to balance over the cycle, so you no longer 
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need to calculate the structural deficit. We then have the institutions. In order 
to promote national ownership, independent fiscal councils were introduced 
at the national level. This is shown in the first column of  Figure 1. 
During 2011–2013, the aggregate fiscal stance of  the euro area was procyclical. 
With the ECB running out of  instruments, the idea of  an aggregate fiscal 
stance emerged. But how can this be organised in practice? There are two ways: 
fiscal coordination, or fiscal integration through a federal budget. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it is not so evident that fiscal coordination is easier than having a 
federal budget. Let me explain. 
It must be very clear that fiscal coordination is necessary only in exceptional 
times when you have large spillovers. There is a literature showing that fiscal 
spillovers are much higher at the zero lower bound, so there is a case for fiscal 
coordination at such times, but not necessarily at normal times when the fiscal 
spillovers are not so evident to estimate. I very much agree that we should keep 
in mind the subsidiarity principle that in normal times there should be more 
weight on local institutions, provided they abide by the rules. The European 
Commission is organising fiscal coordination with the newly created European 
Fiscal Board, which will be the equivalent of  national councils but at the 
aggregate level. The good thing is that you do not need to change the Treaty 
to do this. In the short and medium term, there is no other choice since in the 
next two or three decades, most fiscal policy will likely remain at the national 
level. This is where the weapons are, and you should coordinate where the 
weapons are and not somewhere else. But, the bad thing is that there is a lot 
of  intrusion into national affairs – basically, you are asking a government to 
do something other than what the citizens want their own government to do. 
This is really very difficult. 
Now let us think a bit about the other possibility: the federal budget. You should 
not think of  a federal budget as something very large. In the United States, as 
Erik Jones said, most of  the budget has nothing to do with stabilisation. So, 
it is wrong to say that since you have a federal budget of  20% of  GDP in the 
United States, with 2% of  GDP in the euro area you would have one tenth 
of  the US stabilisation capacity. This is completely wrong because you do not 
have all the spending that doesn’t move over the cycle. Even if  very small, a 
federal budget can help to design more simple rules at the national level. Why 
are national rules so complex? Because you have to incorporate within just 
one rule the two objectives of  fiscal sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. So 
you need flexibility, and in the end you do not understand the rule. In federal 
countries, the rules are much stricter and simpler, but they are compensated 
by a federal budget. 
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Now I am going to talk under the supervision of  Erik Jones, who can correct 
me. Just take a look at the unemployment insurance system in the United States. 
It is a state-level system that is mostly funded at the state level. The coverage 
is generally 26 weeks – sometimes less, sometimes more. The contributions, 
eligibility, and replacement rates all differ across states. There are two federal 
layers: the Extended Benefits (EB) system, co-financed at the state level and 
federal level; and the newly created Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) agency. The federal layer offers a temporary extension of  benefits 
when the unemployment rate surges. During the crisis in 2009, the insurance 
coverage went up to 99 weeks – an enormous increase – and the average 
federal transfer to states was about 0.5% of  GDP, which is large. The cost in 
normal times is small: $42 per worker per year (0.6% of  the first $7,000 of  
earnings). It could be larger in more generous countries in Europe. You can 
see here that as a reinsurance scheme, it is not so large. 
Why am I talking about this? Because such a scheme may prove to be a good 
combination for Europe – an incentive to reform macroeconomic stabilisation 
and a social initiative. We should keep in mind that what we are discussing 
today is not easily understandable to the public; it is very technocratic. We have 
a lot of  Europhobia and so the next initiative needs to have a social component, 
something for the people. We should think of  the success of  the Erasmus 
Programme – for those students who benefited from it, it changed their life in 
practice. Incentive to reform, why? To get into this kind of  reinsurance system, 
you need a lot of  convergence (not harmonisation) of  labour markets without 
too much moral hazard, because it is only in very bad times that a country 
would benefit from the reinsurance. A variant of  it could be a cheque for the 
unemployed, a kind of  Erasmus Programme for workers. 
I will finish with a comparison of  monetary integration and fiscal integration. 
The European system was one of  coordination of  monetary policies. It failed 
and was reshuffled. It was able to continue up to 1999 because there was 
a firm decision to pursue monetary integration. In my view, coordination 
of  fiscal policies is something that we can do today. It will work only if  we 
have the long-term project of  a fiscal union. The EU is a currency without a 
sovereign. We may be right to have a currency without a sovereign, but the 
euro area is an outlier in the world. We must make sure that it is sustainable 
to have a currency without a budget. I know that the United States may not 
be an example for Europe, but at least it is something that does exist and has 
done for a long time. We should look for things that do exist and work. 
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Panellist 4: Javier J. Perez 
I would like to speak on the reform of  EU fiscal rules framework: credibility, 
options and lessons for monetary policy.
Overview: Main issues
A consensus view has emerged around the general idea that EU fiscal rules 
have become too complex.11 Despite this complexity, the architecture of  the 
EU’s fiscal framework lacks tools for the implementation of  euro-area-wide 
fiscal stabilisation actions in particular, especially at times when monetary 
policy may be subject to constraints (e.g., at the zero lower bound). A number 
of  proposals are currently being put forward to correct the two sets of  
(interrelated) problems. 
I argue in this presentation that the Achilles’ heel of  the EU fiscal framework 
is to be found in its implementation flaws rather than in its complexity. At the 
end of  the day, the evolution of  the fiscal rules framework has been a quest 
to find the most resilient set of  rules and procedures possible. The available 
international experience shows that no set of  rules has been ever resilient 
to lack of  commitment, political pressure and time-inconsistency in their 
implementation. To improve the credibility of  any new or old set of  rules, 
greater participation has to be afforded to well-monitored national institutions 
(decentralisation) and, in particular, local fiscal watchdogs.
Credibility and the ability to implement consistent policies are also key 
elements for the second issue at stake. On the one hand, a case could exist 
for pursuing an aggregate fiscal expansion if  the euro area were subject to 
an adverse, symmetric shock. The “euro area fiscal stance” being an abstract 
concept, the practical implementation of  such a policy would depend on the 
incentives of  heterogeneous member states. A win-win situation would be 
one in which countries with enough fiscal space pursue expansionary policies, 
while countries with limited fiscal space stick to policies geared towards fiscal 
sustainability, constrained by well-designed rules. Nonetheless, moral hazard 
problems – i.e., lack of  trust or political willingness by the first group, and/
or lack of  incentives or free-rider attitudes in the second group – can make 
such a virtuous equilibrium hard to achieve. On the other hand, a case exists 
for putting in place euro-area-wide stabilisation tools to cope with adverse, 
mostly asymmetric, shocks. An example of  such a tool would be a common 
11 See  Ódor, Ľ. and Kiss, G.P. (2017), “Lost in Complexity: Towards a decentralised fiscal framework in Europe”, in Ľ. 
Ódor (ed.), Rethinking Fiscal Policy after the Crisis, New York: Cambridge University Press.
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unemployment insurance scheme. That said, a design that is immune to moral 
hazard problems like those mentioned above would be needed for any new 
(or old) scheme to work.
Is “complexity” really the problem?
“Maastricht rules” were simple. The medium-term anchor was public debt, 
with a numerical reference value set at 60% of  GDP, and the operational 
target was the public deficit level, with a consistent reference value set at 3% 
of  GDP. The system was completed by a set of  procedural guidelines designed 
to prevent deviations from targets ex ante (the preventive arm of  the SGP), and 
to correct deviations ex post should they occur (the corrective arm of  the SGP). 
A “no bailout” clause aimed at shielding the whole system.
These rules have been in place for almost two decades, with limited changes. 
An initial period of  “stress” linked to the 2000s dot-com economic recession, 
and the true test of  the most recent euro area sovereign debt crisis, led to the 
development of  additional safeguards and procedures, and to the completion 
of  design lags. The details are well known. Nonetheless, the evolution into 
a more complex set of  rules followed from the very attempt to implement 
the fiscal rules framework: coverage against multiple contingencies (including 
rules governing “flexibility”), resilience during recessions, improved incentives 
schemes, better-defined concepts (as in the case of  the structural balance), 
and so on. The fact is that real-world situations are complex, and legislative 
systems and institutions across the world tend to become complex when trying 
to provide adequate answers for any state of  nature. This is what history 
teaches us.
The question that remains to be answered, then, is whether any system of  
rules is doomed to become too complex? This is particularly relevant when 
one tries to assess the merits of  current proposals to restart the EU’s fiscal 
framework around a reduced set of  principles. In particular, many experts 
suggest that more prominence should be given to the public expenditure rule 
as the operational target of  the system of  fiscal rules.12 Let me focus on this 
issue, because recent experiences with such rules in some countries has not 
been encouraging. 
The first feature of  a government expenditure rule is that the measure of  public 
expenditure that is to be constrained has to be defined. Which expenditures 
are to be excluded from the rule? Unemployment benefits? Large one-off 
payments? Public investment? The exclusion of  unemployment benefits 
12 See, among others, Claeys, D. and Darvas, Z. (2016), “How to reform EU fiscal rules”, Bruegel Opinion, April (available 
at http://bruegel.org/2016/04/how-to-reform-eu-fiscal-rules/).
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would be granted by its mainly cyclical nature, which leads to the issue of  
defining which part of  that expenditure item is cyclical and which is structural. 
The exclusion of  large one-off payments is not a clear-cut issue either, as the 
definition of  such events is far from obvious when assessed in real time. Just 
to provide a few examples: Would bank bailouts always qualify? In other 
words, how large is “large”? What about exceptional expenses related to health 
outbreaks? And exceptional defence spending linked, for example, to terrorist 
attacks or geopolitical tensions? The exclusion of  public investment takes us 
back to the problems experienced by “golden rules” in the past. 
The second (nice) feature of  public spending rules is that they are set to 
constrain public finances in the medium term. But, in order to define a 
medium-term spending plan, one needs an estimate of  the relevant country’s 
potential GDP growth and a medium-term price anchor. The latter is easy, 
as the ECB’s target is medium-term inflation. But the former feature brings 
us back to square one: if  we were able to define potential GDP in real time 
without controversy, it is likely that nobody would be unhappy with estimating 
structural government balances.   
We can keep endlessly discussing the “optimal set of  fiscal rules” and devoting 
a great deal of  honest intellectual effort to redefining rules every now and then. 
This is a necessary endeavour because, as I have argued above, institutional 
systems have to evolve to accommodate new situations and to learn from 
past mistakes. But what the political economy literature teaches us is that the 
willingness of  the relevant actors (countries, the European Commission and 
the Council of  the EU) to apply a given set of  rules is the key to this debate. 
Complexity of  the rules or (real-time) implementation problems?
Let me provide some examples of  practical issues that affect the implementation 
of  any rule, and that if  dealt with by technical, non-biased bodies, would 
certainly reinforce any efforts to make the system of  fiscal rules work. I will 
skip the widely analysed core issue of  the causes of  structural government 
balance revisions,13 with the interesting insight that real-time macro forecasts 
are one major source of  the real-time bias in the estimation of  output gaps, 
and will focus on some less standard topics.
A first example has to do with statistics. The production of  fiscal data in 
Europe is the responsibility of  independent national statistical offices and is 
subject to scrutiny by the European Commission (Eurostat). Nonetheless, the 
literature shows that, from a political economy point of  view, governments 
13 Analysed in, for example, Hernández de Cos, P., Lacuesta, A. and Moral-Benito, E. (2016), “An exploration of  real-
time revisions of  output gap estimates across European countries”, Bank of  Spain Occasional Paper 1605.
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might have incentives to resort to creative accounting practices so that the 
initially released figures are distorted. In addition, frequent past data revisions 
imply shifts in subsequent targeted/projected paths over the medium term, 
given that government targets and projections are linked to the base year in 
which these targets/projections are produced. Moreover, even in the cases in 
which revisions do not present a clear recurrent pattern but are nonetheless 
frequent, the comparison of  successive paths of  government targets might 
be blurred, and may eventually undermine the soundness and consistency of  
fiscal policy choices over time.
Table 1: Revisions to government balance-to-GDP ratios (d) over time, from 
initial (Spring of  year 1) to final release (Autumn of  year 4)
Pool of  15 EU countries (1998-2008)
Revision after 4 years:  
r8t = d8t - d1t
Revision after 3 years:  
r6t = d6t - d1t
Mean -0.34*** Mean -0.18**
Standard deviation 1.04 Standard deviation 0.83
Noise-to-signal ratio 0.43 No. of  observations 135
No. of  observations 119
Revision after 1 year: 
r3t = d3t - d1t
Revision within 1st year:  
r2t = d2t - d1t
Mean -0.02 Mean 0.00
Standard deviation 0.62 Standard deviation 0.53
No. of  observations 150 No. of  observations 165
Notes: ***statistical significance at 1%; ** statistical significance at 5%.
Source: de Castro, Perez and Rodriguez-Vives (2013)
Moving to fiscal data, revisions to government balance figures should, in 
principle, be explained by the normal and necessary updates in the underlying 
statistical sources and/or by methodological improvements and changes in 
accounting standards. Nevertheless, data revisions are not random. Table 1 
shows how subsequent government balance revisions in the EU led to higher 
deficits during the 1998–2008 period. Furthermore, some recent research14 
shows that preliminary government balance data releases are biased and 
14 See De Castro, F., Pérez, J.J. and Rodríguez-Vives, M. (2013), “Fiscal Data Revisions in Europe”, Journal of  Money, 
Credit and Banking 45(6): 1187–1209.
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inefficient predictors of  subsequent releases, that such systematic bias in 
government balance revisions is a rather general feature of  the EU, and that 
expected real GDP growth and political cycles explain revision patterns. 
In addition, Eurostat’s decisions and methodological clarifications leading 
to forced data revisions explain a large amount of  the bias towards lower 
government balances, providing evidence that some individual countries might 
have distorted preliminary releases of  data by using accounting rules in a 
partial way. 
The second example has to do with the ability to anticipate fiscal slippages 
in real time. On this point, I argue that there is room for more analysis, in 
light of  a recent strand of  the literature that looks at fiscal forecasting and 
monitoring issues. Figure 1 shows how international organisations and private 
sector analysts forecasted the 2011 and 2015 Spanish government balance over 
time. The initially released balance (the “Spring Excessive Deficit Procedure 
notification”) turned out to be outside of  the range of  all forecasts, including 
that of  the European Commission. The forecast errors are striking, not only 
for their size but also because of  the fact that even estimates produced with 
information up to the very end of  the year were far off the released data. A 
recent line of  research shows that these errors could have been reduced if  a 
formal and transparent role had been assigned to short-term fiscal indicators 
based on public accounts data.15 In the case of  the example chosen for Figure 
1, the forecast errors turned out to be extremely policy relevant. As regards 
the 2011 forecast, the shock undermined the fiscal credibility of  the newly 
elected Spanish government, acting as a catalyst for the sovereign debt stress 
that Spain was subject to over the course of  2012 and for the associated change 
in the EDP policy path. As for the 2015 error, it led to Spain being subject 
over the course of  2016 to a step-up in the EDP process, and led to a new 
change in the EDP adjustment path that affected the credibility of  the entire 
EU system of  fiscal rules.
15 For a discussion of  the case of  Spain and for references to other studies for the EU as a whole, see Pedregal, D.J., 
Pérez, J.J. and Sánchez, A.J. (2014), “A toolkit to strengthen government budget surveillance”, Hacienda Pública 
Española / Review of  Public Economics 211(4): 117–146.
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Figure 1: Evolution of  government balance forecasts for Spain for 2011 (top 
panel) and 2015 (bottom panel) from the European Commission, IMF and 
OECD
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A third example is related to the previous one and looks at the ability of  
independent institutions such as the European Commission to reduce biases 
in monitoring fiscal rules in real time. Recent research16 shows that the fiscal 
forecasts of  international agencies are affected to some extent by the same 
type of  problems that the literature widely acknowledges for governmental 
forecasts: bias linked to political cycles or the influence of  opportunistic GDP 
cycles. The main reason is that informational shortages may lead staff of  
independent agencies to internalise “political biases” in governmental forecasts 
when trying to grasp genuine “private information”, given that international 
analysts have to solve a signal extraction problem to separate “true” from 
“biased” information in data provided by governmental agencies themselves.
What can be learnt from the implementation flaws?
The previous examples have clear-cut policy implications. 
First, independent national fiscal institutions might be a natural option, to the 
extent that they may have better access to inside national information than 
international organisations, allowing them to perform closer monitoring of  
official budgetary projections, in particular regarding transparency requisites, 
accountability and the threat of  sanctions. National fiscal watchdogs tend to 
have better inside knowledge of  the legal framework, more granular data 
knowledge, and also advantages when dealing with legislation and government 
documents in national language. This could be of  particular relevance to 
highly fiscally decentralised countries, given the hurdle of  dealing with centre-
subnational financing arrangements. 
Second, we need to devote more resources to developing, monitoring and 
auditing statistics, as the basis of  the whole system of  fiscal rules is reliable data. 
A balance has to be struck between the number of  economists commenting 
on and analysing data, and the number of  statisticians producing them.
Finally, short-term fiscal indicators (monthly and quarterly fiscal data) should be 
formally included in the European multilateral fiscal surveillance process. Their 
formal use in the public discussion would certainly enhance the preventive 
arm of  the Stability and Growth Pact, making it possible to acknowledge fiscal 
slippages early enough that pressure to take corrective measures could be put 
on governments by EU institutions and the public at large
16 See, for example, Merola, R. and Pérez, J.J. (2013), “Fiscal forecast errors: governments versus independent 
agencies?”, European Journal of  Political Economy 32(C): 285–299.
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The way forward: Decentralisation or EU-wide mechanisms?
The preceding discussion would lead me to favour Ľudovít Ódor’s “realist” 
option – i.e., the EU needs to move the emphasis to reinforcing national 
fiscal frameworks, including by giving more prominence to national fiscal 
watchdogs. Further decentralisation to the national level, though, carries the 
need to incorporate a credible “no bailout” clause by the centre (i.e., by the 
European Commission and the monetary union partners). The international 
experiences of  subnational fiscal crises are not very promising in this regard. 
The key open question here is: What is the legal design that would allow a 
credible application of  the “no bailout” clause? At the EU level, the recent 
bailouts of  programme countries indicate that for the monetary union to 
survive, a lax approach may have to be taken in certain circumstances. Within 
EU countries, the recent Spanish experience also shows that strict national rules 
may not provide a credible safeguard when it comes to bailing out regional 
governments subject to high fiscal stress.
The latter example makes it clear that for the monetary union to move 
forward, a parallel movement in the direction of  centralisation is also needed 
beyond the role that credible fiscal rules may provide as implicit coordination 
mechanisms. In this regard, the proposal of  the Presidency to deepen the 
fiscal pillar of  EMU is warranted. The recent economic crisis, in particular 
through its sovereign debt crisis face, has made it extremely clear that for a 
monetary union to function properly, some type of  common or coordinated 
fiscal capacity at the area level should be put in place. The latter applies, 
in the first place, to the design of  centralised risk-sharing mechanisms to 
cope with asymmetric shocks. Moreover – and even more importantly at the 
current juncture of  low economic growth and the zero lower bound – a smart 
management of  the available fiscal space at the euro area level should cater 
for the development of  some type of  common discretionary response to cater 
for shocks of  a symmetric, aggregate nature.
The strengthening of  a centralised fiscal capacity, though, has to be designed 
so as to minimise moral hazard risks and permanent transfers from some 
countries to others. There are various alternatives in the literature that do 
respect these conditions and, as a consequence, deserve to be explored and 
adopted. The EMU project clearly deserves bold steps to be taken in this 
regard. Beyond “public risk-sharing mechanisms”, though, it is important to 
stress that there is margin to improve “private risk sharing” at the EMU level. 
Eliminating barriers to a more complete integration of  capital, credit and 
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labour markets is a must from this perspective. In this regard, completing a 
genuine banking union is a necessary companion for further developing the 
fiscal pillar in the EMU. 
Panellist 5: Cláudia Rodriguez Braz17
The recent economic and financial crisis led to a widespread increase in general 
government deficits and debt in EU member states. The increase was more 
acute in countries with structural weaknesses and fragile public finances that 
faced the impact of  pronounced economic recessions and strong public support 
to the financial sector. This environment placed severe pressure on the EU’s 
institutional framework, which has undergone several changes to adapt to 
the new challenges. Amongst these adjustments, it is important to highlight 
the higher degree of  complexity/flexibility introduced in the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the establishment of  independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) at 
the national level to reinforce the monitoring role of  the European surveillance 
mechanism. In the context of  the economic recovery, improved underlying 
fiscal positions (albeit still with very high debt ratios) and fully operational 
IFIs in most member states, it might be useful to have an informed discussion 
on the role of  fiscal policy and the optimal institutional set-up in the current 
juncture. In this respect, two questions are certainly relevant:
• Can fiscal policy play a role in stabilising the economy at the euro area level?
• What role should IFIs play in the European fiscal architecture?
Related to the last question, another noteworthy question is:
• If  a bigger role is allocated to IFIs, does fiscal analysis at the level of  national 
central banks become obsolete?
I will now address these three questions in turn.
Can fiscal policy play a role in stabilising the economy at the euro 
area level?
In simple terms, a fiscal stance can be described as the impact of  fiscal policy 
on economic activity. However, its measurement is not straightforward. Most 
economic analysis uses a definition based on the change in the cyclically 
adjusted (or structural) general government balance (total or primary). The 
17 The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily represent those of  Banco de Portugal or the Working 
Group on Public Finance (WGPF) of  the European System of  Central Banks. The opinions conveyed here have 
benefited substantially from the discussions and the work carried out by the WGPF, which is a privileged forum for 
fiscal policy analysis.
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concept has been widely applied at the country level, but the notion of  a euro 
area fiscal stance, as the aggregate of  national policies, and its appropriateness 
received limited attention in the past.  However, this situation has changed 
recently for three reasons:
i. the prevailing economic conditions associated with low protracted growth, 
a still significant negative output gap (-1.1% in 2016 in the euro area as a 
whole, according to the Spring 2016 European Commission forecasts)18 
and an unemployment rate that is expected to remain high, in particular 
in countries that were most severely hit by the crisis; 
ii. constrained monetary policy, with interest rates crossing the zero lower 
bound and the implementation of  non-conventional measures; and
iii. institutional developments, with the establishment of  an independent 
advisory European Fiscal Board by October 201519 (expected to become 
operational by mid-2016) mandated to evaluate the euro area fiscal stance.
Given these conditions, it is easy to understand the debate around the use of  
national fiscal policies for exceptional support for a faster closure of  the euro 
area output gap.  However, as there are still considerable risks to sovereign 
debt sustainability prevailing in several countries, the answer to this question 
depends ultimately on how the costs associated with the failure to meet the 
stabilisation and sustainability objectives are assessed and weighed.20
The application of  discretionary fiscal policy has well-known serious drawbacks. 
Indeed, besides the implementation lag, given the time period that usually exists 
between recognising the need for an intervention and the actual enacting of  
a fiscal measure, there also are problems associated with the reversibility of  
such fiscal measures and the limited capacity to assess the state of  the economy 
in real time. In fact, this explains the strand of  the literature advocating that 
in normal times, the stabilising role of  fiscal policy should be based solely on 
the functioning of  automatic stabilisers. In a situation where an expansionary 
fiscal policy in one member state would be used to stimulate the economic 
activity of  the euro area as a whole, the uncertainty in terms of  the magnitude 
of  spillover effects adds to the above-mentioned shortcomings. 
18 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-finance/european-economic-forecast-spring-2016_en.
19 “On steps towards completing Economic and Monetary Union”, Communication from the European Commission, 
October 2015 (available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-600-EN-F1-1.
PDF).
20 See European Commission (2015), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2015, Brussels (available at https://ec.europa.eu/
info/publications/economy-finance/report-public-finances-emu-2015_en).
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In the original set-up of  EMU, the fiscal stance should be determined by 
the national objectives to ensure fiscal sustainability and not be driven by 
stabilisation needs. However, the Stability and Growth Pact includes several 
elements that consider the state of  the economy in the application of  fiscal 
rules. For example, in the definition of  the Medium-Term Objective (MTO), 
a safety margin is taken into account in order to safeguard respect of  the 
Treaty reference values for the deficit and the debt at times of  negative output 
gaps. Additionally, in the preventive arm of  the Pact, the pace of  convergence 
towards the MTO also takes into account the cyclical position of  the economy 
(the new “flexibility matrix”) and, in the corrective arm, a general escape clause 
might be used in case of  a severe economic downturn for the euro area or the 
EU as a whole. All these provisions do not automatically ensure a desirable 
euro area fiscal stance and, as such, the original focus on sustainability of  the 
EU fiscal architecture remains. 
Figure 1: Fiscal space in the euro area, 2016
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The recourse to fiscal policy for stabilisation purposes depends heavily on an 
evaluation of  the fiscal space. According to the IMF,21 fiscal space can be defined 
as the availability of  budgetary room that allows a government to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability 
of  a government’s financial position. While there is some agreement around 
this broad definition, the actual measurement of  fiscal space varies widely 
depending on the method or model used, which points to the need for caution 
when delivering policy recommendations. If  a simple, rules-based definition 
based on the difference between the European Commission estimate for the 
2016 structural balance and the country-specific MTO is used, it can be shown 
that currently the fiscal space in all euro area countries is very limited, with 
the exception of  Luxembourg, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Cyprus (see 
Figure 1). It is important to highlight that the absence of  fiscal space does 
not preclude a growth-friendly recomposition of  government revenue and 
expenditure, where economic activity would benefit through means of  the 
different fiscal multipliers of  the instruments used.
In any case, if  a more expansionary euro area fiscal stance were judged to 
be desirable, this would require coordination of  fiscal policies. Following the 
Five Presidents’ Report,22 there has been some discussion of  the creation of  a 
fiscal capacity which could address, amongst other possibilities, asymmetric 
macroeconomic shocks. If  a proposal of  this type were to materialise, it would 
have the advantage of  ensuring ex ante national contributions, while allowing 
efforts to be directed to countries with greater negative output gaps, which 
typically have higher fiscal multipliers. However, there would be the risk of  
free-riding behaviour, in particular through the postponement of  important 
structural reforms. In addition, it should be noted that a fiscal capacity per se 
would only ensure an impact in the euro area fiscal stance in case of  mismatch 
between the timing of  contributions and the use of  funds or the existence 
of  a direct borrowing facility at the aggregate level. A fiscal union (or a euro 
area treasury, as foreseen in the Five Presidents’ Report) would make a desirable 
fiscal stance easier to achieve, as fiscal sustainability and stabilisation would 
be determined at the euro area level. However, this would imply potentially 
significant risk sharing and consequently would require a far-reaching transfer 
of  fiscal sovereignty to the euro area level, which could be considered a 
drawback from the perspective of  some individual member states. Finally, it 
21 Heller, P.S. (2005), “Understanding Fiscal Space”, IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/05/4 (available at www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2005/pdp04.pdf).
22 Juncker, J.C. in close cooperation with Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and Schulz, M. (2015), The Five Presidents’ 
Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels: European Commission.
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is worth highlighting that both a fiscal capacity and fiscal union would need 
to be carefully designed and their practical implementation would likely be 
a lengthy process. 
What role should independent fiscal institutions play in the European 
fiscal architecture?
With the establishment of  IFIs in almost all EU countries, a debate on the role 
of  these institutions in the European fiscal architecture has emerged. Some 
argue that Europe should move towards a decentralised framework in terms 
of  fiscal surveillance. If  this was to be the case, IFIs could play a crucial role.
According to a survey carried out in the second half  of  2015 by the ESCB 
Working Group on Public Finances (the results of  which were not made public), 
the IFIs’ setup and functioning are currently found to have limited weaknesses. 
However, there are still some concerns in terms of  staff resources, access to 
information and the risk of  political bias in the respective assessments. 
The tasks of  IFIs are diversified, but most make an ex post assessment of  key 
budgetary documents, such as the budget and the update of  the stability 
and convergence programmes. As they have no sanctioning power, their 
effectiveness comes mainly through peer pressure exerted by the influence of  
public opinion. If  IFIs were to deviate from their monitoring role, for example 
by proposing concrete guidelines for the fiscal measures to be adopted by 
governments, they would most likely be considered responsible for the almost 
inevitable failures.
One possible solution to this dilemma would be to improve the institutional 
framework by reinforcing the set of  rules at the national level. The design 
of  an optimal fiscal rule is, however, extremely difficult. On the one hand, 
overly simple rules are transparent and easily understood by the public but 
do not work because they are easily circumvented.  On the other hand, state-
contingent rules are best, but a certain degree of  complexity may lead to 
manipulation and uneven implementation. It is also important to note that 
political economy arguments are relevant not only at the enforcement stage, but 
also at the time of  the approval of  the rule, where loopholes may deliberately 
be left in place.
To sum up, reinforcement of  the national fiscal frameworks to allow IFIs to 
play a greater role would replicate to some extent the problems faced at the 
EU level. 
76    Rethinking Monetary–Fiscal Policy Coordination 
If  a bigger role is allocated to IFIs, does fiscal analysis at the national 
central bank level become obsolete?
Some argue that there is a “fiscal policy obsession by central banks”, but at 
times of  institutional rearrangement it is definitely worth rethinking the role 
of  national central banks in fiscal analysis.
While all central banks in the European Union publicly communicate to some 
extent on government fiscal policies, there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
scope and method of  communication. There have been a few changes recently 
in most central banks’ public communications on fiscal policies, but these have 
mostly gone in the direction of  more public communication.
Communication by central banks on fiscal policies can be regarded as a 
complement rather than a substitute to the public and independent assessment 
of  fiscal councils. Several arguments support this view. First, central banks 
are concerned with the implications of  fiscal policy for monetary policy. 
Second, the public scrutiny of  governments’ fiscal policies improves if  different 
independent institutions are publishing the respective assessments, as there 
are more informed views on the subject. Third, central banks can refer to 
the IFI assessments, reinforcing the messages to be conveyed. Finally, the past 
experiences of  countries where an IFI has existed for a long period co-existing 
with fiscal analysis carried out by the central bank, as for example is the case 
in the Netherlands with CPB, supports the complementary view. 
General discussion
Erik Jones: I would like to start by asking a few questions to the panellists. 
The audience can then chip in with any questions or concerns they may have.
Can you have a credible “no bailout” clause with political entities of  such 
radically different sizes? It is one thing to let the city of  Mobile in Alabama 
go bankrupt. But, can you really let New York City go bankrupt?  By the same 
token, can you have a credible “no bailout” clause when sovereign and bank 
finances are so deeply intertwined? If  you were to look at the history of  the 
United States, when states tend to get bailed out is when their banks are in 
trouble. So, the savings and loans crisis was all about bailing out state-based 
banking systems. Spain would have loved that in 2012. 
The second set of  issues has to do with perceptions of  solidarity. Every time I 
talk to finance ministers about successful structural reform, they tell me that 
national ownership is the key. But, they only say that in the context of  their own 
country. When they look at other countries, they describe national ownership 
in terms of  moral hazard. I wonder if  you can reconcile the tension, because 
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I sense the absence of  a German voice on this panel who would look at the 
structural reform debate and say that the concessions that you need to offer 
to make that work are not concessions that we want to see. 
The third issue has to do with the explanation or justification of  cross-border 
transfers, particularly in the context of  unemployment insurance, especially 
when unemployment surges generate histories. Here, I would point to cases like 
Italy and Belgium, where cross-regional transfers to support unemployment 
ended up as a long-term problem and developed into serious political 
movements against the unity of  the country. In Italy, that did not play out as 
badly as it could have done. In terms of  simple rules that you can get at the 
sub-national level if  you have a federal fiscal entity, I wonder about that fallacy 
of  composition. Think about how much easier President Obama’s life would 
have been in 2010–2011 if  the state governments had not all been following 
balanced budget rules and crushing public sector employment at the same time. 
Obama introduced fiscal stimulus and then the state governments subtracted it 
because they all followed the same very simple fiscal rules. I think that Obama 
would have preferred not to have had that. 
The last issue is how we insulate our fiscal authorities from the activities of  the 
private sector. A lot of  the private-sector debt creation is going to migrate into 
the public sector. If  you want to see an example of  that, look at the whole pay 
cheque lending issue in the United States. Pay cheque lenders are short-term, 
small dollar lenders. They are all regulated at the state level and the federal 
government is terrified of  these guys because of  their implications in terms 
of  social distress and, ultimately in the long term, in terms of  fiscal policy. 
Ardo Hansson (Eesti Pank): I think the Chair has led us to this point on 
whether the panellists have any view on the desirability of  an orderly state 
bankruptcy or insolvency procedures for sovereigns in Europe and whether 
this is a part of  the institutional framework. As you listen to Minister Mramor 
on how difficult it is and that everything is changing, that there are countries 
that think rules are too flexible and others that think that they are not flexible 
enough, maybe market forces are a bit of  a substitute. Could you simplify 
things if  you had a bit more market discipline? A recent paper by Dellas and 
Tavlas23 compared the gold standard with the recent European experience. The 
gold standard was a very extreme corner solution, with a common currency 
but no common institutions and no coordination. Presumably, fiscally at least 
it worked. So, whether or not rules are moving somewhere in that direction, 
substituting markets for rules might make sense. 
23 Dellas, H. and Tavlas, G.S. (2013), “The Gold Standard, the Euro, and the Origins of  the Greek Sovereign Debt 
Crisis” (available at https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2013/9/cjv33n3-13.pdf).
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Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (IMF): I was surprised that nobody mentioned the 
banking union in this panel. A full banking union is probably one of  the most 
striking differences between the US system and what we have in the euro 
area. You can have the city of  Detroit going bankrupt but not leaving the 
dollar. In the euro area at the moment, you cannot have severe distress on the 
fiscal side without risking a run on the banks. We witnessed something like 
that very recently. What is the minimum level of  banking union that would 
change the situation?
Mejra Festić (Bank of Slovenia): We know that we have different GDP 
structures, different productivity and different purchasing power across 
European countries. Nevertheless, there are some trends and intentions for 
fiscal centralisation and fiscal union. I would like to compare fiscal union with 
the European deposit insurance scheme phases. It is too early to implement 
the European deposit insurance scheme because we have less systemically 
important banks, different supervision of  these banks, different bankruptcy 
procedures, different out-of-court restructuring and compulsory debt 
settlement. So what is your opinion, if  we compare these two instruments? 
Within what time span would it be feasible to fulfil and integrate fiscal union 
and the European deposit insurance scheme?
Johannes Clemens (Deutsche Bundesbank): Drawing on his experience, 
Minister Dušan Mramor showed us how fiscal policy functions in reality, 
especially with regard to the structural budget balance. As Javier Perez pointed 
out, I would say that the measurement problem of  the structural budget 
balance or potential output is not just in the volatility of  its measurement but 
also in its bias. Usually, those who estimate potential output have a bias towards 
overestimating it. From a political economy angle, this is quite rational. It is a 
great story for politicians to be below potential output most of  the time because 
then you can do something. This is for me a theoretical explanation for the 
debt bias of  fiscal policies. I also would like to raise another point related to 
the interconnection between fiscal stance and the Stability and Growth Pact 
limits that started in 2012. Should this be interpreted as the functioning of  
Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” statement24 in order to give a signal that 
the fiscal policy stance could be loosened because monetary policy would bail 
out fiscal policy?
Erik Jones: We have questions on market discipline, banking union, deposit 
insurance, measurement bias and fiscal stance. I would like to invite each of  
our panellists to respond to any of  the themes that they want. 
24 www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
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Cláudia Rodriguez Braz: More market discipline is surely welcome, but it is 
not possible to safeguard an adequate reaction of  markets to the circumstances 
and with appropriate timing. Indeed, there is some literature that points to 
sudden (and over-) reactions by financial markets. Overall market discipline 
can help, but it is not a solution to all problems per se.  
A question was also asked about the possibility of  having a mechanism for 
the orderly restructuring of  debt. My opinion is that the issue is not on the 
table for the time being. In the current European framework, in particular at 
the euro area level, a mechanism exists solely for assisting in case of  liquidity 
problems (the European Stability Mechanism) but not for when solvency is a 
high risk.  In any case, I believe that some steps in the direction of  establishing 
such a mechanism will be adopted in the coming years. 
The establishment of  a European deposit insurance scheme would go in the 
direction of  decoupling banks from sovereigns and help in managing sovereign 
crises. There are, indeed, some similarities in the difficulties of  establishing a 
European deposit insurance scheme and a fiscal union. As has been pointed 
out here today, a fiscal union with sovereign states that have different national 
rules, different cultures, different fundamentals and different social preferences 
will be extremely difficult to launch in the near future.  
Finally, I fully agree that the discussion of  the use of  fiscal policy with a 
stabilisation purpose that occurred in 2012 might have been distorted because 
of  the potential output bias. In any case, the sustainability objective should 
have been present at the time, as the fiscal space was also quite limited then. 
Lucio R. Pench: There are too many questions on the table. It was remarked 
that banking union was absent from the discussion. It is a good remark. Speaking 
in a personal capacity, it remains a question whether we should implement a 
full banking union, including the fiscal back stop, deposit insurance and all 
the other elements. Could this conceivably be enough over and above a fiscal 
union to make a full banking union work? It is true that a banking union, if  
so implemented, would have important stabilisation properties. Still, I wonder 
whether in the absence of  a common safe asset, one would have an opposite 
comparison with the situation in the United States.
This links to the issue of  a sovereign restructuring mechanism. At the end of  
my presentation I spoke, though vaguely, about the reinstatement of  the “no 
bailout” rule which, in fact, was avoided in the course of  the crisis. I believe it 
could be argued that precisely because of  the problem with relying exclusively 
on market discipline, a solution that would go in the direction of  reinstating the 
“no bailout” rule, including exposure limits for public debt on banks, should 
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be explicit as to be accompanied by other elements in terms of  creation of  
a common safe asset. One could envision a grand bargain, ideally, but this 
would be very difficult to implement in practice.
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré: On the “no bailout” clause, there is a very good book 
by Cottarelli and Guerguil25 that looks at the experience of  federal countries, 
where sub-national entities have fiscal problems that are as dirty as what we 
have in the euro area. It is very clear that there is no bailout for small entities; 
you let them fail. But for the big entities this is never the case, not even in 
Germany. We will have to deal with these dirty solutions. However, we won’t 
be safe unless sovereign debts can be restructured without triggering a systemic 
crisis. I think the ESM could play a role here to stop contagion when this kind 
of  thing happens. In the short term, we have a problem with the banks. For 
the banks, a big challenge is how to diversify sovereign risk on their asset side. 
Sometimes we forget that sovereign bonds are the ultimate source of  liquidity. 
So, we should not penalise banks for holding these bonds. I agree that they 
should hold diversified debt in safe assets. The challenge is how to move from 
one situation to the other.
For deposit insurance, I do not understand why we are not restricting deposit 
insurance to those banks which are directly supervised by the SSM. Who 
should pay for an error in supervision? At one point, if  you do not have a 
backstop for deposit insurance and if  the SSM makes a massive error on 
a bank, then you have to ask the national government and other banks of  
the country to pay for the error. This is impossible. We need to put fiscal 
responsibility in line with governance. 
About unemployment insurance, what is important is the difference between 
the unemployment rate and the moving average of  unemployment rate. It 
is not a permanent transfer; after two years it stops. In France, you have a 
stable unemployment rate, so unemployment insurance would not benefit 
this country. There have been some simulations showing that during the past 
such a scheme would have benefited Germany and Spain, with no permanent 
transfers. You can design it so that it does not happen. 
Ľudovít Ódor: When I presented the proposal for the new institutional 
framework, there were two items at the bottom of  Figure 1 – the two necessary 
building blocks for any kind of  successful fiscal framework in the euro area. 
First, a well-functioning banking (or financial market) union. Currently, we 
have too much reliance on bank financing compared to the United States, high 
concentration risks and zero sovereign risk weights. In my view, there is still 
25 Cottarelli, C. and Guerguil, M. (2015), Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experience of  Fiscal Federations, 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
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a lot of  work to do in order to create a financial Single Market. The second 
necessary element I mentioned was an ex ante sovereign resolution scheme. 
Europe should face the moral hazard problem not only from the borrower 
side (by implementing smart fiscal rules in synergies with fiscal independent 
institutions) but also from the lender side. It can be done by specifying (ex ante) 
the amount of  losses bond investors can expect in case of  sovereign insolvency. 
In that case, market participants will be more reluctant to lend to irresponsible 
governments. Also, market signals can be enhanced through the presence of  
truly independent fiscal institutions capable of  uncovering the true state of  
public finances in real time.   
My second point is on the uncertainty surrounding the real-time measurement 
of  the output gap. We estimated this uncertainty by comparing different 
vintages of  the structural budget balance calculated by the common EU 
methodology. In the case of  structural adjustment, the average difference 
between the most optimistic vintages compared to the most pessimistic ones 
was around 0.5% of  GDP. Moreover, for countries that joined the EU in 2004, 
the sign of  the change in the output gap changed in 40% of  the cases. In my 
view, instead of  focusing on the structural budget balance, it is much better to 
use the evolution of  expenditures (adjusted to discretionary revenue measures) 
as the most important operational guide for fiscal policy.
Dušan Mramor: We also made an analysis of  what the mistakes here are. 
There is a big difference between new EU member states and old EU member 
states. The smaller the country and the newer the member, the bigger the 
difference. You know which country has the best results? Germany. So, this 
methodology is quite well adapted to the changes in Germany, but it is not 
well adapted for especially small countries. It is procyclical, and what we found 
is that the output gap is positive when it should not be. That means that it is 
pushing fiscal policy to be restrictive. At the same time, more restrictive fiscal 
policy is the consequence of  uncertainty, as I explained earlier during my 
presentation. So, the new EU members are forced to have much more severe 
austerity programmes than are sensible in order to be within the lines of  the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Ex post, you find out that the fiscal stance was too 
conservative. It is very interesting when you study this topic. There are many 
questions – very big ones – but I leave this today to academics.
Javier J. Perez: This discussion on observables is important, but I will 
draw your attention to the fact that observables are sometimes quite hard 
to understand when it comes to accounting issues. Sometimes, relying on 
observables is a complicated theme. 
82    Rethinking Monetary–Fiscal Policy Coordination 
On the “no bailout” clause, the problem is that the only real solution to this 
clause is to have some type of  debt-restructuring mechanism. This is what we 
have learnt from the experience of  other areas, including the United States. 
Otherwise, there is an intermediate alternative: “funds for conditionality”, 
which is what we do with the ESM. But, the restructuring can have many forms. 
Finally, on national ownership and on coordination of  fiscal and monetary 
policies, since monetary policy is at the zero lower bound, in case of  an 
“accident” it could be the case that some type of  fiscal stimulus is needed at 
some point. The governance of  a “coordinated fiscal reaction” is complicated, 
as there are many ways of  implementing it. How can we share the burden 
among countries? Sometimes, the debates just focus on asking Germany to 
expand public investment. I do not think this is the only way. We should be 
creative and think about this issue from different perspectives, playing with 
the flexibility embedded in the current fiscal rules framework.
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A short answer to the question implicit in the title of  this session – How difficult 
is it to conduct monetary policy when fiscal space is limited? – is “very difficult”. 
There is broad agreement on several issues regarding monetary and fiscal 
policies considered on their own and interacting with each other. However, we 
still do not fully understand how the two policies could be effectively combined 
in a new post-crisis environment in Europe. We are still far from understanding 
how to create the conditions for implementation of  structural policies, which 
everyone sees as a key ingredient of  the macroeconomic policy mix in the 
prevailing environment. 
First, on monetary policy. All panellists seemed to agree that without the 
expansionary measures taken so far, economic growth in Europe would have 
been much weaker. That said, further easing is not seen as a priority at this 
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point. For instance, Estonia is experiencing nominal wage growth of  6.5%, 
with inflation negative and real GDP rising by only about 1.5% per annum. As 
Ardo Hansson asked pointedly, does one need to further stimulate the economy 
in this situation and get wages growing at 8% a year? Or, take the case of  
Slovakia, which is not showing clear signs of  overheating. Jozef  Makúch noted 
astutely that it was not necessary to consider further accommodative measures 
at this point, given that the recently introduced non-standard measures have 
not had the time to do what they were intended to do. Moreover, banks have 
already seen margins between lending and deposit rates severely squeezed. So, 
additional lowering of  policy rates would further reduce banking sector profits. 
In the case of  Croatia, Boris Vujčić argued persuasively that the focus should 
not be on further easing but rather on bank and corporate balance sheets 
repair. The Croatian National Bank has already created 2.5 to 3 times more 
liquidity, in relative terms, than the ECB by relaxing the macroprudential tools 
that had been tightened during the credit boom. However, banks cannot place 
all that liquidity because the real sector is highly indebted and lacks adequate 
equity and collateral to resume borrowing. The Bank of  Albania faces a similar 
challenge. It lowered policy rates from 6.5% in 2008 to a historical low of  
1.25% at present, injected liquidity into the banking system, and widened the 
range of  eligible collateral for central bank lending facilities. And yet, Gent 
Sejko was concerned that the easy financing conditions thus created were 
not being transmitted to the real sector because of  extreme risk aversion of  
domestic banks – or rather, their parent institutions in the euro area – and 
high indebtedness of  Albanian firms.  
Regarding fiscal policy, there was broad agreement that the concept of  fiscal 
space was too elusive and difficult to measure to be a reliable benchmark for 
the calibration of  fiscal policy, not to mention the adjustment of  fiscal and 
monetary policy stances. In country after country, the amount of  fiscal space 
was grossly overestimated in the run-up to the crisis. So how could anyone 
be sure that the countries being asked to “do more” in terms of  fiscal policy 
today really had the room to do so? Vitas Vasiliauskas presented some shocking 
evidence to this effect: only four out of  28 EU countries fully complied with 
the fiscal provisions of  the Stability and Growth Pact this year. Ardo Hansson 
argued that having a bit of  fiscal space did not mean a country should use 
it. In particular, countries in EMU needed more fiscal space than otherwise 
because, as Hans-Helmut Kotz put it cogently, there were no backstop facilities 
at the national level – national central banks in the common currency area 
could not act as lenders of  last resort to rescue domestic banks as, for instance, 
the Bank of  England did. Lubomír Lízal reminded us that even in countries 
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which looked fiscally sound at first sight, fiscal space was an illusion when one 
took into account contingent public-sector liabilities arising from health care, 
pensions and other costs of  ageing populations.
Even without questioning the concept of  fiscal space, many panellists had 
reservations about the potential effectiveness of  fiscal expansion at this 
juncture. There was broad agreement that most countries had room to boost 
private investment and keep deficits unchanged by altering the composition 
of  taxes and public spending, for instance by reducing the tax burden on 
labour and capital and cutting red tape. However, the idea that one could 
jump-start an economy recovering from the financial crisis by pumping public 
funds into infrastructure projects seemed a bit simplistic. Granted, there was 
the possibility of  locking in near-zero or even negative funding costs for some 
advanced economy governments, and most economies did have significant 
public infrastructure needs, as illustrated by Hans-Helmut Kotz. 
However, implementing large-scale projects is tricky. Good governance and 
thorough cost-benefit assessments are crucial for appropriate project selection 
and preventing cost overruns. Even in advanced economies, the planning and 
execution of  infrastructure projects may not be as efficient as often assumed. 
Even if  current funding costs are low, this does not necessarily mean that 
all public projects are worthwhile. Interest rates will at some point rise from 
the current exceptionally low levels. With a project’s expected life of  several 
decades, the rates of  return would have to be assessed against interest rates 
over the long term. 
A related point concerns the impact of  low interest rates on public debt. As 
Boris Vujčić noted, low interest rates have temporarily prevented a snowballing 
of  debt servicing costs and made fiscal positions look better than they really 
are. Lower interest payments also seem to translate into higher credit ratings 
– rating agencies do not seem to look through the current record-low interest 
rates fully when evaluating sovereign creditworthiness. But, this effect will not 
last forever. This is one more reason to start working on structural reforms.
With monetary policy overburdened and fiscal policy generally having limited 
room for manoeuvre, the use of  complementary policies to support growth 
becomes a key issue. One option explored by non-euro area members such as 
the Czech Republic (and earlier, Switzerland) is foreign exchange intervention 
to limit currency appreciation. Lubomír Lízal outlined the achievements of  this 
approach so far, but noted that it could not be recommended more generally. 
The Czech Republic, like Switzerland, was running external surpluses and 
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had a strong banking system. Nevertheless, the idea that exchange rate policy 
could be used to support the inflation targeting framework is becoming more 
mainstream.
Hans-Helmut Kotz reminded us of  another macroeconomic policy that has 
been almost forgotten since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s: incomes policy. 
One of  the few countries that still practices incomes policy is Germany. The 
institutionalised practice of  coordinated wage settlement and disciplined 
labour unions have provided a highly effective way of  restraining real exchange 
rate appreciation.  
Regarding structural policies, a key challenge in practice seems to be finding and 
then seizing a window of  opportunity to implement such reforms. There are 
always plenty of  excuses: strong resistance to health care and pension reforms in 
ageing societies (known in Japan as “silver democracy”); a prolonged weakness 
in economic conditions that increases labour unions’ focus on employment 
protection; weak fiscal positions, which make it difficult to compensate the 
losers from reforms; and so on. But on those rare occasions when politicians 
finally seize the opportunity and implement structural reforms, they seem to 
work small wonders – witness the Hartz reforms in Germany in the 2000s, 
or currently (and half  the world away), the energy and telecoms reforms 
in Mexico. Most often, however, structural reforms are implemented under 
duress, as in Spain post-crisis, which partly gives them negative publicity. 
From the OECD work, we know by now quite a bit about the benefits and 
costs of  structural reforms in the short and long run. However, we know 
precious little about the political economy of  their implementation. Another 
shocking statistic discovered by Vitas Vasiliauskas is that none of  the EU states 
fully addressed any out of  more than 100 country-specific recommendations 
by the European Commission for 2015 and 2016, while more than 90% of  
reform recommendations were addressed with only limited or some progress. 
This brings us to a deeper issue raised by Hans-Helmut Kotz: the analytical 
foundation of  euro area policymaking is the rational expectations revolution 
in macroeconomics and its policy ineffectiveness proposition. One corollary 
of  this theory is strict separation between monetary and fiscal policies. 
Monetary policy was thus assigned a single objective (price stability) and a 
single instrument (the interest rate). Fiscal policy was assigned largely the 
allocation role (ideally, as neutral as possible), while its stabilisation function was 
reduced to automatic fiscal stabilisers (given that discretionary policy of  any 
kind was deemed suboptimal) and ensuring debt sustainability, i.e., satisfying 
the intertemporal budget constraint. There was no need, or indeed scope, 
for monetary–fiscal policy coordination in this world. These ideas stood in 
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sharp contrast to the earlier Keynesian teaching, which argued that monetary 
and fiscal policies acted through a common funnel – aggregate demand – 
and therefore could and should be coordinated to find an optimal stance of  
individual policies. 
Nor was there any concept of  financial stability policies in this idealised world, 
partly because we did not experience the full effects of  financial liberalisation 
and globalisation until we were hit by the global financial crisis. Central banks 
that used macroprudential tools before the crisis, such as Croatia and Spain, 
were considered in some ways offbeat: how could their policymakers pretend 
to know what “excessive” credit growth was?      
Eight years after the global financial crisis, it is clear whose policies went off 
track. The panellists all seemed to agree that the separation of  monetary and 
fiscal policies would not be tenable in the future. A new macro policy framework 
was needed, in which monetary and fiscal policies worked together and were 
combined with macroprudential, structural and, perhaps, incomes policies to 
achieve sustainable growth with macroeconomic and financial stability.
Presentations by Lead Speaker and panellists
Lead Speaker: Hans-Helmut Kotz1 
This is an outstanding opportunity because the topic of  the panel is relevant 
not only for the euro area but also for beyond, including the United States. In 
my presentation, I would like to touch upon three points.
First, this talk would have lasted two seconds in 2007. At that time, there was 
no debate on this issue because there was no issue of  monetary and fiscal 
policy mix. The roles of  the two policies were completely separated. The 
canonical pre-crisis view was that there was a clear assignment of  tasks, clear 
responsibilities and no reason to coordinate. The question then is why we 
have changed our views so significantly between August 2007 and now. The 
second point that I would like to highlight is what is different now, in terms of  
monetary policymaking, for conducting central bank policy in a fiscally stressed 
environment. The third point is what this means for the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and why EMU is such a complicated environment for this issue. 
1 Co-authored with Günter W. Beck, University of  Siegen and SAFE Policy Center, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt.
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Reassessment of  macro policy options
Coordination of  monetary and fiscal policies (which used to be called the “two 
macro handmaidens”) fell by the wayside as an issue of  policy debates in the 
early 1980s.2 Over time, a view became dominant that a clear-cut division of  
labour between domains of  policymaking should prevail. More precisely, given 
that there was no long-run trade-off between wage inflation and employment, 
monetary policy should focus on underwriting the stability of  purchasing 
power. Fiscal policy was about the provision of  public goods and had a purely 
allocation function, whilst simultaneously honouring the intertemporal public-
sector budget constraint. In this framework, the level of  employment was 
largely seen as the upshot of  the workings of  the labour market. 
These policy approaches reflected theoretical developments – the Monetarist 
revolution (including the expectations-augmented Phillips curve) as well as 
the policy-ineffectiveness proposition (as it arose in a rational-expectations 
model with instantaneous market clearing), largely of  the 1960s and 1970s. 
From there, as a logical corollary, a coherent policymaking setup was derived: 
central banks had a mandate with a primary objective – namely, providing for 
a low level of  inflation. Monetary policy was optimised by taking fiscal policy 
and wage policy as given. No need for coordination; everyone was supposed 
to do their homework.
This canonical view has been reassessed in the wake of  the global financial 
crisis. With monetary policy limited by the zero lower bound of  nominal 
interest rates, the burden of  macro-stabilisation (reducing the output gap) 
could not be carried by central banks alone. Meanwhile, in a number of  cases, 
fiscal policies ran up against liquidity and solvency constraints. Some countries 
were deemed by markets to be on an unsustainable fiscal path. Solvency was 
threatened. Apparently, there was even no room for letting automatic stabilisers 
do their work, let alone deploying discretionary fiscal impulses to bring output 
closer to trend. In fact, some believed that this was a non-issue, claiming that 
there was (and is) no output gap at all. It is all about misallocated resources, 
an uncompetitive supply side (that is, overcapacities). Moreover, monetary 
policy is substantially more complicated in Europe’s monetary union, with its 
centralised monetary authority and multitude (19) of  fiscal policies, operated 
on a decentralised level and coordinated by a set of  rules (the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Fiscal Compact, etc.).
2 See Blinder, A. (1982), “Issues in the Coordination of  Monetary and Fiscal Policy”, in Monetary Policy Issues in the 
1980s, Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City, pp. 3–34.
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In this presentation, we will briefly sketch the canonical view (that prevailed 
up to the global financial crisis) on the appropriate mix between fiscal and 
monetary policy and then highlight questions as they arose in the wake of  the 
crisis, leading to a sudden (positive) reappraisal of  macro policy instruments. 
This also meant the re-emergence of  the old perspective on the coordination 
issue between monetary and fiscal authorities. More particularly, with monetary 
policy restricted by the zero lower bound, fiscal policies were supposed to 
use fiscal space, given that it existed. Again, these issues are obviously more 
complicated in the case of  the euro area, given its substantial divergence in 
the set-up and shape of  national fiscal policies. 
Policy objectives, mandates and interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policies
Monetary policy: The price norm
For a quarter of  a century now, modern monetary policy has been understood 
as inflation targeting, pursuing a price norm of  about 2%. In the consensus 
view, it was the task of  the independent monetary authority to engineer an 
output gap that credibly delivered on this promise. Monetary policy reaction 
functions (Taylor rules) concisely captured this approach.
Fiscal policy: Debt sustainability
At the same time, fiscal policy was supposed to deliver fiscal sustainability, 
honouring the inter-temporal budget constraint – that is, preventing unstable 
dynamics from arising. The net present value of  ordinary public sector revenues 
had to be at least as large as the present value of  expenditures.
The time path of  the debt to GDP ratio (Δb) can be usefully understood as 
reflecting the evolution of  four factors:3 
Δb = d + (r − g)b
where d is the primary (non-interest) deficit as ratio to GDP; r is the real interest 
rate on government debt; g is the growth rate of  GDP (i.e., the tax base); and 
b is the existing ratio of  outstanding public debt to GDP.  
As is also well known, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises without bounds with a 
primary deficit and a positive wedge between the real interest rate and the 
growth rate of  the tax base (i.e., r > g).4 Another untenable constellation would 
3 See, for example, Tobin, J. (1984), “The Monetary Fiscal Policy Mix in the United States”, in P. Jackson (ed.), Policies 
for Prosperity. Essays in a Keynesian Mode. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 142–167.
4 Often, to separate out the inflation effect, this condition is also expressed in nominal terms as R > g+π, with R as the 
nominal interest rate, and g and π standing for the growth rate of  nominal GDP.
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be the same positive wedge (r > g) with a primary surplus, but insufficient to 
counterbalance the high starting level of  debt (b). Japan, for example, needs a 
high primary surplus (in the non-interest part of  the budget) only to stabilise 
its very high debt ratio, very low funding costs notwithstanding. It suffers from 
a large volume of  outstanding debt relative to GDP and a very low growth 
rate of  nominal GDP.
This is, of  course, only arithmetic or accounting, but it emphasises that we have 
to acknowledge all four “parameters” when thinking about the trajectory of  
government debt.5 It is also remarkable that over the last century, only about a 
third of  the increase (or the fall) in the debt-to-GDP ratio was “due” to primary 
deficits (surpluses).6 The rest was accounted for by the constellation of  growth, 
nominal interest rates and inflation. In other words, the link between deficits 
and debt is less pronounced than is often believed.
This is where a short-term coordination issue between monetary and fiscal 
policy arises, in terms of  how to underwrite a sufficient utilisation of  resources 
(a small output gap). This short-term macro-stabilisation issue has been at 
the core of  the original debate about the structural interdependence between 
monetary and fiscal policy.
However, what about long-term sustainability? The inter-temporal government 
budget constraint requires that in the long run, the present value of  future 
surpluses can absorb (i.e., is equal to) today’s debt. Alas, this transversality 
condition is very vague indeed. Woodford, for example, has strong reservations 
over whether it is appropriate to conceive of  the government as optimising 
“subject to given market prices and a given budget constraint.... For the 
government is a large agent, whose actions can certainly change equilibrium 
prices and an optimizing government surely should take account of  this in 
choosing its actions” (p. 693).7
An indication of  this analytical lacuna is the inability to come up with an 
optimal level of  public debt8 or a threshold beyond which debt becomes 
uncontrollable. This also means that fiscal space – the distance to distress – is 
a rather imprecise concept.9 The debt-sustainability frontier is to a large degree 
5 We put parameters in quotation marks since they are clearly not simply givens, exogenously determined. Macro 
policies, for example, could have an impact on the output gap. Structural policies could raise trend growth.
6 See, Abbas, A.N.B., El-Ganainy, A. and Horton, M. (2011), “Historical Patterns and Dynamics of  Public Debt: 
Evidence from a New Data Base”, IMF Economic Review 59(4): 717–742.
7 Woodford, M. (2001), “Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability”, Journal of  Money, Credit, and Banking 33(3): 669–728.
8 See, for example, Villieu, P. (2011), “Quel objectif  pour la dette publique à moyen terme?”, Revue d’Économie Financière 
3(103): 79–98.
9 The concept has been developed, in particular, by IMF economists;  see Ostry, J., Ghosh, A. and Espinoza, R. (2015), 
“When Should Public Debt Be Reduced?”, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/10, June.
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defined by a vector of  political forces – the acceptability of  a programme to 
generate the required primary surplus, through tax hikes and/or expenditures 
cuts.
Unsustainability (i.e., not meeting the solvency constraint) or the perceived 
capacity to roll over debt appears to lie in the eye of  the beholder. It is here 
that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme of  the 
summer of  2012, with its spread-dampening effect, comes in.
Perspectives on monetary policy in a stressed fiscal environment 
The short run
Macro-stabilisation works through what James Tobin called a “common 
funnel”. Tobin was, of  course, referring to aggregate demand. Monetary 
policy bears on aggregate spending via its effects on interest rates and interest-
sensitive expenditures. Fiscal policy impacts aggregate demand via taxation 
and spending decisions. It is ultimately the total size of  the monetary and fiscal 
policy package that counts.10
In this light, monetary and fiscal policy are not really separate tools;11 there is 
an inherent, inevitable interdependence with regard to output stabilisation or 
smoothing of  the cycle.12 This leads to the issue of  coordination: in the wake 
of  the global financial crisis, pulling away budgetary policy from stress territory 
and, at the same time, preventing fiscal trouble from derailing monetary policy.
But then, even if  the desire to cooperate exists, coordination amounts to an 
intricate challenge, for the following reasons: different objectives, different 
preferences (time horizons) and different assessments (models).
This makes the implementation of  consistent policies difficult and seemingly 
speaks for “clear separation” and “rule-based” policies. The central bank 
minimises a loss function (defined in output and inflation deviations) by 
operating a monetary policy (Taylor) rule with the Phillips curve (the supply 
side) as a constraint. Also, in view of  substantial difficulties – in particular, 
lags – in fiscal policy implementation, monetary policy was seen as by far more 
flexible to respond to macro-stabilisation issues. 
10 The monetary-fiscal policy mix was seen as an instrument to influence output composition (between consumption 
and capital expenditures). A tight money, expansionary fiscal policy mix (à la Reagan-Volcker), leading to higher 
inflation-adjusted interest rates, was deemed to reduce capital expenditures and, hence, to slow down growth.
11 See Tobin, J. (1982), “Money and Finance in the Macroeconomic Process”, Journal of  Money, Credit and Banking 14(2): 
171–204; and Tobin, J. (1984), op. cit.
12 This is, of  course, acknowledged by monetary theorists. Carl Walsh, for example, writes about the recognition that 
“fiscal and monetary policies are linked through the government sector’s budget constraint”; see Walsh, C. (2010), 
Monetary Theory and Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 135.
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The long run 
Fiscal policy was supposed to meet the debt sustainability condition – i.e., 
meet the solvency constraint – by generating a primary surplus which could 
compensate for a potential wedge between interest rates and growth. In other 
words, the sustainability of  a budgetary course with a constant debt ratio 
requires
b ≤     d(r - g)
to hold. That is, in the long run the existing debt-to-GDP ratio has to be 
smaller than the primary surplus divided by the wedge between interest rates 
and growth.
Here, seemingly, monetary policy was in no way involved; it simply had to 
deliver on its inflation objective. In other words, the monetary financing 
option appeared to be barred. But, as Sargent and Wallace have stressed, it 
is ultimately the consolidated government budget constraint which must be 
honoured.13 Therefore, given dynamically unsustainable debt positions, fiscal 
policy can force monetary policy’s hand. The intertemporal budget constraint 
implies a binding limit for a price-stability-oriented central bank.
EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact acknowledged this interdependence 
between monetary and fiscal policy.14 It was conceived to protect the central 
bank against consequences as they potentially arise from unsustainable fiscal 
policies. Hence, the ECB’s independence was not deemed to be a sufficient 
condition for providing price stability. Nor was bond markets’ capacity to 
rein in sovereigns with a strong deficit bias (through higher risk premia). This 
could be understood as an institutional response to the “unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic” – establishing that central banks ultimately are resigned to giving 
in when fiscal policy embarks on an unsustainable course.15
13 Sargent, T.J. and Wallace, N. (1981), “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic”, Federal Reserve Bank of  Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 5(3).
14 See Canzoneri, M.B., Cumby, R.E. and Diba, B.T. (2002), “Should the European Central Bank and the Federal 
Reserve Be Concerned about Fiscal Policy?”, in Rethinking stabilization policy: A symposium, Kansas City, MO: Federal 
Reserve Bank of  Kansas City, pp. 333–389.
15 The fiscal theory of  the price level, starting from the observation that modern central banks control short-term 
interest rates (and not the money supply), argues that in the long run it is fiscal policy which pins down the path of  
the price level; see Woodford (2001), op. cit.. But this is, as Alan Blinder insists, a very long run or an “infinite run” 
that does not impose “any serious constraints” on actual politics; see Blinder (1982), op. cit.
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The global financial crisis, the euro crisis and a reassessment of  
the monetary–fiscal policy mix
The global financial crisis ushered in a substantial reassessment. Faced with 
a dramatic fall in output, a corresponding rise in unemployment (except for 
the case of  Germany) and central banks that were compelled to become 
highly unconventional (when reaching the effective lower bound), not only 
were automatic stabilisers left to do their work but also discretionary fiscal 
policy was rehabilitated. This came with a swift and very large increase in 
the level of  public debt (see Figure 1). Interest rates on government bonds, 
however, continued their long-term downward trend, except for the case of  
peripheral euro area economies (see Figure 2). In the latter cases, liquidity 
as well as solvency issues implied at times a substantial widening of  spreads 
against safe assets. The threat of  a euro area break-up (euphemistically dubbed 
“redenomination risk”) called for a compensation. 
Figure 1: Debt as a ratio to GDP (%) 
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Figure 2: Government bond yields (%)
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Overall, the global financial crisis has demonstrated that: 
•  price stability did not provide (simultaneously) for financial stability;
•  debt positions can become vulnerable and untenable – and rather suddenly 
so (e.g., Ireland and Spain) – with purported fiscal space becoming a 
chimera; this holds particularly true for sub-sovereigns (i.e., member states 
of  monetary unions); and
•  sovereign risk premia are evidently related to the access (or not) to lender-
of-last-resort or backstop facilities (e.g., Spain versus the United Kingdom).16 
The very substantial fiscal and monetary response to the global financial crisis 
– large increases in deficits and debt, substantial expansion of  central bank 
balance sheets – at the same time did not lead to a commensurate increase 
of  interest rates, risk premiums or inflation, at least not in the United States 
or EMU’s core.  
16 See De Grauwe, P. and Yuemei, J. (2013), “From Panic-Driven Austerity to Symmetric Macroeconomic Policies in 
the Eurozone”, Journal of  Common Market Studies (51): 31–41.
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In any case, there appears to be a Tobin-type “common funnel” also in the 
long run. Monetary policy cannot deliver without a sustainable fiscal policy.17 
However, this was still a world where banks – or non-bank banks (i.e., banks’ 
functional substitutes) – did not matter. In a number of  cases during the global 
financial crisis, however, it was the banking sector and private-debt instability 
eroding a presumed fiscal space extremely rapidly (think of  Ireland or Spain). 
This has to be accounted for in policymaking going forward. The euro area’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (for sure, delicate and complicated) is 
a first attempt at addressing these issues.
Cooperative monetary policy: Is it feasible… 
Debt-to-GDP ratios (in cross-country, longitudinal analyses) have a statistically, 
but not so much economically, significant impact on long-term interest rates. 
Also, in a number of  studies, thresholds with substantial confidence bands 
show up.18 In panel analyses, those non-linearities come largely from EMU 
member countries, possibly capturing a break-up and ultimately an inflation 
risk (in a new, devalued currency).19 
Fiscal stress does impact monetary policy.20 Monetary policy could be forced 
to accommodate an inevitable adjustment to a more sustainable position. 
Or, it might become subject to the dominance of  fiscal policy. But, it cannot 
disentangle itself  from this inescapable interdependence.
Accommodative monetary policy, however, might reduce incentives to adjust 
budgetary trajectories to a sustainable path. Fiscal policy might stay longer on 
an ultimately untenable course, eventually wreaking havoc with the inflation 
objective. While this moral hazard story is plausible, empirically, monetary 
support was a necessary condition of  fiscal consolidation. 
With fiscal policy embarked on an unsustainable path, there is not much 
that monetary policy could achieve. Fiscal dominance prevails. In Europe, 
in a number of  cases, it would be more appropriate to read things through a 
lens of  financial dominance. Fiscal policy, despite having the space in at least 
17 Woodford (2001, op. cit.) has an epigraph of  Karl Brunner’s: “Proposals for a monetary rule require a supplementary 
proposal of  a fiscal rule”.
18 See, for example, Cechetti, S., Mohanty, M.S. and Zampoli, F. (2010), “The Future of  Public Debt: Prospects and 
Implications”, Bank for International Settlements Working Paper No. 300, Basel; and Reinhart, C., Reinhart, V. and 
Rogoff, K. (2012), “Debt overhangs: Past and Present”, NBER Working Paper No. 18015, Cambridge, MA.
19 Greenlaw, D., Hamilton, J., Hooper, P. and Mishkin, F. (2013), “Crunch Time: Fiscal Crises and the Role of  Monetary 
Policy”, NBER Working Paper 19297, Cambridge, MA. Employing updated long-term interest-rate and government 
debt data for euro area economies, we ran panel fixed-effects regressions in the spirit of  Greenlaw et al. (2013). Our 
results confirm their findings - they are largely driven by observations from euro area peripheral economies.
20 Greenlaw et al. (2013), op. cit.
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some member states, let the ECB take care of  a number of  fragile banks. 
Clearly, monetary policy can only buy time, not deliver a solution to Europe’s 
overcapacity in banking. 
More specifically, against the background of  unconventional monetary policy, 
large-scale asset purchase programmes should also lead to substantial losses 
on the central bank’s balance sheet when rates ultimately rise, mechanically 
increasing with the duration of  assets bought. Although, what concerns the 
ECB is that this could mean a substantial shock to its capital buffer, the duration 
of  assets acquired being significantly lower than in the case of  the Federal 
Reserve. While central banks can do without equity for a while and up to a 
limit, their political and budgetary independence would evidently suffer.
… and what is the difference in Europe’s EMU? 
EMU member states are sub-sovereigns. They float their bonds in a currency 
over which they have no agency. The ECB is prohibited by the European 
Treaties from acting as a lender of  last resort to EMU governments. Therefore, 
liquidity risk premia (not unlike uninsured roll-over risk for bank debt) have 
become so pertinent in the EMU. That is also what gave its clout to the 
announcement of  conditional Outright Monetary Transactions in the summer 
of  2012. At the same time, OMT is the best that EMU member states in fragile 
fiscal positions can hope for. 
Hence, EMU member countries with barely any fiscal space to show for 
cannot rely on “their” central bank – the ECB is supra-national, or stateless. 
Relief  could only come from partner countries using their capacity to reduce 
output gaps (cushion the shock), restructuring (with its inevitable repercussions 
on vulnerable financial institutions) or a mutualisation of  sovereign risks 
(Eurobonds). The latter option seems to be far “out of  money”. 
In view of  a prevalent deficit bias – especially in polities with proportional 
representation and, hence, frequent coalition governments – fiscal rules to 
control debt as well as focusing on structural, cyclically corrected deficits 
(i.e., letting automatic stabilisers do their work) make sense.21 However, given 
the high variance in output gaps across EMU member states, automatic 
stabilisers sometimes might need some substantial discretionary support, as 
the global financial crisis has demonstrated. This is infeasible under the current 
institutional features of  the EMU. The SGP is prone to being procyclical at 
the country level. The recently installed European Fiscal Board might be 
tasked with assessing the appropriateness and need for a discretionary stance.
21 See Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995), “The Political Economy of  Budget Deficits”, IMF Staff Papers 42(1): 1–31.
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Going forward, a number of  questions and open issues have to be addressed. 
Monetary and fiscal policy actions are inextricably linked, in the short as well 
as the long run. In the wake of  the global financial crisis, both responded to 
financial instability. How should policy account for this “omitted” (crucial) 
variable? With fiscal space gone, are there any options left for monetary policy? 
Can we get back to the pre-crisis, Great Moderation environment? Or do 
we have to reconsider in the new world (with non-standard monetary policy 
interventions and an enlarged set of  tasks) the assignment of  stabilisation 
tasks and ways to coordinate these (rule-oriented or situation-dependent, 
discretionary)? What makes the euro area different? Can the United States 
be a blueprint? 
Banking union, for example, is an attempt to respond to the inexorable link 
between money and credit.22 But, of  course, the link between euro area sub-
sovereigns and their national banks has not been severed. Moreover, this is 
a potentially large source of  fiscal instability. In the case of  a systemic crisis, 
the bail-in option will not be available. Unfortunately, however, banking crises 
are typically systemic. In redesigning its financial regulatory system after the 
global financial crisis, the United States has not opted for a bail-in approach. 
It, of  course, has a federal backstop.
Panellist 1: Ardo Hansson
The focus of  this session links back to monetary policy, but we cannot get away 
from what we discussed during the sessions yesterday. Just to start, I would say 
that an accommodative monetary policy stance in the euro area is warranted 
now simply because inflation is below target and we have a very clear mandate. 
That is not very controversial. Inflation is driven significantly, although not 
entirely, by commodity prices. Sometimes we forget how substantial this 
commodity price shock was. We usually look at oil prices. However, if  we look 
more broadly and include metals, food prices, construction material prices and 
so on, they are probably 50% down in three years, and commodities are in 
all kinds of  goods and services that we consume. It was quite a serious shock. 
Yesterday, we talked about the difficulty of  measuring the output gap and that 
it is probably closing now. If  we look at unemployment rates, they are slowly 
coming down. So, the output gap is probably closing, and that is good news. 
It probably shows that at the margin, things are beginning to work. Looking 
forward, we have to keep our expectations somewhat realistic.
22 See Kotz, H.-H. (2017), “Monetary union, banking union: Money and credit, inexorably linked”, in L. Papademos 
(ed.), Banking Union and Monetary Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (forthcoming).
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Sometimes we get overly pessimistic about the cyclical positions. We refer 
to the earlier period as the Great Moderation. But in many countries, it was 
also a period of  great excess, maybe not so much in the fiscal accounts but 
certainly the financial sectors, balance of  payments, and so on were quite 
out of  balance in many countries. Looking back, and knowing what we now 
know, we probably regret some of  the things we did, but these now create our 
current initial conditions and give us more headwind. Since the outbreak of  
the crisis, to the extent that there was overleveraging before, it has subsequently 
got even worse. 
Moreover, measuring the output gap is tricky. This might also require a focus 
on labour market indicators. We see this in some countries such as Slovakia 
and the Baltic states, which admittedly do not account for a large share of  the 
euro area economy. When you simply look at the output gap in GDP terms, 
it sees to be below potential. However, if  you look at what is going on in the 
labour market, it is quite different. You may say that the economy is overheated. 
Thus, potential growth may not be as high as if  you could filter it out from 
the GDP growth series. In Estonia, we currently have GDP growth of  about 
1.5% but wage growth of  around 6.5%. This is very tricky. Potential growth 
might be even lower than we think. Getting inflation back to a higher level is 
important, but it is only a part of  the challenge. 
There is also a primitive mantra which says that those countries that have fiscal 
space should use it. However, many of  the countries that have fiscal space 
tend to be operating near or above full employment, and they should not be 
encouraged to drive their domestic economies even more out of  balance. At 
the same time, most of  the countries which could do with some stimulus do 
not have fiscal space. This was brought out in the presentation by Claudia 
Braz yesterday, which showed only two or three countries in the EU that have 
the potential to use fiscal space. This mantra is also incorrect in implying that 
fiscal space should ideally be zero. In other words, if  you have fiscal space, you 
should use it up. In fact, you should build up a bit of  fiscal space. 
Yesterday, we also talked about the aggregate fiscal position of  the euro area. 
This is a concept that probably makes sense in the United States. However, if  
we have over 95% of  our public expenditure at national or sub-national levels, 
this concept is quite policy irrelevant. Making a comparison, for example, 
with this hotel: what is the average temperature in this hotel? It is defined 
and measurable, but what does it mean if  I aim for an average temperature 
of  22 degrees, while it is currently 18 degrees? Someone comes in and says, 
“since all of  our thermostats are at maximum except the one in this conference 
room, you people will have to bear 40 degrees because we need to get average 
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temperature up”. You have to look country by country, because fiscal policy 
in a monetary union should be targeted more at domestic challenges than it 
might be otherwise. 
Figure 1: General government lending and gross fixed capital formation of  
euro area countries, average 2011–2015 (% of  GDP)
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Source: AMECO, European Commission.
Figure 1 shows the correlation between public investment and deficits in the 
euro area. You can change the time period, you can try to define it in structural 
terms, but the basic point is that there does not seem to be any relationship. 
If  you think that creating space to run larger deficits would make everyone 
start undertaking public investments, this would probably not help. In the end, 
this will dissipate in the consumption side and you could end up even worse 
off – you have dissipated your fiscal space, but you have not permanently 
channelled those expenditures into growth. 
We should not only talk about what to do now, but also why we got into this 
situation. Since that was most of  yesterday’s discussion, I will only say that if  you 
have a monetary union, you need more fiscal space than otherwise. Turning to 
what to do about monetary policy, it should remain broadly accommodative at 
this point in time, but there are two qualifiers. The first is the need to maintain 
a degree of  patience because there are lot of  special forces at play behind the 
current low inflation. We have had quite an unusual and severe commodity 
shock, and the extent of  leveraging – maybe overleveraging – is substantial. It 
will not go away anytime soon. That does create some headwinds which will 
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naturally make the transition a bit longer. Some work done at the Bank for 
International Settlements concludes much along the same lines. Second, you 
can also choose the composition of  monetary policy instruments which will 
deliver a given broad stance, but do so more carefully. You can always think of  
an instrument having an effect on inflation, but also as having either positive 
or negative spillover effects. By carefully considering all of  these effects, you 
can choose a mix to get the same impact on inflation but with different side 
effects on, for example, the behaviour of  enterprises and the behaviour of  
governments. Maybe you can deal more with moral hazard, issues on financial 
stability, and so on. It is like a doctor prescribing a medicine – of  course, they 
want you to get well, but there are many ways of  getting well and you want 
to make sure that there are as few negative side effects as possible. 
With regard to fiscal policy, there is a composition question. On both the 
revenue and expenditure sides, there is a lot of  scope in many countries to 
move to more growth-friendly mixes. Naturally, there is no mechanistic rule 
that says once public debt rises above 90% or 80% or 60% of  GDP, everything 
automatically moves from sustainable to unsustainable. However, we are not 
in a world of  public debt at 30% of  GDP, where we could have a discussion 
about counter-cyclical policies.  In many countries, there is more need to 
restore fiscal space and maintain confidence. 
Panellist 2: Jozef Makúch
Let me begin my presentation with a question to which an answer is widely 
sought: Is monetary policy facing a “new normal”, or is the current situation 
merely a temporary phenomenon? This seminar provides an ideal setting in 
which to explore the answer. 
Monetary policy implementation remains challenging
In recent years, central bankers have been facing a number of  serious and 
unprecedented challenges. While finding ourselves in unchartered waters, we 
must still steer a course that takes us to our objectives. The long-running 
deviation from the inflation target raises the questions of  whether the target is 
correct and whether the time is right for its reassessment. Some people argue 
that an increase in the target could raise inflation expectations, while others 
say that reducing the target would be reflective of  a long-term low-inflation 
environment. In my view, such discussions are still at the academic level. 
There needs to be research into whether inflation-target adjustments in other 
countries have had favourable and clear effects on expectations and on the 
transmission of  monetary policy to the economy as a whole. 
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Inflation is subdued despite monetary policy accommodation
Despite a continuous and substantial easing of  monetary policy conditions, 
the inflation target is being missed, mainly owing to strengthening headwinds. 
How is monetary policy supposed to outweigh sudden and unexpected shocks 
in oil prices, especially when they involve a combination of  demand and 
supply shocks? As studies show, a supply shock should have a positive impact 
on commodity-importing economies, and we see this most noticeably in the 
inflation rate. Is there a further pass-through to the wider economy, however, 
that would stimulate the demand side? The answer here seems to be: not as 
effectively as we would expect. The impact of  sudden and unexpected oil price 
shocks in an environment of  prolonged high unemployment, slower growth 
and very low inflation (even turning into deflation) may be putting downward 
pressure on inflation expectations. 
What should the monetary policy response be? 
I firmly agree with other speakers that monetary policy cannot deliver its full 
potential in the absence of  sustainable and responsible fiscal policy. But if  that 
ideal is not being practised, it may be asked whether monetary policy should, or 
could, be still more aggressive? The scope for deploying standard instruments 
is almost exhausted. We have even shown that interest rates are not zero-level 
bound; they can be lower still and we are now testing how low they can go. 
Looking closely at interest rates, it is clear and logical that monetary policy 
transmission has a greater impact on lending activity than on deposit-taking 
business. The resulting narrowing of  margins has had a significant, but still 
manageable, negative impact on banking sector profits. If, however, further 
easing of  monetary policy is necessary, it will have to be conducted cautiously 
so as not to bring about a totally counterproductive threat to financial stability. 
I myself  do not see much room for manoeuvre here. 
At a time when liquidity is excessive, bond yields and interest rates remain 
at all-time lows and the ECB balance sheet is as large as it has ever been, 
inflation still remains muted. In what other ways could monetary policy be 
accommodative? Recently, unconventional instruments were introduced on the 
assumption that they were temporary, short-term measures, but the situation 
has changed and we should therefore get used to a new normal in the monetary 
policy arsenal. There is a role here, too, for the academic debate to explore 
the potential for using other, new non-standard instruments as the need may 
arise. The question is whether they will be as effective as earlier measures. 
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In the case of  the euro area, there is no need at present to consider further 
accommodation. The recent non-standard measures have not had sufficient 
time to do what they were intended to do. 
No excuses for fiscal policy
The effectiveness of  monetary policy is, as we have been taught, heavily 
dependent on the environment in which it is implemented. While monetary 
policy has tools to stimulate demand, it cannot influence the performance of  
the supply side of  economy, which is crucial for sustainable growth. Although 
the scope for fiscal policy is limited, we should not take that as a new normal. 
We should not see fiscal policy as some kind of  Sleeping Beauty. At the time 
when monetary policy targets and the ECB mandate were being formulated, 
it was assumed that responsible fiscal policy and the responses of  product and 
labour markets to imbalances would be sufficiently strong and flexible to prevent 
extended deviation from the equilibrium. As it turned out, that assumption was 
not universally valid. Since fiscal policy was not always conducted responsibly 
in the good times, it has been unable to aid monetary policy in the bad times 
by easing conditions and supporting economic growth. But despite the lack 
of  fiscal leeway, it is incumbent on governments not only to consolidate public 
finances, but through reforms, to lay the ground for stimulating the supply side 
of  economic growth. In the short term, governments must assume growth-
friendly consolidation by making efficiency savings in those areas of  the public 
sector where the potential for productivity gains is significant. 
Panellist 3: Boris Vujčić 23
I took the task of  reflecting on the conduct of  monetary policy in a limited 
fiscal space situation very seriously. First, I will examine how much fiscal space 
exists and then look at the possibilities for monetary policy – not only for pure 
monetary policy but also for macroprudential policy, which I believe is very 
important and has been often overlooked. In the latter context, I will shed 
light on the implementation of  counter-cyclical monetary policy in Croatia.
Fiscal space and cyclicality of  fiscal policy in the EU
Expectations as to what monetary policy can achieve in Europe have risen 
over the course of  the crisis. Demands that it should go beyond its principal 
mandate of  price (and financial) stability and try to support economic recovery 
more directly have come from both politicians and the general public. What 
23 I would like to thank Josip Funda, Igor Ljubaj and Alan Bobetko for their valuable contributions.
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has led to such developments, especially when we know that it is fiscal policy 
that can have a more direct and faster effect on the real economy? You build 
a road, your investments go up, maybe you will create some multiplier effects, 
your GDP increases – it seems quite simple. So, why would you go in for all 
these complicated LTROs, OMTs, QEs, etc.? The answer to this question lies 
in problems of  debt sustainability for all sectors of  the economy, including the 
government, which has substantially narrowed the fiscal space (see Figures 1 
and 2), while structural reforms take time to deliver tangible results.
This lack of  fiscal space in most European economies can be largely attributed 
to the lack of  prudent fiscal policies in good times (before the crisis erupted 
and escalated), when most countries were running high structural deficits 
and procyclical fiscal policies. However, somewhat in their defence, at that 
time most countries were not fully aware of  the magnitude of  structural fiscal 
imbalances, as potential GDP levels were perceived to be higher than they 
are now estimated to have been for the same period. Ex post assessment of  
structural balances by the European Commission for 2007 for almost all EU 
countries are less favourable than estimates presented in the Commission’s 
Autumn 2008 forecast.24
There are many definitions of  fiscal space. For example, the IMF defines it 
as the scope that policymakers have to calibrate the pace of  fiscal adjustment 
without undermining fiscal sustainability. In other words, short-run room for 
manoeuvre must always be weighed against the objective of  fiscal sustainability 
over the medium to long run. However, with a fiscal framework that contains 
relatively strict rules, it is the rules-defined fiscal space that matters and we can 
forget about debt limits and other, more theoretical approaches. So, to put it 
simply, the difference between a country’s structural balance and its Medium-
Term Objective (MTO) is the measure for fiscal space in the EU.
 
24 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication13290_en.pdf
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Figure 1: Fiscal space in 2007                    
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Figure 2: Fiscal space in 2016
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As the European fiscal framework was less strict at the beginning of  the crisis, 
even without fiscal space, countries did try to stimulate their economies and a 
package of  stimulus measures was also prepared at the EU level in 2009 and 
2010. However, the escalation of  the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area put 
fiscal policy into urgency mode, with the ultimate objective of  bringing debt 
levels back to sustainable paths. So, procyclical fiscal tightening dominated in 
the EU in the 2011–2013 period (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Cyclicality of  fiscal policy in the European Union
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Croatia’s fiscal policy was procyclical both before and after the onset of  financial 
crisis. Fiscal policy procyclicality is well known in the literature and, although 
there is no unanimity among economists about the optimal cyclical behaviour 
of  fiscal policy, there is broad consensus that procyclical policies should be 
avoided as they add to macroeconomic instability. From a Keynesian point 
of  view, that is, a procyclical fiscal policy amplifies fluctuations in real output, 
thereby leading to prolonged recessions in bad times. From a neoclassical point 
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of  view, a procyclical fiscal policy is in conflict with the consumption- and 
tax-smoothing principles, which prescribe that government spending and tax 
rates should remain unaffected by business cycle fluctuations.25
Figure 4: Cyclicality of  fiscal policy in Croatia
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Nevertheless, procyclical fiscal policies were, and still are, a Croatian reality. 
During 2003–2008, the Croatian economy was seemingly doing well and 
real GDP was above its potential level while, at the same time, the structural 
primary deficit deteriorated, which had a procyclical effect on economic 
activity. Only in 2005 was there an adjustment of  the underlying primary 
balance, leading to a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The lack of  fiscal space also 
led to procyclical fiscal behaviour in the crisis period. The fiscal adjustment 
was especially notable in 2015, when the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
improved by almost 2.0% of  GDP. For the sake of  clarity, what is relevant 
25 See Andersen, L.A., and Nielsen, L.H.W. (2008), “Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy”, University 
of  Copenhagen (available at http://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/Fiscal%20Transparency%20and%20Procyclical%20
Fiscal%20Policy%20_jan%2008_.pdf).
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here is whether the amount of  resources that the government is placing in the 
economy is increasing or decreasing, which is different from a simple change 
in the government deficit. 
However, Croatia is not an exception in such behaviour. On the contrary, a 
procyclicality bias can be observed in many other EU countries. This was 
especially the case before the crisis (the good times), and after the onset of  the 
sovereign debt crisis (the bad times), as already shown in Figure 3. Looking at 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries only, some did have a counter-
cyclical stance in different years. But if  you look at a GDP-weighted average 
of  the fiscal stance, again you get the fact that fiscal policies were actually in 
the wrong place before and after the crisis, basically acting procyclically rather 
than counter-cyclically (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Cyclicality of  fiscal policy in CEE EU member states
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Such a policy orientation has led to a gradual public debt stabilisation in the 
EU after a strong surge in debt-to-GDP ratios during 2009–2010. In 2015, 
public debt in the EU28 declined from the previous year. However, it was still 
almost 25 percentage points of  GDP higher than in 2008. Notwithstanding 
the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, interest payments in the EU decreased 
somewhat due to a decline in borrowing costs. However, as the debt level 
remains high in many countries, the heavy burden of  interest payments weighs 
on the ability of  fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. Here, Croatia stands 
out as a country with one of  the largest increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
one of  the highest interest payments-to-GDP ratios in the EU, having almost 
doubled in the past seven years. This makes the budget quite sensitive to interest 
rate shocks, and therefore the contractionary fiscal policy will probably have 
to continue for a while (Figures 6 and 7). 
Figure 6: General government debt, 2015 
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Figure 7: Interest payments, 2015
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Counter-cyclical monetary policy in Croatia
The Croatian National Bank (CNB) has maintained a counter-cyclical 
monetary policy stance since well before the start of  the crisis. In the pre-crisis 
period, this entailed maintaining a large part of  credit institutions’ assets as 
a regulatory buffer to curb what was perceived by the CNB as an excessive 
and unsustainable credit growth. These measures proved to be very beneficial 
in giving some independence in monetary policymaking. Credit growth was 
heavily taxed, and banks were asked to have a lot of  foreign exchange liquidity. 
Measures involved strong penalisation of  abundant capital inflows in the 
banking sector, while capital requirements were linked to foreign exchange 
lending to the borrowers who were not hedged. This forward-looking policy 
stance enabled the CNB to release large amounts of  foreign currency liquidity 
following the onset of  the crisis (Figure 8), while at the same time keeping the 
banking system highly capitalised, stable and resistant to shocks. Therefore, 
with the stubborn recession in Croatia, the monetary policy stance in recent 
years has been highly accommodative and strongly oriented towards leaning 
against the cycle (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8: The Croatian National Bank’s monetary policy indicator
!"#
!$#
%%#
%&#
'(#
'"#
)*+,-./012*345014+645.-*/ -478-,+4+711111111111111111113**9,+4+711111
Note: Monetary policy indicator = credit institutions’ assets required by regulation/total credit 
institutions’ assets. Assets required by regulation (net of  excess liquidity) include calculated 
reserve requirement in Croatian kuna, allocated reserve requirement in foreign currency, 
marginal reserve requirement, CNB bills and minimal foreign currency liquidity.
Source: CNB.
To conduct proper policy actions, awareness of  the cyclicality is crucial. As in 
the case of  fiscal policy, if  the macroprudential policy or prudential policy is 
in the wrong place in one part of  the cycle, it will surely be in the wrong place 
in the other part of  the cycle. This is what happened in many other countries 
where prudential regulation and marginal regulation costs were increased 
through the crisis. On the one hand, central banks had very expansionary 
monetary policies, while on the other hand marginal regulation costs were 
going up for the banks, offsetting to some extent the monetary policy effects. 
Leaning against the cycle in the case of  Croatia was clearly counter-cyclical 
(Figure 9).
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Figure 9: The Croatian National Bank’s leaning against the cycle: Monetary 
policy stance and output gap
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Source: CNB.
Nowadays, the CNB is further boosting the already exceptionally high liquidity 
of  the monetary system, which in relative terms is several times higher than 
in the euro area. In 2016, the CNB also introduced structural repo operations 
through which it started providing liquidity with a four-year maturity, clearly 
showing that the expansionary stance will be maintained for some time. This 
led to an additional decrease in money market interest rates. The yield of  
T-bills in Croatian kuna with a one-year maturity fell below 1% in March 
2016, an historically low level (Figure 10). The overnight interbank interest 
rate also recorded favourable developments, averaging 0.5% during the first 
quarter of  2016.
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Figure 10: Surplus liquidity and money market interest rates
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In line with monetary policy efforts, financing conditions have been improving. 
The average interest rate on short-term corporate loans fell from 7.5% in 2009 
to 4.8% in March 2016, while the cost of  long-term corporate loans decreased 
by almost two percentage points in the same period (Figure 11). It should be 
noted that due to emerged global and sovereign risks, a peak in interest rates 
was recorded in 2009, even though the monetary counter-cyclical response to 
the crisis was already substantial. Financing costs for households have generally 
also been on a downward path.26
Notwithstanding the monetary policy efforts, interest rates for firms and 
households remain significantly higher than in the euro area. Obviously, 
their stronger downward adjustment is constrained by structural factors, most 
notably the sovereign risk. In fact, the risk of  default matters more now than 
it did prior to the crisis. Although lending rates have generally fallen from 
their pre-crisis levels, at the same time they have become more divergent 
and dispersed, in line with the divergence of  the perceived sovereign risks 
26 The interest rates on housing loans jumped considerably in December 2015 because of  the conversion of  loans in 
Swiss francs. The level of  the renegotiated interest rates on converted loans was determined by a special law and, 
for a significant portion of  those loans, it was higher than the market interest rate currently applicable to newly 
approved housing loans indexed to the euro. In contrast, the average interest rates on the total of  newly approved 
long-term household loans (including housing loans) fell considerably as a result of  the conversion, as the share of  
newly approved housing loans in all long-term household loans rose sharply in the process of  conversion and the 
interest rates on those converted loans were, as a rule, much lower than those on non-housing long-term loans.
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(Figure 12). This suggests that there is still room for further lowering of  interest 
rates in Croatia, but the pace will depend on a number of  factors that are 
beyond the scope of  domestic monetary policy, including macroeconomic 
fundamentals and investor perceptions. Overall, financing conditions are much 
easier and interest rates are lower, but it matters even more how the country 
is perceived on a risk-scale basis.
Figure 11: Domestic bank interest rates 
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On the other hand, this also points to potential spillover risks to local corporate 
borrowing costs from global monetary policy tightening. In fact, a rise in 
global interest rates would produce an automatic increase of  the already 
high sovereign debt burden through the “snowball effect”, and the growing 
refinancing costs of  government would be passed on and mirrored in higher 
interest rates for enterprises.
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Figure 12: Credit ratings and bank interest rates for short-term corporate 
loans
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Note: Rating is expressed as average numerical value or rating grades by the three major rating 
agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; for 2007 only Fitch). Numerical values 
represent positive/negative distance from investment grade BBB–/Baa3. Rating ranges between 
–9 and 9, where –9 represents the lowest speculative grade (C by Fitch and Moody’s, and R by 
S&P), and 9 represents the best possible grade (AAA by Fitch and S&P and Aaa by Moody’s). 
Lending rates refer to new lending to non–financial corporations with maturity up to one year 
amounting to up to €1 million. 
Sources: ECB, Bloomberg and Fitch Ratings.
Concluding remarks
The need for fiscal adjustment leads to higher expectations of  monetary policy. 
This has not taken monetary policy beyond the mandate of  central banks, 
but pressure on them is certainly present. On the contrary, by supporting the 
economy through historically low interest rates and unconventional policies, 
central banks are exactly contributing to the fulfilment of  the main objective. 
However, they are running out of  ammunition. Surprisingly, debates are now 
emerging over whether expansionary fiscal policy should be used exceptionally 
at the current juncture in order to support the closure of  output gaps. This 
points to a further need for coordination of  different streams of  economic 
policy. Otherwise, as Gürkaynak and Davig have emphasised, trade-offs for 
central banks will be worsened and the incentives of  other policymakers 
distorted.27
In the case of  Croatia, with a monetary framework based on exchange rate 
stability – which is the corner stone of  inflation expectations and of  financial 
stability – degrees of  freedom are reduced. Nevertheless, as a result of  prudent 
monetary policy before the crisis, the CNB has managed to provide ample 
liquidity to the financial sector and maintain financial stability.  However, 
monetary policy can only buy time and lower the cost of  structural reforms; it 
cannot provide liquidity ad infinitum. A key policy priority is to embark anew on 
deep structural reforms that will increase the competitiveness of  the domestic 
economy and the efficiency of  the public sector.
27 Gürkaynak, R. and Davig, T. (2015), “Perils of  central banks as policymakers of  last resort”, VoxEU.org, 
25 November (available at http://voxeu.org/article/central-bankers-policymakers-last-resort).
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Panellist 4: Gent Sejko
Before going into more detail on the topic of  this panel, I would like to share 
some thoughts with you regarding the coordination of  monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
The price stability mandate of  central banks and their operational independence 
do not lessen the need for effective coordination between monetary and fiscal 
policies. At a strategic level, the foremost objective of  macroeconomic policy 
is to achieve sustainable growth, in a context of  price stability and a viable 
external account.
This goal requires the contribution of  both fiscal and the monetary policies, 
within their respective domains, as well as a fair degree of  coordination 
amongst them.
On a macro scale, a balanced policy mix and an effective policy coordination 
requires:
i. Policy sustainability: monetary and fiscal policies need to be on a sustainable 
path. Prevailing academic consensus requires this sustainability to be 
anchored in simple and effective policy rules, such as an inflation-targeting 
regime and some kind of  fiscal sustainability law. Furthermore, sustainability 
is mutually reinforcing: inflation expectations can only be anchored if  fiscal 
policy does not raise destabilising fears while, at the same time, the fiscal 
policy can be more sustainable if  it is not burdened by excessively high 
interest rates, fuelled by a not-so-credible monetary policy.
ii. Policy credibility: monetary and fiscal policies need to be credible. Policy 
credibility arises from a combination of  a clear and sustainable policy 
framework, the right structure of  incentives, as well as a positive track 
record.
iii. Policy awareness: in other words, the recognition of  different goals, different 
transmission channels and different time frames, informing and constraining 
monetary and fiscal policies.
In the long run, a balanced policy mix would minimise demand volatility, 
enhance the allocation of  resources and promote long-term growth. Effective 
policy coordination would limit the fiscal deficit to a level that can be financed 
via capital markets, without recourse to monetary financing, without distorting 
the allocation of  resources, and without unsustainable external borrowing. 
Effective policy coordination would also bind monetary policy towards 
achieving its price stability mandate, thus reducing long-term risk premia 
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and supporting financial stability. As a corollary to all that I have mentioned, 
a weak stance in one policy area burdens the other policy area with excessive 
demands.
This brings me to the specific topic of  this panel: conducting monetary policy 
when fiscal space is limited. 
The aftermath of  the recent crisis left all economies in the region struggling 
to reignite economic growth. Most of  the countries are doing this while at 
the same time facing the pressing need to consolidate their public finances.
Albania is no exception. Although the repercussions of  the crisis were not so 
severe, economic growth has almost halved compared to its pre-crisis trajectory. 
Aggregate demand is unable to generate full employment of  labour and capital, 
while CPI inflation has continuously undershot our target. In this economic 
landscape, our monetary policy has taken an ever-more expansionary stance: 
the policy rate (currently at 1.25%) is at an historical low, which would have 
been unthinkable a few years ago; we have increased our liquidity injection 
operations as well as expanded the range of  acceptable collateral; and we have 
also made use of  conditional forward guidance as an alternative instrument 
of  monetary policy.
On the other hand, our public debt jumped from around 55% of  GDP in 2008 
to around 72% of  GDP today, on account of  the joint action of  automatic 
stabilisers and some degree of  counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus. However, this 
fiscal expansion was thought to be unsustainable, especially given the difficult 
financing conditions in international financial markets. It was also thought to 
be counterproductive, because of  crowding-out concerns in the presence of  
tight liquidity conditions in domestic financial markets and because of  negative 
feedback loops through higher risk premia.
As a result, our fiscal policy is now locked on a consolidation path, aiming 
to bring the public debt below 60% of  GDP by the end of  this decade. This 
means that monetary policy remains the only counter-cyclical tool to stimulate 
economic activity. Taking everything into account, I believe fiscal consolidation, 
coupled with an expansionary monetary policy, delivers the correct policy mix 
in the country.
However, given our experience so far, I would like to conclude my speech with 
three observations: 
i. Monetary policy remains effective even in the presence of  fiscal consolidation. 
In Albania, we have been able to steer interest rates into a downward 
trajectory and to stimulate credit growth in domestic currency. However, 
the effectiveness of  monetary policy is hampered by fiscal contraction. 
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While the two policies moving in opposite directions would not be ideal 
in the best of  times, it is doubly undesirable in the presence of  balance-
sheet adjustment in the private sector and heightened risk premia and 
deleveraging in the financial sector. 
ii. Monetary policy can still achieve its goal of  price stability in the presence 
of  fiscal consolidation. However, this statement needs to be qualified 
further. From a longer-term perspective, inflation remains a monetary 
phenomenon. If  a central bank is committed to its price stability mandate, 
and given enough time for the monetary transmission mechanism to work, 
there should be no reason why we should not be able to meet our inflation 
targets. However, there are two caveats here:
• In pursuit of  its inflation target, a central bank can, and might, be forced to engage 
in unconventional monetary policy tools. This is very much the case when 
central banks are flirting with the limits of  conventional instruments 
of  monetary policy (the zero lower bound of  policy rates or extreme 
risk aversion in the financial system). As we know, unconventional tools 
can both be distortionary and present us with the risks of  unintended 
consequences in terms of  financial stability. Under certain premises, 
the risk associated with employing unconventional monetary policy 
tools might be sufficiently strong to revisit the scope or the speed of  
fiscal consolidation;
• A prolonged undershooting of  the inflation target might decouple inflation expectations 
from the inflation target of  central banks, requiring a more active monetary policy. 
This is not an argument against the policy mix per se; rather, it is a 
reminder of  the crucial role that central bank communication and 
management of  expectations should have.
iii. We should avoid burdening monetary policy with too many goals or risk 
losing our credibility. With public finances highly indebted, politicians have 
been only too happy to place the burden of  economic recovery on central 
banks. As central bankers, we might enjoy this visibility, but we must be 
cautious to not get carried away. We must always remind ourselves of  
what monetary policy can and cannot achieve: we can ultimately affect 
nominal variables in the economy (i.e., the price level), but we can affect 
neither long-term growth nor general prosperity in the economy. To that 
extent, I think we must always remind politicians to carry out their duties 
on structural reforms and make best use of  the breathing space provided 
by monetary policy.
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Panellist 5: Vitas Vasiliauskas 
This is the right place and the right time to discuss various issues related to 
fiscal policy and monetary policy. Some of  the issues of  my presentation 
were already touched upon in the previous panels. But, since I was taught at 
university that repetitio est mater studiorum, I believe that repetition will be helpful 
in our case as well. Let me start by framing these issues and conclude with a 
couple of  directions that I think should guide the solutions. 
The euro area has to deal with the worst of  both worlds: weak potential 
growth and a cyclical recovery. After the global financial crisis, a number 
of  structural issues emerged in many states. High structural unemployment, 
lack of  competitiveness, inefficient judicial procedures and the burden of  
non-performing loans (NPLs) – countries are dealing with these with varying 
degrees of  success. These are difficult issues due to their short-term costs. But, 
from the perspective of  long-term growth it is imperative that these reforms 
are continued and that, in most cases, the progress should be faster.
At the same time – and this is an issue for today’s discussion – the cyclical 
recovery, and especially domestic demand, is very fragile. The incentives to 
consume and to invest are still rather weak. It will take a while before the 
views of  consumers and businesses independently converge. A push “from 
outside” is needed.
Let me back this up with some facts.
First, euro area domestic demand is continuing to grow too slowly, and has 
been doing so for too long. If  we look at the cumulative percentage change 
since the peak in 2008 – the green bars in Figure 1 – it is still negative. The 
traditional measure of  the cyclical position – the output gap (the red diamonds 
in the figure) – shows broadly the same picture. Seven years have passed, but 
a number of  member states are still producing below their potential. 
Second, the aggregate euro area indicator masks large variations between 
cyclical positions of  member states. Some countries are well into the recovery 
stage, while many others still have sizeable output gaps. 
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Figure 1: Domestic demand and output gaps
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Source: European Commission, Eurostat.
How can episodes like this be prevented? 
The institutional design in the euro area foresees the role of  business cycle 
stabilisation for monetary policy. The role of  fiscal policy is seen as automatic 
and as stabilising the economies in response to (mostly small) non-systemic 
asymmetric shocks. Gaps in this design emerge when a number of  economies 
are subject to negative shocks that are sufficiently large to affect the whole 
region. The current situation is a good illustration of  that. 
To offset shocks of  this magnitude, the desirable effect can be achieved by 
a combined policy response. The Eurosystem’s accommodative monetary 
policy has been gradually reinforced through several packages since 2014. 
We observe that monetary accommodation has improved confidence and 
financial conditions. The ECB’s focused communication and the commitment 
to monetary easing until inflation returns to the long-term target has prevented 
deflationary environment. 
Let me now turn to fiscal policy. Debt levels, which are above the Maastricht 
criterion of  60% of  GDP in a majority of  the member states, highlight 
sustainability concerns. Meanwhile, large negative output gaps indicate the 
need for stabilisation policies. 
So how can we find the right balance between the economic stabilisation and 
debt sustainability objectives of  fiscal policy? My first direction is a credible 
fiscal framework. In recessions, despite a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance, 
credible long-term fiscal commitments should be able to convince markets 
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of  the determination of  member states to steer their debt ratios towards 
the Maastricht rule. It would then be possible to create some fiscal space 
in the short term which would help to put more emphasis on the economic 
stabilisation objective.
The current fiscal framework, de jure, foresees some of  these principles. De 
facto, the picture is far from this. With strong emphasis on sustainability of  
public finances but without real corrective action, member states are losing 
confidence and credibility in bond markets. As a result, countries have to bear 
negative consequences without proper gains from the real structural changes 
in public finances. 
Let us have a look at some evidence.
While dealing with the recent economic challenges, the EU has proved its 
ability to take on ambitious commitments. But, at this stage, the most important 
thing is the ability to deliver what was agreed. Just to illustrate: at the moment, 
according to the European Commission’s assessment of  the draft budgetary 
plans for 2016, only four EU member states fully comply with the provisions of  
the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, none of  the EU states fully addressed 
any out of  102 country-specific recommendations for 2015/2016. More than 
90% of  all reform recommendations were implemented only with limited or 
some progress (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Progress on implementation of  country-specific recommendations, 
2015–2016 
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Why is the EU’s track record in complying with the agreed rules so poor? 
More importantly, how can that be changed?
We need strong political will to enforce what we jointly agreed on by 
strengthening and making the existing rules more binding. Currently, there is 
room for interpretation and enforcement is almost non-existent. Clarity and 
simplicity of  the rules, as well as compliance and enforcement mechanisms, 
should be among the main guiding principles. These are the necessary 
conditions for credibility of  fiscal policies in the euro area. 
Another direction is feasibility. There are many policy proposals on the table. 
They range from fully fledged fiscal union with substantial component of  
federalism, to minor improvements to the current framework, to no changes 
at all. Very often, suggestions that look economically attractive are not feasible 
to implement in practice. For example, at the current juncture, a genuine fiscal 
union with a common euro area budget and borrowing capacity is hardly 
feasible owing to political and legal constraints. The idea of  a euro area finance 
ministry is also likely to be controversial in most member states. 
Figure 3: Effectiveness and feasibility of  alternative fiscal frameworks
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However, better enforcement of  our existing rules could also be achieved 
by enhancing the current fiscal framework. Higher transparency, policy 
credibility over the longer term and limited leeway for interpretation would 
be the objectives of  these potential changes.  
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The experience of  the last few years has shown that the current fiscal framework 
has some limitations, especially when economies are hit by large negative 
shocks. Thus, changes may be warranted. The content and details of  these 
changes may vary, but concrete policy proposals should be discussed with two 
guiding principles in mind. These changes should (i) ensure credibility of  the 
fiscal framework, and (ii) be politically feasible.  
Panellist 6: Lubomír Lízal
I would like to talk about the Czech experience with monetary policy when 
fiscal space is limited. Briefly, I would like to give you some flavour of  Livin’ on 
the Edge, if  I might go back to the musical analogy used by my predecessor.28 
Actually, the debate is not whether fiscal policy is the most efficient. That is 
certain. The question always is whether there is space for fiscal policy that 
can and should be used.
Figure 1: Five-year government bond yields of  selected countries (% p.a.)
!"
#
"
$#
$"
%#
%"
&#
#$'#" #$'#( #$'#) #$'#* #$'#+ #$'$# #$'$$ #$'$% #$'$& #$'$, #$'$" #$'$(
-. /0 12 03 45 62 75
!"##$
Source: Bloomberg L.P., Thomson Datastream.
I would like to use Figure 1 to illustrate that, in general, any perception may 
sometimes be completely wrong. In particular, at one extreme, perceptions of  
no specific sovereign risk were widespread before 2008, when all countries in 
Europe were more or less equal. After the crisis, you get complete divergence 
of  yields, which is just the other extreme of  the same type of  belief. 
28 www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nqcL0mjMjw.
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This graph illustrates two things I consider to be important. First, if  you see 
such a huge movement of  the pendulum from one extreme to the other, you 
might be worried about your own position, especially when you are not certain 
whether the extremes were truly extreme.
The other thing is that, historically, all the small CEE countries are typically 
viewed by analysts as being one big animal, not a group of  small, sometimes 
rather different species. The outside world does not distinguish the differences. 
This is quite a dangerous situation for these countries. Typically, you have a first 
movement that can be quite problematic, with huge overshooting, and after 
that you probably see some correction. But the message is that the volatility 
can be excessive with regard to individual fundamentals. Boris Vujčić has 
shown that the Czech Republic had a public debt of  somewhere around 40% 
of  GDP. From that you would conclude that the Czech Republic has quite 
substantial space for fiscal expansion, fulfilling the SGP and all the criteria 
that were there. That is a rational view. But, Czech fiscal policy was procyclical 
before the crisis. Following the crisis and the related havoc on sovereign bond 
markets, an anti-deficit policy climate came into being. It was not easy to 
be expansionary again, especially when the markets were on the verge of  
punishing countries that had been having problems with fiscal deficits. This 
leads me to my second point.
One part of  the problem we might have is the space that is truly available. 
The second binding limit is the perceived space available. Given the discipline 
of  the markets that might be behind the curve or with a wrong swing of  the 
pendulum, the perceived fiscal space limits could be more detrimental than 
the actual limits. You can see that although fiscal policy was expansionary 
to some extent at the beginning, it was also procyclical with the real cyclical 
position. So, monetary policy somehow had to react to that and provide the 
needed additional stimulus. One thing I should mention regarding the local 
situation is that Czech core inflation had been negative for a long time, basically 
since the start of  the crisis (see adjusted inflation in Figure 2). As the outside 
environment was not that detrimental from the point of  view of  inflation, the 
central bank was able to cope with the situation using standard instruments. 
But at the end of  2012, we got to the zero bound with our statutory rates. At 
that time, the Czech National Bank switched to so-called technical zero, which 
means that all deposit interest rates were set close to zero.
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Figure 2: Situation of  the Czech economy in 2013 
Core (adjusted) inflation and prices of  tradeables and non-tradeables (year-
on-year % change)
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You can see the small blue dip at the end of  the series of  the non-tradable part 
of  inflation in Figure 2. At that time, both elements of  inflation – domestic 
and foreign – were on the verge of  going into a deflationary spiral. So the 
question was what to do next. As an inflation-targeter, you might have certain 
well-justified exemptions as regards deviations from headline inflation, but that 
was not the case in 2013. At that time, central banks were facing limits on 
standard monetary policy and had to use other instruments. We saw a lot of  
forward guidance, but there were also other instruments on the table. Given 
the specific situation of  the Czech economy and the Czech financial sector, 
we had yet another problem (or maybe a blessing). We were in the opposite 
situation to the majority of  countries from a financial stability point of  view. 
We are a net lender and the Czech financial sector was, and still is, healthy and 
flooded with liquidity. During the financial crisis, the Czech Republic and its 
public money did not have to save or help any bank operating in the country.
That actually means we were very close to what we might call a liquidity trap. 
In that respect, you need to think about what a QE-type programme would be 
doing. It would be putting further liquidity into a segment that does not need 
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it. In addition, all the excessive liquidity was parked at the central bank at that 
time anyway. It was clear that providing liquidity would not bring about any 
further monetary easing. The other thing I should mention is that, although 
there was a debate about forward guidance, we were not sure it would provide 
enough of  a stimulus at that time. And last but not least, negative rates – 
although they had been discussed, with the exception of  the Danish central 
bank, there were no cases of  negative rates in 2013. But, most importantly, we 
were afraid that the future might not be as bright as was perceived and that 
another round of  monetary easing would be needed. In that case, we would 
face the same dilemma. Going slightly negative means you can go a bit further, 
but if  you need a substantial further loosening of  monetary policy, you have 
the same dilemma of  choosing yet another instrument.
We opted for a foreign-exchange-type commitment. This is a modified 
version of  what you can find in the papers by Lars Svensson, the former 
deputy governor of  the Swedish central bank, on escaping a liquidity trap. 
We introduced some modifications, but the economic principle was the same: 
the central bank would announce a commitment to weaken the currency to a 
level that is sustainable with respect to achieving the set inflation target. From 
that perspective, we believed that such a commitment – and I also refer to the 
discussion in the first panel yesterday – is a problem-solver in a situation where 
other channels of  monetary policy pass-through are not working that well. 
To provide you with some flavour of  how it worked: it worked quite well on 
the real economy but not on inflation. In short, the situation of  the Czech 
economy in 2013 was characterised by extremely sluggish domestic demand. 
The problems were of  a domestic nature and did not relate to changes in 
foreign demand. In this situation, we needed to loosen the monetary conditions, 
and here the exchange rate commitment served us well. However, inflation 
remained quite low and was even lower than before. Figure 3 shows the 
components of  inflation. The red bars are domestic pressures, and you can 
see that after the commitment they turned from negative to positive. Headline 
inflation is being pushed down by oil and commodity prices, truly external 
factors out of  the control of  the central bank.
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Figure 3: Contributions of  the components of  inflation
Annual percentage changes; contributions in percentage points
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From this perspective, I would argue that the commitment has served us well, 
although we have postponed the exit from the commitment several times due 
to the fact that we have been in an era of  low international commodity prices 
and of  disinflation from the euro area. Figure 4 summarises the real monetary 
conditions, separating the effect of  the interest rate from that of  the exchange 
rate. You can see that the central bank has always been on the loose side with 
the interest rate, but with a floating exchange rate it is really the rate – see the 
red bars below zero before the foreign exchange commitment – that has been 
continuously tightening the monetary position.
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Figure 4: Czech monetary conditions
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Sources: Czech National Bank calculations.
When using the exchange rate, you always have to have a debate about beggar-
thy-neighbour policy. Any policy using the exchange rate, of  course, is always 
suspected of  doing just that. Here, I have two simplified facts explaining why 
our exchange rate commitment is not a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. If  you 
look at the effective exchange rate, you can see that the commitment set the rate 
in real terms at more or less where it was before the crisis in 2007. Why? During 
the crisis, the Czech currency witnessed quite a substantial appreciation, up to 
10%. You can also see that other CEE peers – such as Hungary and Poland – 
that had higher inflation before the crisis had more standard space to loosen 
their monetary policy, and thus also witnessed an accompanying decline in the 
real exchange rate. For us, there was also a ripening of  the sweet-gone-sour 
fruits of  low inflation before the crisis. Since we were a low inflation country 
(close to Germany in terms of  inflation numbers), our standard monetary 
space was also limited. And last but not least, as a paradox, one cannot use the 
beggar-thy-neighbour label for the exchange rate policy in our case, because 
after the commitment weakened the currency, we witnessed an increased rate 
of  imports. A completely counter-intuitive effect has been achieved. The reason 
is that with the exchange rate commitment we have moved the real interest rate 
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down, stimulating demand for investment – and the majority of  the investment 
is of  an import nature. We saw an effect opposite to that which you would 
normally see with a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
General discussion
Dubravko Mihaljek: Are there any points that panellists would still like to 
make, any emphasis that they would like to add, any reactions to what others 
have said? We have, broadly speaking, moved from considering room for 
monetary policy in a situation where countries do not have their own monetary 
policy and fiscal policy is constrained by rules to situations where countries 
have quite a bit of  space both because fiscal policy is relatively disciplined and 
other instruments have been used, like foreign exchange rate like the case of  
the Czech Republic and counter-cyclical macroprudential tools in Croatia. A 
recurrent theme of  these presentations is that with ongoing fiscal consolidation, 
it helps a lot when there are some structural reforms. One particular form 
of  structural reform that would be desirable in this circumstance, and was 
mentioned by Boris Vujčić, is corporate-sector restructuring; in particular, 
equity injections in the corporate sector so as to boost the collateral base that 
could then help restart the transmission mechanism through the banking sector. 
Bojan Ivanc (Chamber of Commerce of Slovenia): A comment on your 
view on sustainable future GDP growth of  the euro area. Potential growth 
is based on productivity, on working age and how long we spend working, as 
well as on the ratio of  working age population to the total population. The 
demographics are pretty negative for EU monetary union. Also, if  we examine 
productivity in the past and then try to project it forward, we have to admit 
that the job market currently is different from what it was years before. More 
jobs are in the service sector, where productivity cannot increase as fast as in 
the manufacturing sector. In terms of  productivity, this is bad news for future 
GDP growth. My point is that if  you see lower GDP growth going forward, 
that would mean that the fiscal space is limited already and that the country 
should tighten fiscal policy. Otherwise, in times of  a new crisis there would 
be no space left. 
Suzanne Bishopric (Global Sovereign Advisors): My question is about 
creating more fiscal space through cleaning out the closet effectively. Boris 
Vujčić talked about low asset valuations impeding the borrowing capabilities 
of  companies. What other techniques are there to free up that capacity? 
Policies such as assets sales, bankruptcy improvements to make the process 
more streamlined and write-offs might free up the liquidity. 
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Mojmir Mrak (Faculty of Economics and Center of Excellence in 
Finance, Ljubljana): I have one question for the panel. We are talking about 
limited fiscal space and we always somehow come to the issue of  a very high 
level of  public debt. What are the views of  the panellists regarding the ways 
to bring down debt to a sustainable level? Because the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio 
has proved not to be a sustainable level for some countries. I remember that 
Slovenia had a problem getting access at a debt level of  45% of  GDP. What 
are the alternative ways of  bringing down the debt ratio? Primary surplus? 
It takes very long. Privatisation? Yes, but it also has limited success. We are 
basically talking about a process of  10–15 years. What about inflation? Maybe 
these are questions for the people from governments, but it would be useful to 
have the views of  central bankers. 
Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins University): Three quick questions. First, 
reflecting on this panel and the second panel that we had yesterday afternoon, 
can we identify the fiscal space before the factors, or is it something we only 
recognise after it has passed? It seems there is a significant measurement 
problem. Second, can we mark a clear boundary between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy, particularly when monetary authorities are engaging in seemingly 
unending large-scale asset purchases?  I am just curious. Third, I was very 
struck by Vitas Vasiliauskas’ presentation on the failure of  reform. How do 
we explain that every single country is failing to engage in reform? Because 
political will ceases to be a minimum category when nobody has it. Is there 
something about the political reform process that needs to be revisited?
Mejra Festić (Bank of Slovenia): Related to the protracted period of  
economic recovery and all the pressures faced by the banking sector – on 
account of  low or negative interest rates, income risk, low interest margins, 
unstable structure of  liabilities, deposit outflows and other associated risks – for 
how long are these pressures sustainable for the banks from the point of  view 
of  banking sector consolidation and fiscal consolidation?
Lucio Pench (European Commission): I would like to go back to a point 
that was made in the introductory remarks. In the first phase of  the crisis, 
we had an unprecedented increase in public debt – reflecting expansionary 
fiscal policy worldwide – associated with large revenue losses and unchanged 
expenditure trends. Against this background of  very high public debt, not only 
has a rise in inflation not materialised, but we find ourselves in the opposite 
situation. In this context, let me draw attention to the fact, highlighted by my 
esteemed friend Francesco Papadia,29 that nominal interest rates are probably 
at their lowest level ever. I do agree with the point made by Ardo Hansson 
29 Chair of  the Selection Panel of  the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund.
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that we should be realistic about growth prospects; namely, the pre-crisis trend 
may not resume. Still, when we think about the difference between the interest 
rate and growth rate, which is what matters for public debt sustainability, 
we should acknowledge that something unusual is happening. Contrary to 
common assumptions, as reflected in the intervention by Boris Vujčič, the 
interest rate‒growth rate differential is not feeding the “snowball effect”, but is 
working the other way around. Current data and the forecasts for the next few 
years suggest that more and more countries will benefit from a snowball effect 
in reverse. In turn, this suggests the existence of  a situation of  excess saving 
or excess demand for safe assets. I believe that in our reflection on the role of  
fiscal policy, we should factor in this peculiar situation and the concomitant 
need for deleveraging, which was highlighted in several presentations.
Steve Phillips (IMF): I have two questions related to the Czech Republic’s 
use of  the exchange rate to achieve monetary policy objectives. The first 
question is whether this technique is generalisable to other economies. Is there 
something special about the Czech Republic that made the technique more 
likely to succeed and less likely to run into problems, compared with other 
economies that are larger or less open to trade? The second question picks up 
on the suggestion that this was a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. A beggar-thy-
neighbour policy would seek to divert demand by weakening the real exchange 
rate. But I understand that was not the intention. The Czech authorities were 
not trying to change the real exchange rate but rather to stimulate inflation, 
hoping that wages and prices would respond to the weaker nominal exchange 
rate, so that the initial competitive advantage would be eroded. I wonder to 
what extent that has happened.
Nikolay Gueorguiev (IMF): I have one question and one comment. The 
question is about the ECB and inflation. Not all inflation is the same – there 
is demand-driven inflation and cost-push inflation. This may become very 
relevant a few months from now when the effect of  energy prices on inflation 
may suddenly become positive as the base effect gets out of  the picture, or 
if  energy prices continue to go up as they have in the past few weeks. I am 
curious about what the panellists think is the right policy response in the euro 
area if  headline inflation goes to, say, 2.5% but core inflation remains at 1%, 
real wages do not particularly respond and demand continues to be depressed. 
The comment is on the fiscal dividend of  QE. Let me use the occasion to 
advertise work we did in the context of  the 2015 Article IV Consultation 
discussions on Slovenia. We tried to estimate what is the benefit to the public 
in terms of  interest savings for all euro area countries from QE relative to the 
(admittedly hard to estimate) counterfactual without QE. We found that it 
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is not negligible – in the neighbourhood of  0.25 to 0.75 percentage points a 
year, depending on the country’s level of  debt and how expensive it has been. 
Now the interesting question is what to do with this dividend, which most 
likely cannot go on forever. So, it is natural to say let us save it in full. There 
is a good argument that in an environment of  deficient demand as well as 
deficient supply of  infrastructure, some would be spent on infrastructure in 
the countries that need such investment most badly. 
Matija Lozej (Central Bank of Ireland): Since Ireland was mentioned several 
times, let me comment on that. The reason why fiscal space has disappeared 
in Ireland is because this was all done before the “whatever it takes” statement 
by Mario Draghi; so bond spreads went up. If  this had been done afterwards, 
it might be that things would work differently and the sovereign could go 
through by itself. My question is whether you think that such a statement, that 
brings the spread together or keeps them within a range, would be a sensible 
policy when, for instance, inflation is very low, and whether this should be 
institutionalised. 
Ardo Hansson: With regard to the issue that fiscal space is limited and that it 
might take another 10 or 15 years. During the second session yesterday, Lars 
Rohde presented data that showed that public debt relative to GDP in Denmark 
is gradually coming down. If  you look at Sweden and Canada and some other 
historical periods, you could find cases where the situation looked desperate but 
owing to various factors – good fiscal policy, good structural policy and some 
good luck – the debt-to-GDP ratio crept down a few percentage points per 
year. I do not know of  any country that has done anything terribly dramatic 
overnight and suddenly cut a lot of  debt or suddenly implemented one reform 
that kicked off great growth. I think it is a little bit of  all the different elements 
of  the debt accumulation equation. 
Second, identifying fiscal space in real time is a real challenge, and some of  the 
presentations this morning tried to make that point. In our case (Estonia), the 
apparent output gap was not that large in the middle of  the boom. However, 
now in retrospect, the European Commission says it was +10 or +12% of  GDP. 
Had we known that at that time, there would be a different policy response. 
In real time, there is a bias towards thinking you are pretty close to potential 
output and afterwards you learn that there was this cyclical component you 
did not even really think you had. It is probably necessary to look at a range of  
indicators and synthesise them. I made a similar point about looking at labour 
market indicators. We had a discussion with the IMF about Estonia’s level of  
fiscal space. Anybody can combine these different indicators in different ways. 
One says you are above capacity, the other says you are below, and in the end 
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the government has to make an informed judgement. In our case, when I see 
labour costs or wages growing at above 6.5% a year, to me that is a red flag 
that says you are probably going too far and that you do not have enough 
room to expand, regardless of  what others say. If  you conduct the thought 
experiment and ask if  I want to further stimulate the economy and get wages 
growing at 8% a year, probably not.
Vitas Vasiliausaks: I would like to touch upon a few aspects of  the various 
questions from the audience related to my presentation, namely, the negative 
factors that can influence sustainable GDP growth and how we can explain the 
lack of  fulfilment of  country-specific recommendations (CSR). Every year, our 
country gets a lot of  recommendations from various institutions, starting with 
the European Commission, the IMF during its Article IV missions, as well as 
others. We receive a lot of  valuable advice from them. Of  course, there is no 
common recipe for all countries, and we have to talk about country-by-country 
specifics and individual solutions. If  we are talking about the magical word or 
term “structural reforms”, we should keep in mind that their content depends 
on various individual cases. For example, in my country (Lithuania), for the 
last three years we got essentially the same recommendations in relation to 
reform of  the labour market, pensions and the tax system. I think it is more 
or less the same situation in the other countries relating to the more than 100 
unfulfilled or not fully implemented CSRs. I have a very simple view of  why 
this is the case. First, there is no political will to implement reforms. Second, 
we have a very short political cycle and politicians quite often are short-term 
oriented. Third, we still need to implement those corrective and compliance-
enhancing functions that have been agreed upon at the European level. When 
it comes to deciding on the appropriate action in the case of  non-fulfilment, 
colleagues at various councils think: “Maybe I will be next? Perhaps I should 
then be more flexible today?” I think these three things must be improved and 
then we can talk about a better situation in the future. 
 Jozef Makúch: I have two points. First, monetary policy cannot be a substitute 
for fiscal policy. This is not only because of  our mandate; the problem is 
broader than that. Second, monetary policy faces the heterogeneity of  fiscal 
policies across the euro area. Yesterday’s presentations were excellent, including 
the one by Agnès Bénassy Quéré. Among the questions for policymakers may 
be how to extend integration in fiscal institutions and how to make fiscal policy 
and monetary policy more consistent and coordinated at the euro area level.
Boris Vujčić: The way to address structural issues in the corporate sector is 
not only by providing more equity but also by cleaning up balance sheets. This 
is going on throughout Europe, including in my country (Croatia). There have 
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been assets sales in countries that have had the biggest problems, like Ireland 
and Spain. But those who bought these non-performing assets went elsewhere 
when the liquidity dried up and as the provisioning increased throughout 
the crisis. There were also more incentives for the banks to sell, plus you 
had changes in management in most of  the banks. New management in 
commercial banks are more willing to sell the old people’s babies, but they 
do not want to sell their own at 15 cents to the euro. This is the price. Then 
you have a problem: well capitalised banks can do it, poorly capitalised banks 
have a great problem admitting what shape they are in. If  you look around 
Europe, poorly capitalised banks are still holding on to extending, pretending 
and trying to shuffle through. This is the problem. Unlike the United States, 
we have not fixed the banking problem in Europe yet. Of  course, there is a 
huge difference in the bankruptcy procedures compared to those in the United 
States. In Europe, they are much less efficient than in the United States. This 
matter should be fixed through structural reforms, for which there is not that 
much political will. 
As for the sustainable level of  public debt, I do not know what it is. 
I agree with Ardo Hansson that fiscal space is more an art than a science. You 
have to look at everything, including whether I have space to manoeuvre in the 
short run which will basically enable a medium- to long-run debt sustainability 
goal. This kind of  thing changes over time from year to year, and it is very 
difficult to estimate what the potential rate of  growth of  output is and what are 
the implicit fiscal liabilities. The problem in Ireland was mentioned: Ireland 
had a huge implicit fiscal liability. It is very difficult to be honest ex ante about 
how things are and even to see through them. Sometimes people see and do 
not want to admit, sometimes they do not see. It is always the combination 
of  the two things. For example, the right way to examine the fiscal position 
is to look at the net fiscal position in terms of  the explicit and implicit fiscal 
liabilities. The European Commission accounts for the implicit fiscal liabilities, 
but the private market looks only at the headline public debt. For example, if  
you have a country which nationalised its private pension system and reduced 
the public debt, and Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s upgraded their ratings 
on this basis, it gives a completely wrong incentive to the policymakers to do 
exactly the wrong thing. We have a lot of  problems in the way that we look at 
the public accounts. At the moment, we have something that is not conducive 
to good fiscal policymaking and is providing the wrong incentives. 
I will skip the question on the difference between monetary policy and fiscal 
policy when central banks embark on large-scale asset purchases. 
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There was a question on the banking sector. I see a lot of  problems for the 
banking sector in Europe to reinvent their business model in the medium 
to long run. People from the banking sector can say more about that. The 
business model in CEEs is to get money cheap in the home market and lend 
expensively in the CEEs. This is a very simple model that worked fine for some 
time. However, what you see now is that the whole CEE region is becoming 
like the Czech Republic, where the loan-to-deposit ratios are going the other 
way around. Soon you have more deposits than loans, and the banking model 
does not work that much any longer. Regulatory costs have gone up, fees are 
difficult to increase at the moment and, with no interest margins, you cannot 
expect banks to charge significant negative interest rates to the retail sector. 
Interest rates go to zero and stay there. Maybe for corporate large holders of  
deposits you can, but for the rest it is very difficult. I am not giving investment 
advice, but for the banking sector is very difficult to see the business model in 
the medium term. 
On the snowball effect, I did not say that low interest rates do not help reduce 
the snowball effect. Of  course they do, by definition. I said that most increases 
in the public debt happened not because of  the primary balances but because 
of  the snowball effect. Of  course, it was the interest rate. This is probably the 
most that it does because it does not have much impact on the real economy, 
but it is reducing the snowball effect for the government. That cannot last 
forever. You cannot rely on extremely low interest rates forever to do the trick 
with the fiscal position. That is why we need structural reform. 
Hans-Helmut Kotz: The point that Erik Jones stressed – the difference 
between ex post reasoning and ex ante analysis – is of  the essence. Let me 
illustrate. Just try to recall why virtually all of  us had such confidence in 
economic perspectives in early 2007. Against this background, it is enlightening 
as well as somewhat amusing to listen to all those who, with precious ex post 
or hindsight knowledge, now tell us why all was flawed at that time. To be 
honest, critical voices were in a tiny minority at the time, and were treated as 
grumbling dissenters from benign conventional views. I recall when a good 
friend of  mine, Thomas Mayer, was derided as a doomsayer when he was 
expressing concerns about Spain, noting that one third of  European growth 
came from there, mainly out of  construction which had a share of  about 
14% of  GDP. Another instance is, of  course, Raghu Rajan’s speech given in 
2005 at the Jackson Hole conference. Rajan, then the IMF’s chief  economist, 
made the case that trouble might arise from the unchartered interactions of  
micro-hedging instruments (such as credit default swaps and collateralised debt 
obligations); they might add up to macro trouble. In the ensuing discussion, 
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Rajan was literally treated as a sort of  a backward-minded finance Luddite. 
I also recall the reaction to the publication of  a not-very-positive article on 
credit default swaps in the Bundesbank’s Monthly Report of  December 2004. 
To be brief, group thinking abounds in technocratic policymaking circles. 
To counter this prevailing fact and to enrich our decision basis, there is a 
need for critical thinking. Let me highlight two points from our discussion 
which I find remarkable. The Croatian Governor, Boris Vujčić, told us that 
he conducted monetary policy by using macroprudential instruments. Of  
course, long ago this would have been deemed as unconventional, that is, 
unacceptable. When the Bank of  Spain, building on empirical evidence, started 
using statistical provisioning – what is now called “dynamic provisioning” – 
to quasi-automatically slow down credit growth, it was assessed as not being 
in line with international accounting standards. Nobody even wanted to 
discuss it in 2004, 2005, and so on. Dampening credit growth was judged 
as pretence of  knowledge: how can you know that private credit is not in 
line with fundamentals? What can justify public intervention? This amounts 
to falling back on old-fashioned capital controls. Meanwhile, of  course, the 
general sentiment has changed very fundamentally indeed. There are good 
reasons for a reassessment of  those instruments. In Germany, for example, 
house prices in a few regions are rising at a clip which leaves room for doubt. 
The ECB’s monetary policy, conducted with an eye on the euro area average, 
obviously cannot address this. 
The second issue I would like to discuss has to do with the coordination of  
macro policy tools. Incomes policy, be it implicit or explicit, used to be part 
of  the macroeconomic toolbox in some Northern European economies. Take 
again Germany, where wages evolve more or less in line with productivity, 
and labour unions feel a responsibility for their firms. This impacts the real 
exchange rate, which of  course still exists in the monetary union. Coordinated 
wage settlement institutions thus provide macro stabilisation. To understand 
what is happening in the euro area, it is crucial to think about the interactions 
of  the variety of  industrial relations that we have. This is not important for the 
United States incidentally. The United States has not fared that outstandingly 
well after the global financial crisis. The ratio of  gross debt to GDP went up 
from about 60% to 107%. A number of  states actually took a larger hit in 
terms of  GDP per capita than Greece. Real median household income is 
somewhere close to that in the late 1980s, not to speak of  the lower income 
deciles, which are around what prevailed in the 1960s. The United States is 
challenged by quite similar issues of  productivity, potential growth and so on. 
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In short, we have to seriously think about the coordination of  fiscal policy and 
monetary policy in order to achieve macro stabilisation in a fiscally constrained 
environment. Both work through the same funnel, to quote James Tobin. 
The global financial crisis ushered in very high levels of  debt. They force us 
to reconsider how our economies work and adapt to that. Governor Boris 
Vujčić is right. Historically, according to Rogoff and Reinhart, 70% of  debt 
deleveraging came from inflation and not from growth.
Boris Vujčić: There is a question that we have not answered: why we cannot 
produce inflation now to help debt leverage.
Hans Helmut Kotz: Two points. First, only unexpected inflation would 
ultimately help, if  I may say so. Otherwise, both parties to the debt contract 
would account for it. Second, our lacklustre nominal (and real) growth of  
output has to do with both demand and supply. To quote Paul Samuelson, the 
Lord gave us two eyes to watch both. It is a general equilibrium question. If  you 
just look at the supply side, if  you just care about structural issues, you will end 
up where we are in Europe. Brad De Long, Larry Summers, Paul Krugman 
and others have launched an important debate in the United States. They insist 
that, given the environment we are in, we should invest more in infrastructure, 
broadly understood. What I see in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where I live 
about five months a year, is that public sector infrastructure evidently has quite 
some room for improvement. Unfortunately, though not to the same degree, 
similar issues exist in Germany. We have had to shut down bridges that have 
not been appropriately maintained. This has been called “saving”. Actually, 
it is undermining Germany’s future capacity to produce. There are other 
options. It is not only the supply side. 
Gent Sejko: There are many issues. Regarding growth, from the view point 
of  a transition country like Albania, which has still to complete the transition 
process, we have faced the same phenomenon as the other countries in the 
region and even wider in the euro area. We had a drop in economic growth, 
and now our challenge is how to achieve sustainable growth and go back to 
the levels we had before 2008. This requires revising the economic model 
and undertaking certain structural reforms, some of  which are ongoing. But, 
these reforms have to be carefully considered and smartly undertaken by 
the government and all the actors. This is not possible with monetary policy 
alone. The central bank has to play its role, but without a clear strategy and 
good structural reforms undertaken by the government, we cannot achieve 
the desirable growth. 
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With regard to the questions on banking sector deleveraging and the risk 
premium, we cannot support growth without good support from lending. We 
look for foreign direct investment, but at this point financial support is also 
very crucial. After 2008, banks faced difficulties in countries like ours. Most 
of  them have their headquarters in EU countries so they are under the ECB’s 
regulatory framework, and most of  them are deleveraging. These policies are 
reflected in a less aggressive lending policy, at least less so than before. As the 
central bank, we are very carefully watching the equilibrium between monetary 
policy and financial stability. On one side, we apply certain models to achieve 
our price stability, which is our main focus; but on the other side, this is achieved 
only in a good economic climate, which has to be significantly impacted by 
lending as well. However, we cannot push banks too much because there is a 
high NPL portfolio. So we need to care about the balance between financial 
stability and monetary policy. There is only one way, in terms of  financial 
stability and in terms of  banking. If  banks do not have a good performance 
in lending, they have to be more prudent. However, there is potential. The 
story links economic growth and the financial stability role, but also the need 
to identify where the best potential of  the country is. Once it was construction 
and that still could remain, but there are also some other industries which 
have advantages and can be attractive, like tourism, agriculture or, in some 
countries, mining. These are all linked together.
Lubomír Lízal: A lot has been said about the questions, and I will be more 
provocative. I would say that there is no fiscal space. And we know it ex ante. 
The idea of  looking just at government debt is fine in the short term, but in 
the long term – looking at the prospects, the implicit debts, accounting for an 
ageing population, for the fact that you have promises for the pension system, 
for health care getting more expensive as longevity constantly increases – it is 
giving you the same answer I gave you, namely, there is no space on the fiscal 
side. It is really very difficult to admit that. From the long-term perspective, it 
goes beyond any political cycle. In this regard, I am quite sceptical. I think what 
we are going to see is just some sort of  muddling through. Whenever there is 
a problem, we fail to get to the heart of  it. This is what has been mentioned 
regarding infrastructure investment. Over past decades, governments have 
been inclined to cut investment rather than current expenditure. There has 
even been an incentive to increase the implicit burden. If  there is a problem 
with unemployment, what are we going to do? We will give an incentive to 
retire early. But this is just another form of  borrowing from the future. The 
root of  the problem is that at the beginning of  the past century, we invented 
how to borrow from the future, and we are now using it all the time. So, this 
is probably putting a limit on future development in the general sense. 
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One more point related to debt. Of  course, when governments were facing 
the financial crisis, it was easy to say “no more taxpayers’ money”. It is really 
popular to say that, but it is also to some extent limiting our ability to invest, 
in the sense that the state – as the major investor in infrastructure and other 
parts of  the economy – is cutting investment expenditure because there are 
other pressures, especially as regards fulfilling expenditures that have a short-
term horizon with respect to the political cycle. The only remaining party that 
can pick up the investment financing needs is private investors in the financial 
sector. However, at the same time we are giving them the wrong incentives, 
saying that you need more capital deleverage and that you should match the 
maturities of  your liabilities and assets. This is destroying the last tool that 
was there for investing in long-term growth and long-term prospects. Given 
all that, I would be a little bit sceptical.
I agree with the point on the Czech Republic’s use of  exchange rate policy. 
What lay behind it was a need to change expectations – to move inflation 
expectations and, hence, real interest rates. But that is always difficult to 
explain to the general public. I even had difficulty explaining it to economists. 
I am rather sceptical about the usefulness of  generalising the model to other 
countries. The situation was specific. It was a self-inflicted contraction of  the 
Czech economy, and we had excess liquidity. I would agree that this requires 
specific conditions. 
Dubravko Mihaljek: Would anyone like to address the question on good 
and bad inflation?
Ardo Hansson: It is a good point, but one does not approach this 
mechanistically. We have a very detailed model, a multi-year model where 
we synthesise all the monetary and the real effects and look at the medium 
term. The deflationary effect of  falling commodity prices is weakened at some 
point in time as the base effect is eliminated. Much of  that is already built 
into the model. We look through these short-term fluctuations. One does not 
attach a lot of  importance as long as we see that the medium-term anchor and 
our measure of  inflationary expectations are all right. Patience works in both 
directions: when we see there is a period which was hit by negative shocks, 
we filter some of  them out. But, now we have seen oil prices go up a lot and 
we do not quickly react in the other direction. It requires looking at the future 
horizon through these models and evaluating them.
Dubravko Mihaljek: Mr. Kotz, a last word on the Irish experience.
Hans-Helmut Kotz: That is a very important question. Why? Monetary policy 
has been supra-nationalised in the ECB. This is tantamount to having a stateless 
money. From this perspective, EMU member states are sub-sovereigns. They 
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cannot rely on their central bank providing liquidity when in trouble. EMU’s 
institutions were conceived without anything like a backstop facility. Crises on 
the scale we experienced were not foreseen. Therefore, a backstop facility was 
not a part of  the plan. It was also rejected since such an insurance mechanism 
might create the wrong incentives. Therefore, the European Stability Facility 
was only introduced against strong resistance in 2010, as were the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism and President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” 
policy. There is a good case to be made that those contingent liabilities which 
flew in the face of  the Irish might have been dealt with in a significantly 
less costly way, as the question asked by Matija Lozej surmised, had such a 
backstop facility been around as well as ways of  restructuring and unwinding 
banks. A monetary union without a facility addressing the roll-over risk for 
liquidity (not solvency) issues of  member states is one which is very vulnerable. 
Maybe, Mr. Chairman, you are on the right way – letting me end with this 
more positive note.
Dubravko Mihaljek:  After 2½ hours, it is hard to summarise in one 
sentence. One of  the messages of  this panel is that we need to look out of  the 
conventional toolbox. Several ideas were mentioned: macroprudential tools, 
wage policy and the coordination of  fiscal policy and monetary policy, the 
overall umbrella topic of  this conference. The idea that there may have been 
too much emphasis on trying to look for policies that boost supply is fine, but 
it is more long term. We also need to look at demand management ideas. 
Closing remarks
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Coordination between monetary and fiscal policy is at the heart of  the current 
debate in Europe.  As evidenced in several presentations at this seminar, the 
issue involves not only problems of  macroeconomic management, but also 
deeper problems of  the process of  integration in the European Union.  Indeed, 
while at least in the euro area, monetary policy has been transferred to a 
common institution – namely, the ECB – fiscal policy remains in the hands of  
individual countries and, more importantly, the common rules are increasingly 
seen as an obstacle to needed policies to stimulate the timid recovery of  output 
and employment in the EU.  The problem is that, differently from monetary 
policy, a sizable fiscal stimulus requires public expenditure that has to be 
financed by those countries that have government resources, either through 
taxation or through their commitment to service the debt generated to finance 
public expenditure.  A large fiscal stimulus at the EU level would necessarily 
involve a redistribution of  resources and/or a redistribution of  liabilities on 
debt issued to finance the stimulus. For this reason, the issue of  coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy is deeply rooted in the broader issue of  
further integration in the EU.
There was broad consensus in the seminar on the need for a more effective 
countercyclical fiscal policy in the EU and on the need for “positive” measures 
such as EU-wide public investment projects or common social expenditure 
in the form of, for instance, common unemployment benefits. Policies based 
simply on constraints coming from common rules risk further reducing support 
for the EU project.
Returning to the main theme of  the seminar, the key question addressed was 
what roles fiscal and monetary policy can play in getting the economies of  the 
EU and the euro area out of  a “stagnation trap”. In this regard, views were 
divided. Some believed that the problem of  anaemic growth in Europe was 
due to structural issues that cannot be tackled by monetary/fiscal policies. 
Others emphasised the fact that monetary policy had practically exhausted 
its tools to stimulate the economy, and thus fiscal policy should take the lead. 
The heterogeneity between fiscal positions, especially debt-to-GDP ratios, 
of  the “periphery” and the “core” of  the euro area is a major obstacle to an 
effective common fiscal policy. Nevertheless, one manifestation of  the problems 
associated with the lack of  coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in 
142    Rethinking Monetary–Fiscal Policy Coordination 
the euro area has been the fact that ECB policy has been driven by the objective 
of  avoiding a debt crisis through policies that ended up with commercial banks 
purchasing government debt with funds injected by the ECB.
Beyond the contrast between lack of  demand and supply bottlenecks: 
Financial crisis
The continuing debate on whether growth is blocked by lack of  demand or by 
supply-side bottlenecks neglects the fact that the Great Recession was mainly 
driven by a financial crisis. Financial crises involve both supply-side channels 
and demand-side channels. To draw a “mechanical” analogy, a financial crisis 
can be represented as a car engine breaking down. Thinking about pure 
demand as the fuel needed for a car to run, it is clear that without repairing the 
engine, the car cannot run. This does not mean that the fuel is not needed for 
the car to run. Repairing the engine in the current context of  Europe means 
fixing the financial sector, which in many countries is still in a weak condition 
eight years since the start of  the crisis. Especially in the periphery of  the 
euro area, the financial sector is still dysfunctional, with credit allocation very 
inefficient. As a result, the real economy suffers from lack of  credit. There is 
ample evidence that banks purchase government bonds rather than lending, 
and that the lending that is carried out seems to be still directed to financing 
inefficient firms in order for them to repay the old debt with the banks (“zombie 
lending”). In summary, the recovery in several EU countries is undermined 
by the dysfunctional role of  the financial sector.  
At the time of  the creation of  the euro, one major criticism, especially from 
the United States, of  the construction of  the European Monetary Union was 
the lack of  fiscal backing to the newly created ECB. In the current debate, one 
the main drawbacks of  the euro has been identified as the lack of  “monetary” 
backing for fiscal policy. In other words, countries in the euro area face a 
problem in their sovereign debt because of  the absence of  a national central 
bank that could eventually monetise such debt.
Fiscal backing of  ECB policy and monetary backing of  fiscal policies
These positions seem not well founded and in some ways rather dangerous. 
Indeed, they downplay the role of  the euro as an asset for countries otherwise 
subject to serious risks of  runs on their currencies. If  Italy, Portugal or Greece 
were to abandon the euro in favour of  reintroducing their national currency, 
they would hardly benefit from the possibility of  printing money to “monetise” 
their debt. In the context of  open economies and free mobility of  capital, the 
result would be a flight out of  their national currencies with consequent deep 
crises, rather than a reduction of  the burden of  government debt.  
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In summary, despite clear difficulties, a more efficient coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area and in the EU calls for deeper 
integration in Europe. Such a road does not appear popular these days. 
However, a “closer EU” is not a romantic and unrealistic dream, but perhaps 
the only way to ensure against disintegration of  Europe.
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